Franklin D. Roosevelt discursa sobre este gobierno marxista

We had to struggle with the old enemies of peace—business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. They had begun to consider the Government of the United States as a mere appendage to their own affairs.

 We know now that Government by organized money is just as dangerous as Government by organized mob.

 Never before in all our history have these forces been so united against one candidate as they stand today. They are unanimous in their hate for me—and I welcome their hatred.
The very employers and politicians and publishers who talk most loudly of class antagonism and the destruction of the American system now undermine that system by this attempt to coerce the votes of the wage earners of this country. It is the 1936 version of the old threat to close down the factory or the office if a particular candidate does not win. It is an old strategy of tyrants to delude their victims into fighting their battles for them. Every message in a pay envelope, even if it is the truth, is a command to vote according to the will of the employer. But this propaganda is worse—it is deceit.
No man can occupy the office of President without realizing that he is President of all the people.
Second Inaugural Address (January 20, 1937)

Retrato de un alienado pseudo-intelectual

Fuente
por María Galindo

A todos los hombres célebres les gusta tener retratos, no por nada el Congreso está lleno de inútiles cuadros convertidos en basura con los años. Lo mismo acontece en la Casa de la Libertad, donde las salas de hombres de Estado retratan más que nada el hecho de que el Estado tiene sexo y color de piel.

Inspirada en ese afán retratista, quiero ofrecer hoy un retrato escrito de nuestro Vicepresidente que ya se ha ganado su espacio en esa rutinaria, empolvada, ófrica y homosexual galería de hombres de la historia de la patria.

Los gestos femeninos en sus piernas cuando las cruza, en sus manos cuando habla y en su manera de recogerse el cabello no se lo debe a una tendencia homosexual sino al hecho de que es un hombre educado por su madre en una familia donde la ausencia paterna ha sido una de las características que más han marcado su infancia y adolescencia.

En ese sentido Álvaro es parte de ese inmenso fenómeno boliviano de los hijos varones criados exclusivamente por sus madres. Yo albergo la esperanza de que esos hijos sean capaces de desarrollar relaciones de empatía con las mujeres, de horizontalidad, de solidaridad y sean agudos analistas del machismo y las relaciones de poder fundadas en el sexo. Pero ése no es el caso de Álvaro; si bien la soledad de su madre ha calado profundamente en su personalidad, esto no ha devenido en una empatía con el universo de las mujeres, sino en un fuerte complejo de superioridad.

Un ejemplo de las manifestaciones de este complejo en él es esa alusión tan ridícula al hecho de que es el hombre que más hubiera leído en el país, algo que quien ama los libros y los ha elegido como compañía permanente de vida no necesita subrayar. Esa muletilla le sirve para presentarse como “dueño de la verdad”; se considera docto en economía, sociología, política, filosofía y en todo lo que toca. Esto es una muestra de su descomunal y peligroso complejo de superioridad.

Cualquier observador con un poco de sentido común diría que Álvaro García Linera es vicepresidente por concesión de Evo Morales y porque supo coger una gran oportunidad. Él, en cambio, considera que estaba predestinado y que es él el redentor de lo indígena, que es él el que convierte a Evo Morales en el primer Presidente indígena de América. Vemos, sin embargo, todos los días el papel secundario que van ocupando los y las actoras indígenas en este proceso del que él se va apropiando glotonamente.

Su relación con “lo indígena” es una relación neurótica, le permite ganar sentido y significado en la vida, pero al mismo tiempo le sirve para no entrar en el análisis de su propia condición de hombre blanco, letrado, salido de un colegio particular, hijo de una madre sola y que no entró a estudiar a la UMSA como el 99,9% de los y las bachilleres de este país, sino que tenía que salir al exterior cumpliendo el sueño arribista de la clase media boliviana.

Su relación con las mujeres es utilitaria. En la cárcel necesitó a una guerrillera solidaria; en la universidad, como profesor, a una estudiante enamorada; y en el poder, a una miss o una presentadora de televisión. En todo caso, jugar al conquistador es rentable en una sociedad machista. No tiene compañera no por ser homosexual, sino por no saber amar.

