BOLIVIA: COUNTER-NARCOTICS NEWS AND TRENDS

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09LAPAZ1784	2009-12-17 21:09	2010-12-03 21:09	UNCLASSIFIED	Embassy La Paz

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UNCLAS LA PAZ 001784  SIPDIS  STATE PASS TO CNC LINEAR WASHINGTON DC  JIATF SOUTH FOR USCINCSO MIAMI FL//SCJ2/SCJ3/SCJ5/SCFA  DEPT FOR INL, WHA/PPC, WHA/AND  USAID FOR LAC/SA  JUSTICE FOR OIA, AFMLA AND NDDS  CUSTOMS FOR LA OPS, INTELLIGENCE  DEA FOR OEL   E.O. 12958: N/A  TAGS: SNAR BL KJUS PHUM SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: COUNTER-NARCOTICS NEWS AND TRENDS   REF: LA PAZ 1589   ¶1. 1. Summary and comment: Bolivian Counternarcotics (CN)  officials have voiced public concern over a number of negative  trends, including a sharp rise in the number of cocaine  laboratories seized, the GOB's inability to track the rising number  of small aircraft used to transport drugs to neighboring countries,  the increasing presence of foreign drug cartels, and increased coca  cultivation. Despite positive interdiction and eradication  statistics (septel), local contacts believe these trends will  worsen without immediate GOB attention. GOB officials recognize  the problems, and the overwhelming victory of the ruling Movement  Toward Socialism (MAS) party (reftel) will give President Morales  additional power to shape CN policy. Still, he will face  challenges in stepping up eradication and interdiction efforts,  risking the anger of coca farmers, the core of his political base.  This is the first in a series of NAS reports on counternarcotics  trends and policy in Bolivia. End summary and comment.   Proliferation Of Cocaine Laboratories   ¶2. 2. The Department of Cochabamba has become a center for the  production of cocaine base, according to statements made by FELCN  commanders to Bolivian press. FELCN Cochabamba Director Colonel  Elvin Baptista told reporters November 30 that FELCN destroyed 600  cocaine factories in Cochabamba during 2009. Baptista explained  that most were found in rural areas, close to rivers or other  sources of water, and used Colombian methods, which consist of  grinding up coca using electric motors, and then mixing it with  precursor chemicals in rigid plastic containers.   ¶3. 3. FELCN director Colonel Oscar Nina said on November 12  that the Department of Santa Cruz has become a major center for  crystallization (purification) of cocaine that is processed in  other regions of Bolivia. He explained that FELCN had discovered  16 cocaine crystallization labs during recent operations, one of  which had the capacity to produce 100 kilos per day of high purity  cocaine. The cocaine is produced in Santa Cruz, and the drug is  then exported to Europe and the United States through ports in  Chile and Brazil, according to Nina. (Note: DEA estimates less than  one percent of cocaine seized in the U.S. can be chemically traced  back to Bolivia. End Note).   ¶4. 4. FELCN reported that it destroyed an average of two labs  per day in the Department of La Paz in 2009. El Alto, the  sprawling city of mostly poor immigrants that sits on the high  plain above the city of La Paz, has become a major center of lab  activity. FELCN La Paz commander Colonel Fernando Amurrio reported  that FELCN destroyed 133 factories in El Alto during the first 10  months of the year. Many of these labs are small Colombian-style  labs hidden inside houses, making them difficult to detect. La Paz   is considered a transit point where coca is converted into cocaine  base paste and cocaine and then shipped to Santa Cruz or other  areas of Bolivia to be exported. During a series of coordinated  operations in the Department of La Paz November 20-26, FELCN seized  93 kilos of cocaine and five tons of marijuana, detained 17 people,  and seized five vehicles.   ¶5. 5. FELCN destroyed two large-scale cocaine factories on  November 25 in the Sicaya municipality in the Department of  Cochabamba. FELCN estimated that during their three months of  operation the factories had produced 180 kilos of cocaine base  paste, and estimated that they could have produced one ton per year  if they had remained in operation. The seizures brought the total  number of seized factories in the region to 12 during the month.  Cochabamba and MAS deputy Edmundo Novillo noted that increasing  middle class involvement in coca production and ancillary  activities, in Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, will require greater GOB  response.   ¶6.   Growing Community Involvement in Production and Trafficking   ¶7. 6. The current rise in the net amount of coca grown and  cocaine produced in Bolivia has deepened rural community  involvement in the drug trade, according to numerous NAS contacts  in FELCN and the GOB's Directorate of Coca Production (DIGPRO  COCA). Contacts report that drug traffickers pay between $8,000 to  $10,000 to small rural communities, to buy their cooperation in  establishing cocaine factories, and then share profits with the  community to retain acceptance and trust.   ¶8. 7. In a November 26 operation in the indigenous community  of Machak Marca de Pocona (in Cochabamba Department), FELCN  destroyed 32 Colombian-style labs but was able to make only one  arrest because the entire community fled when tipped off about the  raid. (Note: Locals in such remote areas can often easily spot  official vehicles from miles away, due to the lack of vegetation  and building development. End note.) The local FELCN commander  expressed his amazement to Bolivian reporters at the degree of  involvement of the entire community in the production activities.   CN Police Concerned About Trafficking Via Small Aircraft   ¶9. 8. FELCN Director Colonel Oscar Nina told reporters  November 1 that Bolivia CN forces lack the capacity to detect the  high and rising number of small aircraft that transport drugs to  neighboring countries. Nina explained that FELCN lacks radar or  other technological equipment to confront the problem. Vice  Minister of Social Defense Felipe Caceres told reporters November 9  that the GOB's "weakness" in its war against drugs was on the  country's borders. Caceres noted that President Morales had  instructed the Defense Minister to work on acquiring additional   planes, helicopters and radars to close this gap. (Many of our  Bolivian CN contacts in the Department of Santa Cruz have told us  frequently that Bolivia's lack of control over its airspace results  in near free rein for air trafficking. Sources tell us that 175  suspicious flights were tracked by Brazilian government mobile  radar on the border between Bolivia and Brazil in a two-month  period last fall.)   Involvement of Foreign Drug Cartels   ¶10. 9. Bolivian press reported extensively on FELCN Commander  General Oscar Nina's October 28 statement that Mexican drug cartels  are investing in cocaine manufacturing in Bolivia to secure  sufficient supply to satisfy market demand. Nina stated that  Mexicans employ Colombian drug mafias, which in turn hire local  drug gangs. He also stated that Colombians have taken the place of  Peruvians, who until recently dominated the Bolivian cocaine  market.   ¶11.   ¶12. 10. The District Prosecutor's Office in Santa Cruz recently  expressed concern about the presence of foreign assassins who are  hired by drug traffickers to commit murders in Bolivia.  Anti-corruption Special Prosecutor Alex Oswaldo Cespedes told  reporters November 16 that seven people had been killed in Santa  Cruz over the preceding 59 days, and that he believed foreign  assassins ("sicarios") bore responsibility. Cespedes said that a  major increase in drug trafficking activities in the city had made  conditions ripe for the creation of drug trafficking organizations.  The commander of Bolivia's Special Anti-Crime Police Force, Colonel  Miguel Gonzalez, said it is too early to conclude that foreign  assassins were involved.   Increase in Coca Cultivation   ¶13. 11. The GOB announced December 9 that coca cultivation had  increased 6% in 2009 compared to the prior year, or by roughly  1,830 hectares. Vice Minister of Social Defense Felipe Caceres  told NAS Director that the two main national parks have more than  2,000 hectares of illegal coca - 1,081 hectares in Isiboro-Secure  and 972 hectares in Carrasco. He said the GOB knows it will have  to resort to forced eradication in 2010, noting that many cocaleros  do not respect the limits on cultivation set by the GOB. 

