miércoles, 8 de diciembre de 2010

Evo: The Cuban and Venezuelan conspirator

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06LAPAZ886 2006-03-30 16:04 2010-12-03 21:09 SECRET Embassy La Paz
VZCZCXRO7448 PP RUEHLMC DE RUEHLP #0886/01 0891647 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 301647Z MAR 06 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8662 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 5737 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3015 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6887 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4124 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1437 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 1377 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 3691 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4079 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 8611 RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LA PAZ 000886   SIPDIS   SIPDIS   E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2016  TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL BL PINR SUBJECT: EVO AND HIS ADVISORY CIRCLE (PART 1 OF 3)    Classified By: Amb. David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).   1. (C) Summary: President Morales is an astute domestic  political operator but lacks confidence in his economic and  international relations abilities. As a result, Morales has  surrounded himself with three compartmented groups of  advisers. The first are domestic political operators who  implement his political vision and serve as the attack dogs  for the President. The second group are Bolivian  intellectuals that help shore up his decisionmaking in  economics, intelligence and security, and international  relations, and implement policies on the ground, including  the Cuban doctors program, Venezuelan identification program,  and Bolivian land reform. The third group is his Cuban and  Venezuelan advisers, who seem to have growing influence with  the President, trumping even his intellectual advisers. This  cable is part one of three cables that looks at the  President, who is in his circle of domestic advisers, and how  he uses them, and their competition with the Cubans and  Venezuelans for the President's confidence. End summary.   --------------------------------------  Evo: The seasoned Bolivian politician  --------------------------------------   2. (C) Radical cocalero union leader turned President Evo  Morales Ayma is a pragmatic leader whose domestic political  instincts are extraordinarily acute. Morales is an expert at  spinning stories in his favor, co-opting the platforms of his  adversaries, dividing his opposition, and appealing to his  bases. A leader with strong anti-democratic tendencies, over  the years he has been known to bribe, threaten, and even  physically intimidate anyone who has stood in his way,  including government officials, politicians, and cocalero  colleagues. He has shown great tactical flexibility and an  ability to out maneuver even his most formidable political  opponents to consolidate his own political power. Morales  has developed a reputation for consulting advisers and social  groups on domestic political issues, but is confident that he  is the expert, the advisor and the final decision maker for  those issues. (Comment: This is particularly true on the  coca issue.) His cadre of domestic political advisers  (SEPTEL), which include Senate President Santos Ramirez,  lower chamber President Edmundo Novillo, his personal  assistant Ivan Iporre, and Vice Minister of Government  Coordination and personal attorney Hector Arce, tends to  operate more as "yes men" who carry out the President's  orders than as advisers with real influence on the  President,s decisions.   ----------------------------  Evo: The struggling student  ----------------------------   3. (C) While Morales excels at domestic political  machinations, he is more like a struggling student in the  areas of economics and international relations  decisionmaking. A man who likes to be in control, Morales  has shown an eagerness for learning what he needs to make his  own decisions in these areas. He has sought out intellectual  "experts," primarily from Bolivia,s public universities, to  provide him tutoring in the areas he lacks. Morales often  tunes out detailed economic discussions with foreign  officials and will at times defer to his "experts" when  speaking to the press, large groups, and even US officials on  issues he is uncertain about. His domestic intellectual  advisers (SEPTEL), who include Vice President Alvaro Garcia  Linera, Minister of the Presidency Juan Ramon Quintana, and  Minister of Planning Carlos Villegas, are largely leftist  ideologues and have tended to have more influence with the  President compared to his domestic political advisers because  of his difficulty grasping complex economic theories and lack  of experience in the international arena. Unfortunately,  some of this advice borrows from a storehouse of discredited  ideas and fantasyland assumptions.   ------------------------------------------   LA PAZ 00000886 002 OF 002    Evo: The Cuban and Venezuelan conspirator  ------------------------------------------   4. (S//NF) The third group is a pandora's box of Cuban and  Venezuelan advisers, who may have growing influence with the  President. While we do not know the extent of their  presence, sensitive reporting indicates that Morales meets  privately with his foreign advisers multiple times a week  without any domestic advisers present. The same reporting  also indicates that he receives both political and economic  advice from the Cubans. Morales is implementing several  programs initiated by the Cubans and Venezuelans in the areas  of education, health, and citizen registration. Several of  the President's domestic advisers are working hand in hand  with the Cubans and Venezuelans, seeking to replace US  markets with Venezuelan trade deals, and sensitive reporting  says that they are regularly traveling to Cuba for political  training.   5. (C) Comment: Morales has had a roller-coaster  relationship with several of his key domestic advisers,  especially Vice President Garcia Linera. He is highly  suspicious by nature and is unlikely to tolerate advisers  with their own agenda for power and recognition. Morales  likely sees the Cuban and Venezuelan advisers as  non-threatening to his domestic power. In addition, as an  admirer of Cuban President Fidel Castro and Venezuelan  President Hugo Chavez, Morales probably is drawn by the  longevity of their time in power and seeks to emulate their  "success." If Morales grows wary of his domestic advisers he  is likely to rely more heavily on his foreign advisers to  carry out his vision. End comment.  GREENLEE

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