Otro rasgo característico de Álvaro García Linera es su poco contacto con la realidad. Así como en su adolescencia los libros le sirvieron de refugio donde pensar y soñar con mundos distintos y evadir las tristezas de una vida llena de privaciones, hoy le pasa lo mismo. Hace su análisis a través de lo que ve en la televisión, lee en los periódicos o ve en los libros. No es un hombre que tenga ni haya jamás construido un vínculo subjetivo directo con la realidad que lo rodea. En la cárcel los libros le permitieron evadir el dolor del encierro, ahora en el poder también está mediatizado y está hoy preso de sí mismo y de su rol. Pisar la tierra con los pies, tocar la realidad con las manos, sentir frío sin abrigo, calor sin protección o quemarse al sol es algo que Álvaro no sabe hacer; por eso, además, está siempre tan pálido porque vive como un conde Drácula bajo la sombra de su poder.

En pocas palabras, estamos frente a un hombre neurótico, con un fuerte complejo de superioridad, unilateral, dueño de la verdad y deshumanizado.

Página Siete – La Paz

Seguridad Alimentaria Marx-MASista

Estupideces de plurinacionales:

eju.tv/2012/01/choquehuanca-presentar-ante-oea-declaracin-boliviana-sobre-seguridad-alimentaria/

La producción de alimentos para asegurar "seguridad alimentaria en un estado" no es política de producir productos agropecuarios bajo planificación de un gobierno marx-mas-ista.

El ejemplo clave fue la pudrición (exacto: enmohecido) de la campaña gubernamental de hace dos años para la siembra de arroz.

El gobierno +ista debe construir silos adecuados y sistemas industriales de cosecha, transporte, almacenado y procesado... No simplemente repartir sacos de semillas a sus campesinos masistas.

Bueno. la ventaja de un país de productores dirigidos a masificar la cantidad de un producto es que los consumidores ignorantes no tienen idea de lo que significa cualquier grano mal cosechado, mal transportado, mal almacenado y mal procesado y sobre todo sin control de calidad (alimentaria).

Es que nadie se imagina la cantidad de aflatoxinas que producen diferentes especies de moho en un par de días húmedos en casi todo grano?

Tanta gente que aprovechó la basura de arroz a 3 - 4 Bs/kg que se vende pulido, pero todo destruido por los hongos... El arroz no es blanco, es transparente o amarillento... el resto (blanco y quebradizo) es basura enmohecida, que ni caballos, ni puercos, ni gallinas deben ser alimentados con ella, puesto que dosis mayores de 10 ppm de aflatoxina es contraproducente para la producción pecuaria.

Pobres plurinacionales!

Que tomen ejemplo de planificación comunista
en la "república popular" de China con 30 millones de chinos muertos de hambre por un error de planificación dirigida personalmente por mao-tse-tung para la matanza de unas especies de pájaros granívoros que se comían un quinto de la cosecha. Maximizar la cosecha fue un error ecológico.
O Korea del Norte, donde murieron de hambre como 2,5- 3 millones de coreanos, pese a tanta planificación de Kim Jon Il para la seguridad alimentaria de "su querido pueblo"... Y como absurdo extra, el arroz para los festines del líder era inspeccionado (ya no vive el cerdo comunista por comer demasiado bien y fino) grano por grano (debían ser perfectos en su estructura) por mujeres dedicadas a dar gusto al dictador.

O las locuras agropecuarias de Mugave en Zimbabwe.

Pero claro que cuando hay hambre, cualquier basura sirve para llenar la olla...

Aunque lo pague el hígado... en el caso de las aflatoxinas.
No hablaban los castro y habla chavez de lo mismo?
Cuando en realidad los cubanos no tienen ni siquiera suficiente azúcar para endulzar sus famélica existencia
Y los venezolanos importan  hoy lo que antes del chavismo exportaban al resto del mundo.
Vaya cuento ese de la soberanía alimentaria!

Peripecias griegas del fin del año 2005

Nico's diary, 1 january 2006 (Excerpts)

"anyone going to orinoca to see evo?"

there was loud laughter and affirmative gesturing...

of course they were going to see evo in orinoca, these were his people, the ones who helped to carry him to victory, and besides that, bolivian history was being written.

sensing from the response that the crowds of willing and deserving people would likely have been more than the capacity of available transportation, the next question i asked was more of a prayer than a serious inquiry...

"…and is there any possibility of us joining any of the trucks to orinoca?"

silence...