Coca Union Says Much Coca Circumvents Legal Markets  ¶14. 12. The Yungas Coca Producers' Association (ADEPCOCA), the  union formed by 30,000 coca growers from twelve provinces of Los  Yungas, released a report on November 10 that stated that of the  16,127 metric tons of coca leaf grown annually in the Yungas, only   4,887 metric tons (30 percent) arrives at the legal coca market in  Villa Fatima in La Paz. The destination of the remaining 11,240  metric tons is unknown, according to the report. The ADEPCOCA  report also stated that of the 54,000 metric tons of coca grown  nationwide each year, only 21,778 metric tons (40 percent) reaches  the two legally sanctioned markets -- Villa Fatima in La Paz and  Sacaba in Cochabamba.  Lobbying For A New Legal Coca Marketplace   ¶15. 13. Coca growers of the Munecas Province in the Department of  La Paz presented to Congress a draft bill to create a new legal  coca market in the city of El Alto, next to La Paz, and branches in  La Paz and Cochabamba. Currently, there are two legal markets -  Villa Fatima in Los Yungas and Sacaba in Cochabamba.   Bolivians Polled On Views Of Coca Situation   ¶16. 14. Equipos Mori conducted a November poll in Bolivia's nine  departments that found:  * 60% of Bolivians believe that coca cultivation has  increased since Evo Morales became President;  * 75% believe coca eradication should continue;  * 61% believe that there should be additional government  control over coca production; and  * 55% believe the state should control production and  commercialization of coca.   ¶17. 15. Comment: It may not be surprising that many Bolivians are  concerned about coca expansion and support eradication. Those  directly involved in coca production are a relatively small, but  influential, percentage of the overall Bolivian population. There  are approximately 44,000 families in the Chapare (an average of  five people per family) that are directly involved in growing coca,  and 26,000 families in the Yungas (an average of four people per  family). The total Bolivian population is approximately 9 million.   ¶18.  Creamer

EU WEIGHS ITS COUNTER-NARCOTICS EFFORTS IN BOLIVIA

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09LAPAZ1541	2009-11-10 15:03	2010-12-03 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz

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C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 001541   SIPDIS   E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2019  TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR EU BO SUBJECT: EU WEIGHS ITS COUNTER-NARCOTICS EFFORTS IN BOLIVIA   REF: LA PAZ 1494   Classified By: Charge John Creamer, reasons 1.4 b and d.   ¶1. (C) Summary: Our exchanges with European Union  representatives and an EU working group paper underscore  growing European recognition of the need for intensified  cooperation on counter-narcotics in Bolivia. The Europeans  note increases in coca production, fear the introduction of  third country criminal organizations, and recognize the loss  in GOB capabilities with the expulsion of DEA last year.  Among proposals under consideration by the EU are increases  in technical assistance and alternative development,  development of EU member state law enforcement cooperation,  better internal coordination, and strengthening CN  cooperation with neighboring countries. EU officials are  also keen to reopen the UNODC office in La Paz, and seek U.S.  assistance in pressing the UN to do so quickly. Although EU  counter-narcotics efforts have so far been relatively modest  and focused on alternative development, EU officials  generally share our assessments and are considering stepping  up their engagement, including on law enforcement (by  individual member states) and by pushing GOB reductions in  coca cultivation. End summary.   ¶2. (C) An internal policy paper prepared by the  recently-formed EU Drugs Working Group (made up of  representatives from local EU missions) highlights European  concerns about the worsening counter-narcotics situation in  Bolivia and the Europeans' interest in doing more. The EU  paper notes the growth of cocaine use in Europe -- the  ultimate destination for most Bolivian cocaine -- and the  troubling increase in coca production in Bolivia and other  Andean countries (the EU estimates 32-34,000 hectares under  production in Bolivia, slightly higher than the UNODC's  figure of 30,500). GOB efforts to control the legal coca  market are seriously flawed, the EU notes, while Bolivian  government interdiction remains hampered by the loss of DEA's  logistical and intelligence support (following DEA's  expulsion in November 2008). A major European concern --  also voiced by EU Ambassador Bell and others to the Charge --  is that Colombian and Mexican cartels will enter the Bolivian  market, expanding production and increasing  trafficking-related violence.   ¶3. (C) Amid sustained domestic pressure for increases in  legal production, the EU has provided one million euros to  fund a GOB survey of legal coca demand and other related  studies (the "Comprehensive Study on the Coca Leaf in  Bolivia"). Ambassador Bell explained that the full results  of the legal demand survey will not be available before July  2010, although the GOB may attempt to revise its legislation  governing legal production (including an increase from the  current 12,000 hectares authorized) before then. Bell  suggested that any estimate of 20,000 hectares or less should  prove useful in pressing the GOB to cut coca cultivation.  Separately, UK Ambassador Baker voiced disappointment that  the study will not be ready until next summer, but stressed  that the international community should not wait until then  to press the Bolivians on this issue.   ¶4. (C) EU officials acknowledge that their counter-narcotics  assistance is small scale compared to the aid the U.S. has  provided. According to their policy paper, most assistance  has gone toward alternative development (the European  Commission has provided nearly 50 million euros, Belgium and  Spain several million euros each), with lesser amounts in  equipment donations (the U.K. gave the GOB $500,000 in  forensics equipment this year; Germany and Italy have also  provided small amounts of in-kind aid). The UK, Spain,  Italy, the Netherlands and France have provided limited CN  training to Bolivian police in recent years. Ambassador Bell  maintains that the EU cannot be involved directly in  eradication, but allowed that some eradication-related aid  may be possible (e.g., covering ancillary costs).   ¶5. (C) More critically, Ambassador Bell noted, the EU lacks  the capability to fill the law enforcement vacuum left by  DEA's expulsion, but EU members states can and should be  pressed to strengthen such cooperation, he said. The UK,  Spanish and visiting Swedish ambassadors have all  acknowledged privately that the EU's limited CN approach has  proven insufficient and needs to be expanded to include  direct support for law enforcement. Ambassador Baker  reported that the UK is currently undergoing an internal  review of its regional CN policy, to be completed by early  December, that will include consideration of new efforts in  this area. Additionally, the Europeans indicate that they  intend to step up consultation with neighboring states such  as Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina, which are strengthening  their own cross-border counter-narcotics cooperation with the  GOB.   ¶6. (C) The EU's paper proposes a number of CN measures for  the near term, including increased funding for technical  assistance (e.g., on money laundering and judicial support),  expansion of alternative development aid, and creation of  mechanisms to aid the GOB in evaluating both its CN successes  and shortcomings. The EU working group also identified as a  priority better CN coordination, both internally and with  other international partners. Ambassador Baker amplified  that point, maintaining that a coordinated, united stance  will be critical to overcoming Bolivian President Morales's  apparent resistance to reversing the growth in coca  cultivation. The Europeans also see the re-opening of the  UNODC office in La Paz (closed for budgetary reasons) as key  to strengthened coordination. Ambassador Bell reported that  the EU has contributed 500,000 euros for UNODC projects and  office funding and asked for U.S. help in pushing the UN to  open the office as soon as possible. (Note: We understand  from the UN that donor support will determine whether the  UNODC can return.)   ¶7. (C) Comment: We see a welcome evolution in the EU's  approach toward counter-narcotics in Bolivia, as EU and EU  member state officials evince recognition of the need to move  beyond their relatively modest and narrowly-focused efforts  to date. The Europeans may be convinced that Morales does  not want Bolivia to be categorized as a narco-state, but they  are also clear-eyed about GOB shortcomings (in terms of  political will, capabilities and corruption), and understand  that the EU has to shoulder a greater share of the burden in  confronting these challenges. With policy limitations on  what the EU can do collectively, however, translating this  recognition into concrete action will take time, as well as  leadership from individual member states.  CREAMER

BOLIVIA'S REFERENDUM: MARGIN OF VICTORY MATTERS

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09LAPAZ96	2009-01-23 13:01	2010-11-30 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PHUM PINR ENVR BL SUBJECT: BOLIVIA'S REFERENDUM: MARGIN OF VICTORY MATTERS

REF: A. 08 LAPAZ 2606
¶B. LA PAZ 6
 ¶C. LA PAZ 11
¶D. LA PAZ 62
¶E. LA PAZ 90

Classified By: A/EcoPol Chief Joe Relk for reasons 1.4 (b, d)

¶1. (C) Summary:  With the January 25 constitutional
referendum rapidly approaching, all signs point to victory
for President Morales and his ruling Movement Toward
Socialism (MAS) party.  Although the opposition has made
 inroads into the MAS lead, most national polls point to
between 54 and 60 percent support for the proposed
constitution (with one government poll showing 66 percent),
and the MAS appears set to leverage its considerable rural
base to victory.  After a series of national news articles
raised questions about significant fraud in the August 2008
recall referendum, the National Electoral Court has taken
pains to advertise the electoral rolls as secure.  However, a
recent poll shows less than half of the public shares the
 court's confidence, and the opposition believes significant
electoral fraud is likely.  While cheating seems unnecessary
to secure victory for the MAS, padding their lead would give
the party leverage in congressional negotiations regarding
legislation implementing hundreds of vague constitutional
clauses.  Opposition leaders continue to fear the MAS will
use any stalemate in these negotiations to close congress and
institute rule by decree.  At both the national and regional
levels, the margin of victory matters.  A landslide for the
 MAS nationally, or large victories for the opposition in the
eastern departments, could spark more conflict.  End summary.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -
MAS Victory Seems Assured
- - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶2. (C) With the January 25 constitutional referendum rapidly
approaching, all signs point to victory for President Morales
and his ruling Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party.
 Although the opposition has made inroads into their lead,
causing the MAS to tone down its rhetoric, national polls
point to between 54 and 60 percent support for the proposed
constitution.  (One government poll shows the "yes" vote
winning by 66 percent.)  However, many polls downplay or
ignore the MAS' rural base.  Almost as importantly, the MAS
seems prepared to take at least five of the nine departments,
including La Paz, Potosi, Oruro, Cochabamba, and Pando, with
Beni a distinct possibility.  If the MAS can win at levels
 similar to their August 2008 referendum victory (i.e. 67
percent or more) and can make inroads into the "Media Luna"
or eastern half of the country, they will have much more
leverage in upcoming congressional negotiations over
implementing legislation.

