VZCZCXRO0302 PP RUEHLMC DE RUEHLP #0417/01 0472310 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 162310Z FEB 06 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8110 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 5607 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2872 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6744 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 3968 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1316 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 1215 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 3568 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 3953 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 8470 RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LA PAZ 000417 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA A/S T.SHANNON AND PDAS C.SHAPIRO STATE FOR WHA/AND P.FRENCH AND L.PETRONI NSC FOR D.FISK USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON SNAR PINR PHUM EAID BL SUBJECT: MINISTER OF PRESIDENCY ON COCA, ERADICATION, AND BILATERAL RELATIONS REF: LA PAZ 0406 Classified By: Ambassador David Greenlee for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Minister of the Presidency Juan Ramos de la Quintana told the Ambassador February 15 that the GOB wanted USG agencies to continue their programs in the Chapare, though implementation methods may need to be modified. He acknowledged that the GOB's counternarcotics policies were still being formulated, but assured that the GOB's commitment to combat the illicit drug trade would be met and that the cocalero federations did not speak on the GOB's behalf. Quintana said the depenalization and industrialization of coca was a priority for President Evo Morales. The Minister said cocaleros would be paid to eradicate coca in the national parks while other negotiated alternatives would be pursued with the cocalero federations. On interdiction, Quintana asked for greater information sharing from the DEA on organized criminal networks. When the Ambassador raised objections about anti-U.S. rhetoric creeping into GOB statements, the Minister blamed the Bolivian press for distorting reality. Quintana was forthright, somewhat confused, and suspicious of USG programs. The new GOB may or may not be disposed ideologically to work with us; but it certainly does not yet have the internal cohesion or coherence to cooperate effectively. End Summary. --------------------------------------------- --------- FIRST MEETING WITH MINISTER OF THE PRESIDENCY QUINTANA --------------------------------------------- --------- ¶2. (C) At our request, the Ambassador, DCM, and Econ/Pol Chief met the evening of February 15 with Minister of the Presidency Juan Ramos de la Quintana to seek clarification of GOB policy regarding USG programs in the Chapare. Newspaper headlines that morning carried the cocalero federations' decision to throw out USG agencies operating in the region, a position supported by GOB spokesman Alex Contreras (see reftel). The Ambassador told Quintana that the federations' statements--Evo Morales remains their titular head--and the apparent presidential endorsement had sparked considerable confusion about the GOB's intent. The Ambassador suggested that if eradication is to be stopped and USG involvement in the Chapare ended, the new policy should be communicated officially and we could begin shutting off our multi-million dollar assistance programs now. ¶3. (C) Quintana responded that he appreciated open, frank exchanges free of entangling rhetoric and underscored the GOB's continuing need for U.S. help on the counternarcotics front. But, he added, that message is not being clearly communicated because "...we do not yet have an agreement between the GOB and all the relevant actors on this issue." At the same time, he said the cocalero federations did not speak on behalf of the GOB, which has a stronger commitment than previous administrations and wants to "...break the stigma that Bolivia protects narcotraffickers." ¶4. (C) In that vein, Quintana claimed the GOB had a sound strategy to combat the illegal drug trade: compartmentalizing the problem into "clear chapters" for greater enforcement efficiency on the one hand, and depenalizing coca for industrialization and commercialization on the other. "Depenalization is a complex but necessary task because we want coca to have commercial and industrial purposes. This is an explicit priority for the President," he said, adding that the GOB would meet next week with EU representatives to discuss the terms of the demand study required for domestic purposes. (Note: While not stated, the implication was that the EU study should include consideration of Bolivian domestic demand to include coca necessary for these yet-only-imagined industrial purposes. End Note). --------------------------------------------- - LA PAZ 00000417 002 OF 003 A NEW APPROACH TO ERADICATION AND INTERDICTION --------------------------------------------- - ¶5. (C) Quintana said the GOB would preserve the best of previous GOB policies, including eradication, but implement them differently. The first priority, he offered, is to limit additional cultivation, although he added curiously that the GOB would not strictly interpret the 3200 hectare limit for Chapare cultivation set aside by the October 2004 agreement. He assured that eradication would continue in the two problem areas of the Carrasco National Park and the Yungas de Vandiola, saying that he would travel to the region himself this weekend to meet with cocaleros, but noted that existing military eradicators would work only in the areas where they can proceed peacefully, with negotiation--an open-ended concept--the rule in more