"well", came the doubtful response, "not unless you are part of the international press corps; we have limited special transportation for international press in the caravan of evo morales. you are not press are you?"

"we certainly are", lejla quickly and confidently responded, "for what other reason do you think we would come to oruro the day before evo arrives to make his pilgrimage to orinoca?"

again, silence...

"well then, you must talk with mr. miranda, present your credentials, and hope for the best..."

several hours later miranda arrived. and, not in the mindset to miss such an historic opportunity, we were also present, "credentials" in hand.

"fine, very good," says mr. miranda to a very stunned and surprised nico and Lejla, “but I must know…are you imperialistas, or anti-imperialists?”

sensing that everything was on the line, we responded:
“anti-imperialistas”, sir.

"good”, miranda responded,
“ then you will meet the others at 4am tomorrow in the plaza under "the clock" and will travel to orinoca in the presidential caravan..."

[...]

Lejla (the wife of Nico Mavris) in the little house where Evo was born

MacMorales's Plurinational Index

La ventaja de no tener una multinacional de hamburguesas

Según El Gran Jefe de los Masistas, no subirían los precios de todos esos ingredientes pues estarán en parte subsidiados y sobre todo regulados hasta que se adecúe nuevamente sus precios (como ejemplo: el azúcar)
Pero algo es seguro... faltarán todos!

www.economist.com/markets/bigmac

economy.blogs.ie.edu/archives

El índice Big Mac fue creado como una guía divertida para indicar si las monedas están en su nivel correcto de paridad con respecto a las demás divisas. Algunos pueden pensar que este índice es una frivolidad pero, además de que se han escrito libros y se han hecho varias tesis doctorales sobre él, ha sabido predecir las tendencias de los tipos de cambio.

Desde 1986, la revista “The Economist” publica periódicamente (dos veces al año) el índice “Big-Mac”. El enfoque teórico del índice Big-Mac se deriva de la teoría de la paridad del poder adquisitivo (PPA) que establece que productos similares, situados en diferentes países, deben tener igual precio (ley de un sólo precio). Es decir, el tipo de cambio debe igualar los precios de una cesta de bienes y servicios en dos países. Si se cumpliese la teoría de la PPA un dólar debería servir para comprar lo mismo, o la misma cantidad de productos, en todos los países del mundo. Sin embargo, esto no siempre ocurre ya que con una misma suma de dinero en algunos países se puede adquirir un volumen físico de bienes y servicios muy superior al que se puede comprar en otros. Los analistas tienden a considerar que esta teoría se cumple en el largo plazo, y, por tanto, es un indicador de la tendencia que seguirá el tipo de cambio en el futuro.

Fuente

Hay un índice usado para comparar divisas y medir el valor de las monedas. Este índice es el índice Big-Mac y sencillamente comparar el valor de esta (magnífica) hamburguesa en las diferentes partes del mundo. Este índice toma como premisa que los costes del Big-Mac son los mismos en todas partes, en las mismas cantidades y que por lo tanto el precio final es comparable. Más de 3000 puntos de venta y presencia en 120 países avalan este dato. Podéis ver más información sobre esto en este artículo de Rafael Pampillón.

Ayer publicaba El Mundo algo parecido a este índice, pero lo que se representaba era el aumento del coste de un Big-Mac en España. La siguiente imagen muestra el aumento en el precio de los ingredientes de la hamburguesa. Una vez más, lo relevante no este dato concreto sino su extrapolación a la situación general.

Imagen del artículo del periódico El Mundo, 25 junio 2008

A tener en cuenta también que estos son precios para McDonnalds, que tendrá sus proveedores y que como es lógico aplicará una dura negociación con estos. Este poder de negociación no está tan claro en el comprador individual, aunque este dispone a cambio de mayor flexibilidad para el cambio de proveedor.