- - - - - -
Polling Data
- - - - - -

¶3. (C) Polling data has varied widely over the past two
weeks, due to a combination of a tightening race and polling
methodologies (i.e. city vs. rural).  Recent national polls
by Gallup and Apoyo within the last week show approval for
the constitution with a much slimmer lead than many expected,
ahead only 48 to 42 percent and 49 to 43 percent,
respectively.  Ipsos and Mori both conducted polls of capital
cities and both found the "yes" vote ahead, with Ipsos
 showing a 59 to 35 percent lead and Mori reporting 60 to 40
percent.  However, our contacts tell us all these polls
partially or totally ignored the rural vote, where the MAS
has much of its base.  A poll by Observatorio de Gestion
Publica, publicized by government-friendly Radio Patria
Nueva, marked the constitution's lead at 66 percent, versus
31 percent against.  Some estimate a six percent "bump" when
the rural vote is included.

 ¶4. (U) Polls showing a breakdown
by city or region indicate
the constitution will easily win in at least four
departments: La Paz, Potosi, Oruro, and Cochabamba, likely
with at least 70 percent support in each.  The MAS has a
distinct chance to capture both Pando and Beni as well.  In
Pando, the Observatorio poll shows Pando department split
evenly, and the Ipsos poll shows the capital city of Cobija
supporting the constitution by a ratio of 64 to 36.  Polling
 data for Beni has been more scattershot, but although its
capital city of Trinidad is firmly against the constitution,
by as much as 88 percent, the larger city of Riberalta is
leaning for approval of the constitution.  The Observatorio
poll shows Beni evenly split as a department.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -
Rural and Indigenous Role
- - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶5. (SBU) Although the opposition is making a mighty effort
across the country to rally against the constitution, the
forces of inertia seem to be conspiring against them,
particularly in the form of a largely uneducated rural base
in the Altiplano.  Leading daily La Razon interviewed several
community leaders from the Altiplano, and their supporters,
and reported on January 18 that neither the leaders nor the
supporters had read the Constitution.  Instead, the repeated
 message was that rural communities would take their marching
orders from the MAS, and vote for the constitution. According
to the Ipso poll of capital cities, only four percent of
respondents said they had read much or all of the
constitution, 45 percent of respondents said they have read
some, and 50 percent said they had read none of the draft
text.  In the countryside, the number of those reading the
constitution is much lower.  Post suspects disinterest, blind
faith in Evo Morales' political project, and illiteracy,
 despite the Cuban literacy program, all play a role.  In
addition, the sheer volume of the 411-article constitution
probably scares some potential readership away.

¶6. (C) However, despite the overall level of MAS dominance
among campesinos and indigenous voters, some opposition does
exist, albeit for a variety of reasons.  The xxxxxxxxxxxx, has tried to rally
support against the MAS and the proposed constitution (Reftel
 A).  In a meeting with PolOffs, they lamented the way the MAS
had "cheated" and "fooled" campesinos into believing Morales
was himself truly indigenous or cared about indigenous
issues.  Although they held a national meeting on January 17
and tried to reach out to the press, they sounded defeated
when they acknowledged that the MAS, through a combination of
funding and pressure on local social and business leaders,
held a "vertical control" in the countryside that would be
difficult to break.  They also noted rural communities tended
 to vote in blocks, supporting one political party until they
discarded it to vote en masse for another.

¶7. (C) Going in a completely different direction, some rural
social groups and far-left leaders, such as Achacachi Mayor
Eugenio Rojas and El Alto City Councilor Roberto de La Cruz
also publicly recommended voting against it because it was
seen as not revolutionary enough.  They criticized the
government for making too many concessions to the opposition
 during the constitutional compromise reached on October 21,
including the agreement to not make land reform retroactive.
However, they have a relatively small following, and some,
like de La Cruz, eventually reversed course as the projected
MAS margin of victory shrunk in January.  Edgar Patana,
leader of the regional workers union (COR), other El Alto
union leaders, and the majority of social groups have
recommended voting for the constitution.

 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Opposition Feisty, But Realistic
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶8. (C) The opposition has not given up, but seems to be
battling
more to limit the margin of defeat than to win.  In
Santa Cruz,xxxxxxxxxxxx
told EmbOff that polls show an overwhelming victory for the
 "No" vote in Santa Cruz, but that he is worried about the
opposition's goal of winning in five of Bolivia's nine
departments (Reftel E).  Although a current
privately-commissioned opposition poll showed the
constitution ahead by a margin of only five points, 39 to 34
percent (with 20 percent undecided), opposition alternate
xxxxxxxxxxxx doubted the opposition would be able to
win the referendum outright even under the most optimistic
scenario.  He predicted that Morales would succeed in
 personalizing the constitution as "Evo's constitution" and
leverage his cult of personality.  Ultimately xxxxxxxxxxxx was more
concerned with the margin of the opposition's defeat and
discrediting the results of "any election that uses this
voter roll" (Reftel C).

¶9. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx has been
criss-crossing the country with opposition xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx, campaigning against the proposed constitution, but
 also building a foundation for a likely run for the
presidency. xxxxxxxxxxxx claimed opposition leaders put aside
jockeying to be the 2009 opposition unity presidential
candidate in the final days of the "no" campaign to "attack
the government from three sides:" the prefects (governors)
who been traveling around the Media Luna to show &they are
not afraid" of government threats to arrest them and
galvanize support in opposition departments, a group of three
 presidential contenders to show opposition unity and
xxxxxxxxxxxx, who is used for more cerebral attacks on the CPE
and to &dismiss the governments mythology that they
exclusively represent the indigenous.8  xxxxxxxxxxxx noted that
opposition parties Podemos and MNR are playing a deliberately
muted role, recognizing that their unpopular association with
the &old regimes8 would play into MAS strategy.  "Political
 parties are bad words in Bolivia," xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx La
Paz-based group of mostly young professionals who focus on
issues and distance themselves from the party moniker.  "We
need parties, but we need to start from scratch, without the
old leaders.  This will take time."

¶10. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx told
PolOff the opposition is chipping away at the MAS referendum
 lead despite the government's leviathan advantage in
resources by de-personalizing the constitution and
"convincing people on the street that is not in their best
interests."  Although he conceded the "no" campaign would
ultimately be a losing effort, he cited the emerging feud
between Morales and Church, corruption charges against
government officials, and the increasingly precarious economy
as emerging factors in December and January that created an
opposition "surge" after "we were so depressed" in the fall.
xxxxxxxxxxxx said that the government's newfound mobilization of
congressmen and deputies to challenge the opposition view on
television and radio shows is proof of government panic.
"Before they just thought they could ignore us (and win),"
said xxxxxxxxxxxx.  "They said there was no opposition." xxxxxxxxxxxx
agreed, and added that this is playing into the opposition's
hands, because they "are forced to defend a constitution they
often know little about."  According to xxxxxxxxxxxx has
been challenging MAS supporters to debate him during his
 speaking tours and embarrassed Vice Minister of Social Groups
Sacha Llorenti in a January 20 debate when he started talking
in fluent Aymara.  He asked the dumbstruck Llorenti what he
planned to do if the constitution passed, since all public
officials will be required to speak one of Bolivia's
indigenous languages.  Later he challenged President Morales
to debate him in Aymara, which the president allegedly speaks
poorly.