conflictive zones. ¶6. (C) Quintana saw no change in the GOB's willingness to cooperate with the USG on interdiction and noted that the DEA was welcome to stay in the Chapare. The GOB's non-political approach to interdiction was exemplified, he said, by the non-partisan appointment of a new chief for the counternarcotics police. The Minister asserted that these units had committed human rights violations in the past, a situation this GOB would not tolerate. The Ambassador retorted that any such incidents did not involve DEA agents and that we shared Quintana's concern about human rights. Quintana went on to say that he was not critical of the results obtained by interdiction efforts, but of the methods used to obtain them. "In the past, because of the weakness of Bolivian institutions, USG involvement appeared more like intervention than cooperation. We ask that your cooperation be transparent, conducted with consideration and respect." While expressing a desire to be autonomous in their interdiction operations, he acknowledged the need for the USG's offer of helicopters and other equipment "in the spirit of shared responsibility," and said the GOB had no plans to alter the DEA's role in the drug enforcement arena. ¶7. (C) When the Ambassador asked what immediate changes in the interdiction efforts were contemplated, Quintana observed that the GOB had little understanding of how criminal organizations operated in Bolivia. "All we get," he complained, "are statistics on drugs intercepted and labs destroyed, but nothing on Bolivian criminal organizations and their links to other countries. This makes us suspicious that the counter-narcotics efforts are not sufficiently explained to the GOB or the Bolivian people." He also lamented that the Bolivian anti-drug unit (FELCN) did not have an institute to study criminal organizations. The Ambassador replied that maintaining the integrity of international criminal investigations was crucial but that he would raise the issue with the DEA. ------------------- INTELLIGENCE ISSUES ------------------- ¶8. (C) The Minister noted that the GOB wanted its intelligence services to respond better to the needs of the GOB and was suspicious of their relationship with the DEA. (Note: Quintana associated intelligence cooperation only with the DEA and the counternarcotics effort. End Note.) The Minister said that he wanted "a more democratic intelligence service" in the future. The Ambassador noted USG interest in promoting intelligence cooperation on counter-terrorism issues as well, given regional threats in the Tri-Border region and elsewhere, and suggested a subsequent meeting to discuss these issues in greater depth. ----------------------------------------- MUTUAL DESIRE FOR CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT ----------------------------------------- LA PAZ 00000417 003 OF 003 ¶9. (C) The Ambassador expressed concern about anti-U.S. rhetoric creeping into GOB statements and policies and warned that gratuitous insults did not encourage strong bilateral ties. Talking about imaginary U.S. military bases in Paraguay "as you have done publicly, Mr. Minister," does little to build confidence. Noting the billions of U.S. dollars of assistance in the past few decades, including the nearly one million in disaster assistance for Bolivian flood victims, the Ambassador observed that the USG would sometimes appreciate a good word or thank you, something President Morales notably forgot to offer in his conversation with President Bush. ¶10. (C) While acknowledging that the GOB probably had no intention of ratifying an Article 98 agreement, the Ambassador asked that the GOB respect the U.S. position without intentionally mischaracterizing it and claiming that the U.S. sought to shield its soldiers from justice. The issue is one of jurisdiction, not immunity, he said, and noted that over 100 countries had signed Article 98 agreements with the U.S. --------------------------------------------- ------ ATTACKING THE PRESS AND RE-ORIENTING USG ASSISTANCE --------------------------------------------- ------ ¶11. (C) Quintana, perhaps a little disingenuously, said he shared the Ambassador's concerns about poisonous rhetoric, but blamed the press for distorting the GOB's comments about the U.S. He described the Bolivian press as unprofessional and perverse because it was too closely associated with political parties. At the same time, Quintana said the U.S. was counterproductively omnipresent in Bolivian institutions--an ironic exageration in view of reportedly increasing Venezuelan and Cuban presence--and suggested that our assistance was too dispersed to be strategically effective. He lamented the uneven economic development throughout the country, noting that Potosi remained in abject poverty while Santa Cruz was developing fast "with its radical federalist ideas," and suggested a U.S. Corps of Engineers road project uniting the country would be a smart, focussed investment. The Ambassador reminded Quintana that the GOB nixed expanded military help by attacking us on Article 98. ¶12. (C) Comment: Quintana seemed forthright, a little confused, and abidingly suspicious of USG intentions. He exposed inaccurate views about existing USG programs, a strong ideological bent on coca, and a disturbing disaffection with the media--particularly disturbing since the MAS is considering laws to limit freedom of press. His most revealing comment was that the GOB is still struggling to clarify its policies, including on counternarcotics. Whether the new GOB wants to work with us is an open question; whether it can work with us is equally perplexing. End Comment. GREENLEE
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