 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Fraud, Doubts, and Questions
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -


¶11. (C) The National Electoral Court (CNE), which will
oversee and ratify the results of the referendum, has
undertaken a public relations campaign to assure the public
of the security of the election rolls, which came under
scrutiny after leading daily La Razon published a series of
 articles questioning the validity of the August 10, 2008
recall referendum.  Several contacts, including xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx, told us the MAS padded their
August referendum victory by five to seven points through
fraud at several levels (reftel C).  While many international
observers groups are expected to view the January 25
constitutional referendum -- including the European Union,
the OAS, the Carter Center, the UN, the CAN, the
South-American and Andean parliaments, and UNASUR (septel) --
 the depth of the earlier fraud has muted the opposition's
confidence in observers' ability to ensure the results are
fair.  Members of the Santa Cruz civic committee told EmbOff
that they have no faith in international observers.  The
committee has met with the OAS team already and "told our
side of the story", describing the discoveries of tens of
thousands of false voter cards and the statistical signs of
fraud in areas that managed to vote 100 percent for President
Morales in the August 2008 referendum.  However, the civic
 committee said that the fact that international observers
blessed the August referendum means they do not expect an
honest review of the constitutional referendum.  Civic
committee members also noted that small numbers of observers,
generally based in the city, will not be able to stop
widespread fraud in the countryside, which is where they
believe most of the August 10 fraud took place.

¶12. (C) In a press conference designed to bolster confidence
 in the security of the electoral rolls, National Electoral
Court (CNE) President Jose Luis Exeni presented a PowerPoint
describing the bill of clean health given by the OAS.  As
part of the presentation, he showed the number of voters
dropped from the rolls for not participating in prior
elections and the number added during this cycle.  While all
departments projected to vote against the constitution had a
net reduction in the voter rolls, including 85,000 Crucenos
and 17,000 Benianos, MAS strongholds including La Paz
 (38,000) and Potosi (16,000) saw substantial gains -- a
curious reckoning, considering population and migration
trends to the contrary.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Pando At Center of Storm, Again
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶13. (C) While it is possible the constitution could pass in
Beni, most opposition leaders tell us the MAS has set its
 sights on lightly-populated Pando department as its best
chance to win in five departments.  By winning the popular
vote and a majority of the departments, the MAS could more
credibly claim to have support throughout the country.  Pando
has also traditionally aligned with the opposition, so a
breakthrough win there would send a strong signal that the
strength of the MAS continues to rise.  And with fewer than
32,000 registered voters, or less than one percent of the
country's voting population, Pando is the most vulnerable
 department to even small amounts of fraud or voter
registration changes.

¶14. (C) In a conversation with PolOff, xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx alleged the MAS deliberately fomented unrest in Pando
in September to justify a military siege, depose Prefect
Leopoldo Fernandez, and arrest opposition-aligned leaders to
swing the balance of power to the MAS in the Senate.  Besides
disabling the opposition's ability to campaign by arresting
 many of its leaders,xxxxxxxxxxxx alleged the government crackdown
changed Pando's electoral map by causing hundreds of
opposition voters to flee to Brazil while importing 2,000 new
security forces, which xxxxxxxxxxxx claimed were likely MAS voters
from the Altiplano (Reftel B).  xxxxxxxxxxxx added
that in the run-up to the August 2008 referendum, Government
Minister Alfredo Rada facilitated the establishment of fake
identities via the police role in issuing national identity
cards (which can then be used to vote).  (Reftel C).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
January 26: What Happens Next?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶15. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx told PolOff December 31 that
a general election prompted by passage of the new
constitution requires a plethora of enabling legislation that
the opposition-controlled Senate will block, at least in the
forms likely to be proposed by the MAS (Reftel B).  xxxxxxxxxxxx
 said the new draft constitution is deliberately vague, which
grants MAS legislators wide discretion to "fill in the
blanks" with new implementing legislation.  He also said the
Senate would clash with the government on assigning new
borders for electoral districts, needed for the general
election.  xxxxxxxxxxxx added that Morales' MAS party is
already injecting "ridiculous" interpretations of the
constitution into a wide gamut of implementing legislation
that "the Senate cannot in good conscious agree to."  He said
 Senate rejection of MAS proposals provides a ready excuse for
Morales to dismiss congress for "rejecting the will of the
people" and then have President Morales rule by decree
(Reftel D).

¶16. (C) Despite the official government position that
President Morales will undergo treatment to correct a
deviated septum immediately following the referendum, several
contacts confirm that the problem is actually a tumor in the
 pituitary near the sella turcica and that Morales will travel
to Spain for the operation.  xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx told us Morales' first choice, Cuba, could not
perform the surgery.  Article 238 is also of consequence to
the post-January 25 political landscape.  It would establish
that all other government officials must stand down three
months before general elections expected in 2009, with the
notable exception of the president and vice president.
Besides providing the MAS the advantage of ruling during the
 campaign, it also ensures leadership cannot pass to the
opposition-controlled Senate.  It is unclear why the
opposition waited until the final week before the referendum
to complain about the article or why they accepted it during
marathon sessions in October to arrive at a "compromise
text," which, it should be noted, the opposition agreed to
under duress, with thousands of MAS-aligned protesters
surrounding the congress and threatening violence.

 - - - -
Comment
- - - -

¶17. (C) It is likely there will be some amount of fraud in a
referendum the MAS seems likely to win legitimately anyway.
While it can be difficult to separate fact from fiction, the
Morales administration has a reputation of doing exactly what
they announce they will do.  In this case, 66 percent seems
 to be the target number, and the MAS is likely to pull out
all the stops to reach that level.  With at least two-thirds
support across the country and a minimum of five of the nine
departments under his belt, President Morales would be able
to claim a political mandate to implement the constitution
quickly.  Practically speaking, this will put great pressure
on the Congress, especially the opposition-controlled Senate,
to acquiesce in negotiations and accept MAS versions of
implementation legislation.  If they do not, Morales and
 others in the MAS have spoken of rule by decree.  Using
similar logic, Morales could call for early elections to more
quickly advance the "democratic revolution" in Bolivia.
Early elections would also help the MAS avoid dealing with
the quickly-crumbling economy, which would likely be more of
an issue in December.

¶18. (C) Both sides seem to be angling over the margin of the
MAS victory, not the victory itself.  While Morales continues
 to predict a victory of up to 80 percent, Vice President
Garcia
Linera tried to manage expectations with a 66 percent
estimate on January 21.  The margin matters.  If the
constitution gets less than two-thirds support, many
observers feel this would represent a relative defeat,
especially when Morales himself has set such high
expectations.  On the other hand, we are equally concerned
that large-margin victories in media luna departments could
 lead opposition leaders to ignore the national results and
resume a course for autonomy on their own terms -- putting
them on a collision course with the national government.  A
solid but not overwhelming MAS victory, perhaps around 56 to
60 percent, might be the best outcome to keep both sides from
claiming a strong mandate for extreme measures.
URS  

MORALES BASHES GOLDBERG PINATA ONE MORE TIME

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08LAPAZ2670	2008-12-31 16:04	2010-12-03 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz

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C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 002670   SIPDIS   E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2019  TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PINR OPDC OPRC BL SUBJECT: MORALES BASHES GOLDBERG PINATA ONE MORE TIME   Classified By: Acting EcoPol Chief Brian Quigley for reasons 1.4 (b, d)   ¶1. (C) Summary: Meeting with cabinet on December 30 to  evaluate his third year in office, Bolivian President Evo  Morales justified once again his decision to expel Ambassador  Philip S. Goldberg. Morales noted that with the departure of  Ambassador Goldberg, the political opposition had "bottomed  out," and concluded that Goldberg was "clearly commanding the  conspiracy against democracy" in Bolivia. Morales went on to  praise Bolivia's efforts against narco-trafficking, calling  Bolivia the "most outstanding country in Latin America" in  the fight against drugs. Nevertheless, Morales restated his  hope that bilateral relations would improve under  President-elect Obama. Post questions Morales' logic, but  understands that in the face of declining natural gas prices  and corruption scandals within his administration, Morales  needs to distract domestic attention by using the U.S. as his  strawman once again. End summary.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  Should Old Acquaintance Be Forgot  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -   ¶2. (U) In a year-end meeting December 30 to evaluate his  third year in office, President Evo Morales took time to  validate and celebrate his decision on September 11 to expel  Ambassador Philip Goldberg, whom he accused of leading a  conspiracy to topple the Morales regime. "After suffering  that attack of the (political) right, of the empire, I was  not wrong in that moment when I decided the Ambassador had to  leave. The Ambassador leaves, the opposition bottoms out --  clearly someone was commanding the conspiracy against  democracy, even against the national government itself."   ¶3. (U) Morales went on to accuse the Bush administration of  violating its international commitments in the fight against  narco-trafficking, saying Bolivia "is the most outstanding  country in Latin America in the fight against drug  trafficking." Local press reports and even the government's  own media service noted that the precipitous fall in  relations had been exacerbated by Morales' "personal  decision" to suspend Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)  activities in the country. The official media service went a  step further, adding that Morales also suspended CIA  activity, and that the U.S. brought the suspension on itself  by "meddling in internal affairs." Despite his attacks on  Ambassador Goldberg, the Bush administration, and the "empire  of the north" generally, Morales was quick to state once  again that bilateral relations would be re-evaluated once  President-elect Obama was in office.   - - - -  Comment  - - - -   ¶4. (C) True to form, Morales' mention of declaring Ambassador  Goldberg persona non grata grabbed media attention and  distracted focus from more pressing matters, including the  Quintana corruption scandal, the falling price of natural gas  (and with it the possible reduction of Morales' popular Renta  Dignidad program), and his recent admission that some  cocaleros are selling their coca to be processed into  cocaine. As illogical as Morales' diatribes arguments are,  as long as he can get mileage out of such attacks, the  administration will continue to spread its vitriol.  LAMBERT

MORALES MANIPULATES MEDIA OWNERS

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08LAPAZ2623	2008-12-22 15:03	2010-12-03 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz

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C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 002623  SIPDIS  E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL ODIP OIIP KPAO EAID BL SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: MORALES MANIPULATES MEDIA OWNERS  REF: LA PAZ 2569  Classified By: PAS Couselor Denise Urs for reasons 1.4 b,d  ¶1. (C) Summary: Bolivian President Evo Morales continues on the offensive against the media, part of a long-running campaign against the Bolivian media. Through verbal and financial assaults, the Bolivian Government is attempting to manipulate the way news is reported in this country. The GOB uses financial tactics, such as hitting media with tax bills or spending large sums of money on advertising, to influence editorial lines and to create a fog about truthfulness. It is also using its own media to expand and reinforce a cult following around Morales. End summary.  GOB on the Attack  ¶2. (SBU) The latest round of political attacks against the media (reftel) is part of an ongoing battle. President Evo Morales regularly calls the media his "principal opposition," and his "enemies." Notwithstanding his latest barbs, however, Morales usually adds that he is not against journalists, but against media owners. Rumors have been floating for months that in order to attempt to protect the President from his "enemies," Venezuelan investors are trying to purchase various outlets including La Paz's second-largest daily La Prensa, but so far there is no evidence that any sales have been concluded.  ¶3. (C) Instead, the GOB is intimidating media outlets through legal proceedings and showing favoritism in the distribution of its significant ad budget to push the press toward a more favorable view of its policies. In one example, the GOB sent La Razon, the largest newspaper in La Paz, a tax bill for nearly $5 million for having "avoided taxes during 2006." High-level officials at La Razon speculated to Public Affairs Section officers that this tax bill may have been an attempt to intimidate the paper to move from its generally anti-GOB editorial stance. The tax liability would also lower the value of the paper so that it could be sold at a lower price.  ¶4. (C) Nationalization of certain companies has also helped the GOB push its press agenda forward. On May 1, President Morales nationalized communications giant Entel, one of the largest advertisers in Bolivia. The GOB has been accused of using the enormous advertising budgets of the companies it has nationalized, including Entel, to reward media that publish pro-GOB articles and to punish those that do not.  ¶5. (C) With only one exception, anti-GOB television network Unitel, all of the major media in Bolivia accept direct paid advertising from the Government, including spots that label the media as "liars" and suggest that Bolivians should not trust what they read, see, or hear from the press. Ironically, these same media often editorialize against the GOB during the same broadcasts or in the same newspapers that carry anti-media ads. PAS officers have asked media directors why they continue to carry the GOB ads, and all have stated that without the income it would be more difficult to survive in the very competitive market.  Who owns the Media?  ¶6. (SBU) Although the majority of media in Bolivia are privately owned, it is difficult to determine who the owners are. There are no public records that prove ownership, and companies or individuals who own majority stakes can sell without a public paper trail. There are regular rumors about the possible sale of outlets, but proof of such sales is nil and the rumors usually fade quickly.  ¶7. (C) Another issue of concern is the influence of Venezuelan money in the media. PAS regularly hears that Venezuelan businessmen are negotiating the purchase of one of the television networks (usually cash-strapped ATB) as well as numerous newspapers that are in financial trouble. Others claim it is mere speculation. Nevertheless, Venezuelan money has built a technically stronger, pro-government, populist media network in the main Bolivian cities, called Radio y Television Popular.  ¶8. (C) La Paz,s second largest daily La Prensa reported that Morales has reformed state-owned media outlets in an effort to expand the popularity and cult following of the President. The GOB created a network of community radio stations, an internet wire agency (ABI), and expanded the reach of the Government-owned TV Channel 7 using a $9 million donation from Venezuela to install 120 repeaters. There are also reports that the budget for Channel 7 operations has expanded by $3.8 million and that the normal procurement protocols have been dropped. The political opposition claims that the President is advised by a team of communications experts from Venezuela as well as other countries.  ¶9. (C) Under the Morales administration, Channel 7, Empresa Nacional de Television, has become one of the government's primary media tools, often presenting biased and misleading information, openly propagandizing for the President and his policies, and discrediting the opposition. Channel 7 is intent on expanding its reach and influence throughout the country. The manager of Channel 7 announced that it is upgrading to digital technology, a costly investment by Bolivian standards. A year ago, Channel 7 announced the receipt of a donation of equipment from unknown sources to improve its reach in the departments of La Paz and Santa Cruz, and that it had purchased 50 new repeaters to be distributed to remote locations in the west and the Amazon region. After the Iranian President's visit to Bolivia early in 2007, some publications reported that Channel 7 would get a large donation (some reported the intended donation would be a multi-million dollar investment) to strengthen the state TV network, but there has been no indication that this is going to materialize. Iranian media are now reporting that the donation will be in the form of Spanish-language programming. Channel 7 also airs Venezuelan Government-owned Telesur programming as part of its regular daily schedule.  Who Owns the Print Media?  ¶10. (SBU) Two major media conglomerates appear to own most of the media in Bolivia. Spanish group Prisa (owners of the Spanish daily El Diario) owns La Razon; ATB, a private TV network; and &Extra8 a cheap sensationalist daily. The other media conglomerate, the Canelas and Rivero families, owns most of the national major dailies throughout the country. In La Paz, they own La Prensa; in Santa Cruz, leading daily El Deber; in Cochabamba leading daily Los Tiempos; they also own the only daily in El Alto, El Alteo; in Sucre, Correo del Sur; in Potosi, El Potosi; and in Tarija, El Nuevo Sur. The Canelas-Rivero Group papers are generally critical of the Government. Other smaller, independently owned newspapers fight for ever-shrinking private-sector advertising revenues and often accept GOB advertising to continue printing.  Comment  ¶11. (C) Bolivia's media environment is increasingly difficult. The GOB, aided by large Venezuelan investments, has used financial pressures in an attempt to change the editorial line of the media, and to hasten or provoke the sale of media outlets. The regular rumors about the impending sales of media may be a smoke screen to cover an actual sale, they may be a rouse to frighten the media, or they may simply be the imagination of media owners. It is always possible, however, that media will be sold without public knowledge, changing the opinion-leader landscape in the country. End comment. LAMBERT

BOLIVIA: BEFORE U.S. VISIT, EVO LASHES OUT

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08LAPAZ2458	2008-11-18 13:01	2010-12-03 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz

VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB  DE RUEHLP #2458/01 3231343 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 181343Z NOV 08 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9263 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 8557 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 5916 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 9880 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 7100 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4148 RUEHGE/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN 0902 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 4476 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 4316 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 5960 RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 0558 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 6765 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1540 RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 1524 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 002458   SIPDIS   E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2018  TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR BL SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: BEFORE U.S. VISIT, EVO LASHES OUT   REF: LA PAZ 2370   Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 b,d   ¶1. (SBU) Summary: In the days before his November 16  departure for the United States, where he will speak at the  OAS and UN and meet with U.S. representatives (Dodd, Lugar,  Baukus and possibly others), President Evo Morales and his  closest cabinet advisors lashed out at a wide selection of  USG targets, claiming that the USG has a strategy of  supporting a united opposition front against Evo for the  December 2009 elections. Following the November 1 expulsion  of DEA, Government Minister Alfredo Rada described the DEA as  "insignificant" and said, "the world will not end with the  end of the presence of the DEA." Evo announced that he is  "after the CIA" last week, and in a November 14 interview the  state news agency ABI cited Presidency Minister Quintana as  saying that the "civic prefectural conspiracy" was "fed by  the empire (the United States), financed by organizations  that originate in USAID, the CIA, and the DEA." Speaking from  Venezuela, Quintana added MILGROUP to the mix, saying that  state security fired on civilians in 2003 (during the riots  that led to the fall of ex-President Gonzalo "Goni" Sanchez  de Lozada) because "no state security institution is not  taught, indoctrinated, and intervened by the DEA, the CIA,  and by MILGROUP." End summary.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  Evo Accuses USG of Trying to Unite the Opposition  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -   ¶2. (SBU) At a November 15 rally in Cochabamba, Morales  accused the USG of trying to help form an opposition "front"  to oppose his next presidential run: "I am almost sure,  sisters and brothers, that the next elections (December 2009  if the draft constitution passes in January), all the right  will unite on instructions from the Government of the United  States." At the same time, Evo reiterated his allegations  that USAID finances "the opposition".   ¶3. (SBU) Meanwhile, analysts are weighing in on the issue of  a combined front against Evo, whether comprised solely of the  "moderate left" (that is, the left without Evo's Movement  Toward Socialism party) or united with less- conservative  elements of what is now the conservative opposition party  Podemos. Former president Carlos Mesa (an oft-mentioned  contender for leader of the elusive non-Evo front) opined  recently that "a single front (combining left and right) is  not viable in the sense that there are very distinct  ideological positions between which, eventually, there would  be opposition, but this doesn't eliminate the possibility of  a front..."   ¶4. (C) Comment: Evo's pre-emptive strike against a potential  opposition front--aligning them without evidence with "the  empire"--appears to be an effort to set the stage for  discrediting anyone who runs against him as a U.S. stooge.  As of now the opposition is far from united, with as many as  seven potential presidential candidates: former president  Carlos Mesa, former prefect Manfred Reyes Villa, Tarija  Prefect Mario Cossio, Potosi Mayor Rene Joaquino, Unidad  Nacional party leader Samuel Doria Medina, former president  Tuto Quiroga and even indigenous guerrilla Felipe Quispe. It  is hard to envision how this disparate group would come  together, in fact, many of the strategists for potential  candidates complain to us that other groups and leaders will  not step aside for the good of the opposition as a whole. End  comment.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  Continued Accusations Against USG Agencies  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -   ¶5. (SBU) According to press reports, Minister of Presidency  Juan Ramon Quintana met in Venezuela on November 14 to  propose a multilateral "strategic alliance" of governments  and academics to defend the process of revolutionary change.  Quintana reminded his audience of Bolivia's recent "torturous  civic prefectural conspiracy" which he claimed had been "fed  by the empire (the United States), financed by organizations  that originate in USAID, the CIA, and the DEA." Back in  Bolivia, Minister of Government Alfredo Rada was also  leveling accusations at USG agencies, claiming that the  Bolivian government must deeply review the actions of  agencies such as USAID and DEA: "it is a process that demands  a more-global evaluation to take the decision to normalize  this relation, and that means new rules of pay, transparency  in relations and respect for sovereignty." Rada said that  DEA was welcome to share information in the counternarcotics  fight, but the DEA is mistaken if it thinks it can "continue  in the country or will return to the country to continue  diverting resources of the fight against drugs to work of  political destabilization or political investigation--that  can't continue."   ¶6. (SBU) Rada announced on November 16 that the Bolivian  National Police who worked with DEA will be reviewed and  those that might have worked "on the margin of the interests  of the country" will be fired. Rada warned that if "the  police acted as a foreign embassy in their own institution,  there will be a separation of these people." He added, "If  there are police who worked correctly, with good results, you  can be secure that...they will be able to continue their  work."   ¶7. (SBU) From Venezuela, Presidency Minister Quintana added  new accusations against U.S. agencies, claiming that US  agencies were behind the 2003 decision of the government of  then-president Gonzalo "Goni" Sanchez de Lozada to fire on  civilians. "They consummated the most repugnant genocide in  Bolivia, which was the genocide of the year 2003, when  Sanchez de Lozada was expelled from the country. In the face  of a lack of moderation, in the face of the doubts of the  high military command to massacre the comrades en El Alto,  the Military Group (MILGROUP) occupied the highest levels of  the armed forces and took the decision that the armed forces  had to massacre the people of El Alto to liberate a caravan  that had to supply the city of La Paz with fuel. Therefore,  this is not indirect intervention, this is not interference,  (it is) direct participation in the genocide of the year  2003." (Note: Over 60 people were killed in clashes between  followers of Evo Morales--who had blockaded the capital city  of La Paz--and government forces. The Morales government has  repeatedly accused Sanchez de Lozada of genocide and recently  began processing papers to request the former president's  extradition. End note.)   ¶8. (SBU) Following President Morales' November 11 statement  that he and the government "are after the CIA too," Vice  Minister of Social Movements Sacha Llorenti announced on  November 17 that the presence of CIA agents is "prohibited"  in Bolivia: "there exists no norm that would allow the  presence of those agents in the national territory and to  verify their presence in the country would be a grave action  against our sovereignty." According to Llorenti, the  government is investigating the possible presence of  "external agents or of Bolivians who serve external  agents....the government is decided, and in this there will  be no step backwards, on the dignification of our country and  of its institutions."   - - - -  Comment  - - - -   ¶8. (C) Morales is already campaigning hard for both the  constitution and his re-election, as can be seen by his  standard attacks on the USG. His rhetorical attacks have now  led to the expulsion of both the Ambassador and the DEA, and  cannot be ignored as mere campaign stumping. USAID could be  next, as there have been repeated high-level attacks and  social-movement calls for its expulsion. Morales' new focus  on Bolivian "co-conspirators" (either police working with the  DEA or any political enemy Evo decides to describe as a CIA  collaborator) will almost certainly instill fear among our  contacts, who may become more cautious about meeting with us.  His threat to expel the CIA from Bolivia means that any one  of us can be (mis)identified as a spy and kicked out should  we do--or be falsely accused of doing--anything that  displeases Evo. End comment.  URS

SHANNON MEETING WITH PRESIDENT EVO MORALES

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08LAPAZ1667	2008-08-04 17:05	2010-12-03 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz

VZCZCXRO2966 PP RUEHLMC DE RUEHLP #1667/01 2171730 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 041730Z AUG 08 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8143 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 8206 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 5562 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 9501 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 6721 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3817 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 4101 RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 2289 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 5653 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 6436 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1166 RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 0856 RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 1011 RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 2286 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 1321 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LA PAZ 001667   SIPDIS   PASS TO USAID/LAC DAVID JOHNSON, JOANN LAWRENCE   E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2018  TAGS: ASEC EAID ECON PGOV PREL PTER SNAR BL SUBJECT: A/S SHANNON MEETING WITH PRESIDENT EVO MORALES   REF: LA PAZ 1498   Classified By: Amb. Philip S. Goldberg for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).   ¶1. (C) Summary: WHA A/S Shannon, accompanied by INL PDAS  McGlynn, the Ambassador, DCM, and Emboff, met at 5 a.m. on  July 23 with Bolivian President Evo Morales, who was  accompanied by Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca, Minister  of Government Alfredo Rada, Presidential Spokesman Ivan  Canelas, and Bolivian Ambassador to the U.S. Mario Gustavo  Guzman. Morales expressed his regret for the June 9 march on  the Embassy and its aftermath and acknowledged that Bolivia  "needs" the U.S. However, he also cited "proofs" of a USG  conspiracy against him and his government. Assuring Morales  that there was no USG conspiracy against him, A/S Shannon  agreed that the two countries should work together to build a  climate of confidence, using bilateral consultations as a  mechanism to achieve this end. After the Morales meeting A/S  Shannon and delegation held meetings with Bolivian Senate  President Oscar Ortiz and President of the Congress Edmundo  Novillo. End summary.   EVO FEARS A CONSPIRACY  ----------------------   ¶2. (C) President Morales opened the meeting by saying he  viewed this as a chance to improve relations with the USG.  Evo said he wanted to be "sincere" and to say up front "I do  not believe in the capitalist system." He remarked that his  government is one of dialogue and then went on to talk  about his belief that the United States was conspiring  against his government. Morales complained that "since the  90s the Department of State has described me as a  narco-trafficker as a narco mafia, and I have been called the  Andean Bin Laden" by former Ambassador Rocha. He then cited  a litany of events that he argued proved the hostile intent  of the United States. Morales also expressed concern about  how USAID's resources are spent. Morales said he had been  told that USAID offers money to Movement Toward Socialism  (MAS) mayors for them to switch to opposition party Podemos.  According to Morales, "Bolivian employees of USAID go  door-to-door in northern Potosi telling people if they get  rid of Evo the economy is going to get better." Evo said  that one mayor told him that USAID offered him $15,000 to  $25,000 dollars to oppose Evo. Evo closed his opening  remarks by saying "currently there is a conspiracy led by the  U.S. Embassy against my security, against my government.   A/S SHANNON RESPONDS  --------------------   ¶3. (C) A/S Shannon said that the United States was  committed to the success of Bolivian democracy and the  Bolivian people and had no interest that would justify a  conspiracy against the Morales government. He noted that he  had no interest in receiving Morales, list of supposed  conspiratorial behavior, but rather would like to point out  how the USG has been trying to work with the Morales  administration. Shannon mentioned President Bush's  congratulatory phone call after Morales' election and the  meeting held with Secretary Rice. The A/S highlighted how  the USG has modified its anti-narcotics tactics to work with  the GOB, re-certified the GOB, and extended ATPDA benefits.  He also noted that the USG had worked with multilateral  development banks to forgive $1 billion in loans owed by  Bolivia. Shannon told Morales that "we have no interest in  creating conflicts or political chaos in Bolivia. Our  Ambassador and officers will meet with various groups, but it  is not to conspire against you." Shannon said that Bolivia   LA PAZ 00001667 002 OF 003    and the United States are in a "critical moment in our  relationship" and that he wanted security guarantees for  USAID and the Peace Corps so as "to be able to continue with  these programs."   STOP THE CONSPIRACY AND GIVE US THE CASH  ----------------------------------------   ¶4. (C) President Morales responded that "if the conspiracy  stops then we can begin a new relationship based on our  proposed agenda." Evo said that "only 20% to 30% of USAID  money reaches the people, why don't you support the 'Bolivia  Cambia, Evo Cumple' (Bolivia Changes, Evo Delivers) program  instead?" Evo insisted that the Venezuelan-supported program  is "sound and transparent" and that USAID should redirect its  money there. The president brought up ATPDA and asked for a  five year extension and an eventual "just and beneficial"  long term trade deal. With regard to Millennium Challenge  Account (MCC), Evo asked the A/S "to just tell me the truth"  about the political decision to freeze the program. Morales  said that Brazil and Hugo Chavez are allies that will help  with the road projects but that he hasn't given up hope on  MCC.   DRUGS, USAID, AND THE CHAPARE  -----------------------------   ¶5. (C) Morales complained that people are trying to link  his government to the FARC and that his government is not  being noticed for its respect for human rights. Evo told  Shannon, "I recognize that in the Yungas there has been an  increase in coca production. For political reasons there is  not much we can do." Morales also said that he regrets the  amount of drugs leaving the country. He criticized  USAID's involvement in the Chapare, saying that USAID set up  parallel organizations to the coca unions and that it works  with local mayors against the coca federation. The president  says that he receives letters "from all over the country  asking me to remove USAID."   AMERICAN JUSTICE  ----------------   ¶6. (C) Evo said that people speak well of the American  justice system so therefore he "cannot believe that you would  have those two delinquents (Sanchez de Lozada and Sanchez  Berzain) there. "People are upset, you should expel them. I  tell you this, send back Goni and you will become the mayor  of El Alto."   CHOQUEHUANCA SPEAKS  -------------------   ¶7. (C) Foreign Minister Choquehuanca said "we want to  reestablish confidence. We want American cooperation to be  strictly economic and to be part of the 'Bolivia Cambia, Evo  Cumple' program." Choquehuanca said the GOB was finishing  the Sanchez de Lozada (Goni) extradition request and that it  should be ready by August. He asked that Bolivia be  re-certified and that "our efforts be recognized, especially  our respect for human rights." The Foreign Minister  mentioned establishing exchange programs because the current  USG programs "are not transparent and we are suspicious when  scholarship students are asked to spy on us."   LET'S START ANEW  ----------------   ¶8. (C) A/S Shannon ended the meeting by saying that we   LA PAZ 00001667 003 OF 003    would study the GOB's proposed agenda and add our own points.  He suggested that subsequently dates for bilateral  consultations could be established. Evo said that his friend  President Lula gave him some good advice, "have lots of  patience. If you tell me to separate out the conspiracies  than that's what we will do. We will not break relations.  We will continue to put up with and bear these things. I  regret that my brothers and sisters from El Alto went down to  the Embassy (to try and break into the compound on June 9)  and I recognize that my country needs you."   SENATE PRESIDENT OSCAR ORTIZ  ----------------------------   ¶9. (C) Immediately following the Morales meeting A/S  Shannon and delegation met with Senate President Oscar Ortiz  (Podemos - Santa Cruz). Ortiz stressed the importance of the  senate being "one of the only institutions not in the hands  of the MAS." He told Shannon that "democracy is under heavy  attack" and that time is passing by quickly. The August 10  revoking referendum "will only ratify the deep divisions in  the country and Evo will lose in five departments." The  senator expressed concern about "overt" Venezuelan influence  and the possibility of voter registration fraud. He  chastised the OAS for "coming here last week and making  irresponsible declarations regarding voter registration  records." Ortiz predicted that "eventually the economic  crisis in the country will overtake any political crisis."  When asked about dialogue to find a solution to the current  political crisis Ortiz responded that the opposition wanted a  solution through dialogue and that he had spoken to Vice  President Garcia Linera about this. "However," Ortiz said,  "it takes two to tango." He hopes the "friends of Bolivia"  would be expanded to include the European Union and lamented  the increase in drug trafficking and the fact that "the  Brazilians and the European Union tolerate it."   PRESIDENT OF THE CONGRESS EDMUNDO NOVILLO  -----------------------------------------   ¶10. (C) A/S Shannon also met with the President of the  Congress Edmundo Novillo (MAS - Cochabamba). Novillo said  that the August 10 referendum "will not solve the political  crisis" and that the people do not understand what it is  because "a revoking referendum is something new for the  country." He admitted that "this process of change has  generated uncertainty." When asked what role the congress  could play in resolving the crisis Novillo was pessimistic,  saying that "the polarization is strong, too strong, within  the congress." Regarding Bolivia - U.S. relations Novillo  said he thought it is a good time to reevaluate all aspects  of the relationship with an eye toward common interests. He  said the U.S. should realize "there are suspicions within the  government and within the population because the  relationships with past governments." Novillo said that  anti-narcotics cooperation "is a difficult topic" and that it  is necessary to have a mutually agreed upon agenda. He  recognized that USAID's alternative development programs have  had "a certain amount of success" but that the money could  and should be better invested.   ¶11. (U) Assistant Secretary Shannon has cleared this cable.  GOLDBERG

GOB RESPINS ANTI-U.S. ALLEGATIONS

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08LAPAZ329	2008-02-19 23:11	2010-12-03 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz

VZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB  DE RUEHLP #0329/01 0502300 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 192300Z FEB 08 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6467 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7598 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4967 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 8872 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 6087 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3307 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 3522 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 5243 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 5936 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0553 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0912 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000329   SIPDIS   SIPDIS   E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2018  TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON BL SUBJECT: GOB RESPINS ANTI-U.S. ALLEGATIONS   REF: A. LA PAZ 303  ¶B. LA PAZ 304  ¶C. LA PAZ 218   Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)   ¶1. (C) Summary: The Bolivian government attempted to renew  and, in some cases, repackage old allegations against the  U.S. February 16-18. Bolivian President Evo Morales  threatened to show USAID the door if it continues undermining  his administration. As proof, Morales provided the example  of a political organization that was allegedly turned down  for USAID assistance due to its pro-Morales stance. He also  cited unnamed groups that were asked to work against the  government as a condition for assistance. Morales also  argued against a free trade agreement with the U.S. and  charged the U.S. of involvement in the disappearances of  Bolivians during drug-related conflicts in the region of  Chapare. Morales' assertion that pro-government groups were  prepared to take up arms to defend his agenda were rebuffed  by a wide-range of social and labor groups. Government  Minister Alfredo Rada continues to accuse the U.S. of  involvement in a police "spying" scandal to deflect from his  role in the unauthorized surveillance of opposition  politicians and reporters. The Bolivian government's refusal  to sign a cooperation agreement concerning U.S. military aid  and the impact of that refusal on disaster assistance was  made public February 18. Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca  explained the government did not want to sign an agreement  "with its eyes closed" and was only reviewing the agreement.  Despite public assurances that they want better relations  with the U.S., the relentless public spinning of the Bolivian  government's complaints against the U.S. at the expense of  diplomatic channels suggest the BOG has another agenda:  discredit the U.S. and distract the Bolivian public. End  Summary.   Lights, Camera, Allegations  ---------------------------   ¶2. (U) Bolivian President Evo Morales made several references  to ongoing "political problems" with the U.S. February 15,  although he clarified diplomatic and commercial relations  would be maintained. Morales rehashed the argument that  USAID is supporting opposition groups and that the U.S.  Embassy is "making politics" at the expense of diplomatic  work, such as advancing commercial ties. Morales asserted  during recent months USAID has been convoking groups through  implementing NGOs and offering them money with the  stipulation that they work "against the Bolivian government."  Morales claimed leaders from the Federation of Ayllus  (indigenous local government units) of Potosi told him an  USAID-supported NGO denied their group's request for $20,000  because the organization "supports Evo Morales." Morales  urged citizens to report NGOs that are "bought by USAID to  distribute funds to make politics against the government."  He added, "The government will not allow NGOs to work against  the executive power. Faced with these provocations from  USAID, we will ask them to go home." Morales saluted U.S.  citizens that are denouncing both USAID and the Embassy for  practicing "politics," but offered no details on who he was  referring to.   ¶3. (U) Although most of his criticisms were respun from old  charges, Morales added a new spin on some existing  allegations. Morales asserted Embassy Bolivian police guards  act "like embassy workers ... at the side of the U.S.  government." Morales claimed he learned of this "strange"  police arrangement through Fulbrighter van Schaick, who  accused Assistant Regional Security Officer Vincent Cooper of  asking him to "spy" on Cubans and Venezuelans in Bolivia last  week (Reftels a and b). Though not directly associated with  recent charges the U.S. is behind Bolivian police "spying" on  politicians and reporters, this mischaracterization of our  Bolivian guard force feeds into the Morales administration's  allegations of undue U.S. influence on Bolivian police units.   Evo on FTA, Drugs, and Cooper "Expulsion"  -----------------------------------------   ¶4. (C) Morales rejected a free trade agreement with the U.S.  as a return to the days of former-president Gonzalo Sanchez  de Lozada, when Morales alleges the government made deals  with U.S. businesses at the expense of Bolivians. Morales  characterized the Embassy's decision that ARSO Vincent Cooper  would not return to Bolivia as the "expulsion" of a "man who  conducted North American espionage." Morales repeated his  opinion that the war on drugs has been a failure because it  targeted coca leaf instead of cocaine. He alleged the DEA,  U.S. military, and Bolivian national police headed Bolivian  anti-narcotics efforts "from a U.S. military base" in  Cochabamba Department when there were "demonstrations and  disappearances," implying U.S. involvement. (Note: The U.S.  supports Bolivian anti-narcotics efforts at the Chimore  Airport and has offices there, but there are no U.S. military  bases per se in Bolivia. Despite Morales' intermittent calls  to dismantle such non-existent bases, this issue is a  misunderstanding or a straw man. End Note.)   Call to Arms Disconnected  -------------------------   ¶5. (U) While railing against "oligarchic groups," and  particularly efforts to convoke an autonomy referendum in the  opposition-led Department (state) of Santa Cruz, Morales  claimed pro-government groups would defend his administration  "with arms." Morales said February 14 that sympathizers in  Santa Cruz had told him they would take up arms to ensure the  opposition showed Morales the proper "respect." However,  leaders from MAS-aligned social and union groups rejected any  attempt to resort to arms February 16, calling instead for an  electoral solution to settle Bolivian differences.    Spin Doctor Rada's Dizzying "Spy" Accusations  ---------------------------------------------   ¶6. (U) On February 15, the Ambassador met with Government  Minister Alfredo Rada to discuss the USG's support to the  Police's Special Operations Command (COPES) police unit, a  unit that Rada has stated was likely behind a growing  domestic surveillance scandal. Following their meeting, the  Ambassador issued a public statement which re-iterated that  the USG was never involved in domestic spying and explained  that USG would no longer fund COPES because the unit had been  disbanded on January 29.   ¶7. (U) In an interview with the La Paz newspaper La Prensa  following the February 15 meeting Rada continued to insinuate  )- as he has done publicly on various occasions -- that  COPES was responsible for internal surveillance against  political officials and journalists. Rada once again called  COPES a parallel intelligence organization that conducted  "political intelligence," argued it reported directly to the  USG and not to the National Intelligence Directorate (DNI),  and that it exceeded the scope of its mandate. Rada  explained that since September 11, 2001 the U.S. government  had directed COPES to gather intelligence on terrorist  organizations which violated COPES' mission to conduct  surveillance only on narco-trafficking organizations. Rada  stated, that "terrorism is a fundamentally political  phenomenon . . . therefore COPES . . . conducted political  intelligence . . . All of this a function of the State  Department's priorities." (Note: According to the COPES'  memorandum of understanding between the Bolivian and U.S.  governments, conducting surveillance on both illegal  narcotics and terrorist targets is part of its mission. End  Note.)   ¶8. (U) Throughout the interview Minister Rada engaged in  double speak, at times strongly insinuating the USG was  behind the domestic spying scandal, at other times  acknowledging there was little information tying the USG to  the case. "It would be irresponsible to affirm they (the  Embassy) were behind these (domestic spying) operations,"  Rada stated. He followed with, "The fact that intelligence  personnel from the Embassy received reports from ODEP (COPES'  official name since 2001) makes us believe that they were  aware of these things (domestic spying). Despite earlier  statements in the interview that COPES responded to the USG,  Rada closed the interview with the statement, "That  ODEP-COPES followed direct orders from the Embassy, we cannot  yet demonstrate, but we are investigating. But there was a  direct economic link, and it has been demonstrated that they  worked on priorities designed by Washington." Rada also  tried to link Fulbrighter Van Schaick case to the domestic  spy scandal. Arguing his Van Schaick's sworn statement is  the first piece of concrete evidence that links the USG to  espionage within Bolivia.   Eyes Wide Shut on MILGP Assistance  ----------------------------------   ¶9. (C) The Bolivian press reported February 19 that the  Bolivian government had frozen military humanitarian  assistance, by not renewing our humanitarian assistance  diplomatic note (which acts as a SOFA, or status of forces  agreement, for U.S. military personnel in Bolivia). The  article stressed that non-military aid (USD) 600,000 to flood  victims is not affected. However, it highlighted that our  MILGRP has provided humanitarian assistance (include medical,  dental and eye treatment) since 1996 and has already  prevented aid from arriving for flooding victims. Foreign  Minister David Choquehuanca responded that the government had  not canceled any agreement, but was simply reviewing it.  Choquehuanca stated, "We now do not sign agreements with the  United States with our eyes closed, like what happened in the  past, especially with anti-drug assistance." (Note: The  humanitarian assistance agreement has nothing to do with our  counter-narcotics aid. A Bolivian diplomatic note suspended  renewal of the assistance agreement January 29, citing the  need for a dialogue to bridge a "gap of understanding."  ((Reftel C)) End Note).   Comment  -------   ¶10. (C) Although charges that USAID is undermining the  Bolivian government are nothing new (Minister of the  Presidency Juan Quintana originally laid out the charges in  August and officials have drummed them up periodically  since), Morales' call for Bolivians to help the government  "identify these NGOs" ostensibly working to undermine his  administration is a troubling development. Using Morales'  example of the Potosi group that was "denied" $20,000, any  person or organization that asks for USAID funding and does  not receive it could allege a political motive. We will  continue to counter misunderstandings about USAID's  transparency and apolitical nature with reality. However,  the Bolivian government is unlikely to back off from its  USAID assault any time soon, as it enjoys the propaganda  value of creating an external enemy to distract from domestic  problems. Likewise, although government officials have  privately admitted to us they do not believe the U.S. was  involved in the police "spying" scandal, they are not  disengaging from insinuations of U.S. involvement. Rada's  accusations are designed not to lead to a formal process that  would prove or disprove them, but rather to create the  appearance of U.S. impropriety to distract the Bolivian  public from very real and potentially damaging charges  against him. As such, they are a success. The incongruity  of the government accusing us of being in cahoots with the  opposition and, at the same time, spying on them seems  largely overlooked in the public discourse. Unfortunately,  the Bolivian press does not consistently apply critical  analysis to these incoherent, vague, and sometimes  contradictory charges before distributing them to the  Bolivian and international public.   ¶11. (C) Comment Continued. Although they may not always  believe in the merits of some of their specific accusations,  government leaders from Evo down appear to genuinely believe  the Embassy is working to undermine the Morales  administration. Given his proclivity to view the Embassy as  separate from the U.S. government and people, we expect  Morales to bring the GOB's vague litany of accusations  against the Embassy to both the visiting Congressional  delegation and to the U.S. public during his planned February  25-27 speaking tour in the U.S. End Comment.  GOLDBERG