El índice Big-Mac es un indicador que toma como base el precio de una hamburguesa consumida en los establecimientos McDonald’s en los diferentes países del mundo. El índice Big-Mac sirve para saber si los tipos de cambio de las monedas están bien valorados o si, por el contrario, están infravalorados o sobrevalorados. Es decir, el índice ofrece una guía para saber si una divisa se encuentra en su paridad “correcta” o no. Ello se debe a que el tipo de cambio entre dos monedas está en equilibrio cuando el precio de dos cestas idénticas, compuestas por determinados bienes y servicios, es igual en los dos países. El índice Big-Mac supone que una hamburguesa Big-Mac de los establecimientos McDonald’s es una cesta de bienes representativos, ya que mantiene unas características similares a nivel internacional. El que se comercialice en 3000 establecimientos de 120 países usando los mismos ingredientes, hace posible comparar los precios de los países a nivel mundial. El precio base es siempre el de EEUU y se obtiene como promedio de cuatro ciudades americanas (Atlanta, Chicago, Nueva York y San Francisco).

economist.com/node/17257797?story_id=17257797

Indice del 14 de octubre de 2010

Pequeñeces de un hombre de estado

JEMA y un Zapatero primeros contactos...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LDhzmqwpj_M
JEMA hablando de democracia socialista en la cultura del diálogo
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v44yCj7CNbg
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ejx94RISH6o (biocombustibles, "no somos de la cultura de la muerte" "Irán, por el momento, no es un país que manda tropas, para acabar vidas. Cuba....etc.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xzkoukhqz2s
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gh22laLZHDI
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WkFNMFsQThg
...quienes masacran al pueblo, quienes violan los derechos humanos, quienes hacen daño económico al estado tienen que ir a la carcel!
P. Piensa Ud. que el líder de un pais, no importa cómo progrese, deba estar un tiempo ilimitado en el poder?
eeeh... el LIMITADO no sería tan democrático...y aquí es importante la conciencia del pueblo, y nuestra propuesta es que tiene que haber revocatorio como también ratificatorio
...si el alcalde, prefecto, gobernador o presidente no tiene apoyo del pueblo, debe ser revocatorio [revocado del poder] antes que cumpla su mandato...
en Irán...no puede seguir una matanza en un pueblo como Irán [JEMA cree que EEUU tiene una cruenta guerra en Irán, el traductor nota de forma impensada el error y traduce: Irán...IRAK] [el presidente MASista no sabe ni lo que hace militarmente "su pueblo hermano" iraní..]

JEMA en su repetitivo pututo de conceptos y acepciones en la Asamblea General de la UNO en 1996, expresando y exigiendo estupideces

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zwigM-WDyvw

Recomiendo una media docena de ghost writer para JEMA, aunque sean quechuo-aymaras, pero con algo de cultura política universal y mejor estructura de ideas. Eso sí, sugiero que alguien le enseñe a leerlos correctamente Que logre leer esos discursos debe ser una hazaña,
Para evitar mayores vergüenzas recomiendo que en el futuro se exprese en todo acontecimiento seguido por prensa internacional. en su lengua materna, espero que sus ideas tengan más estructura.
Parece que lo único claro que tiene es que cuba tiene la mejor democracia, y chavez está consolidando su imperio socialista y por lo visto en Bolivia implantará su democracia comunistaria de movimientos sociales donde su Estado decidirá lo mejor para nuestra felicidad, tanto cultural, social y económica...

La estatura del jefazo

Después de leer sobre los 190 cm del Gran Jefe Indígena del Estado Plurinacional considero necesario desmitificar tamaños antes que hagan de él un huno de D' Artagnan de más de 2 m.

Dimitry Medvedev no tiene más de 165 cm y lo único que parece más grande que el ruso es el tupé y la nariz torva del plurinashional

Y por si dudan:

http://massatira.blogspot.com/2010/10/reconociendo-colores.html

Cristina mide aproximadamente no más de 165 cm + 5 cm de tacos = 170 cm
El Jefazo no tiene más de 171 cm
Punto!

BOLIVIA: COUNTER-NARCOTICS NEWS AND TRENDS

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09LAPAZ1784	2009-12-17 21:09	2010-12-03 21:09	UNCLASSIFIED	Embassy La Paz

VZCZCXYZ0000 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHLP #1784/01 3512151 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 172150Z DEC 09 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0260 INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/DIRJIATF SOUTH RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/NATIONAL DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENTER JOHNSTOWN PA RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC RHMFIUU/DEPT OF STATE AIR WING PATRICK AFB FL RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0023 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS LA PAZ 001784  SIPDIS  STATE PASS TO CNC LINEAR WASHINGTON DC  JIATF SOUTH FOR USCINCSO MIAMI FL//SCJ2/SCJ3/SCJ5/SCFA  DEPT FOR INL, WHA/PPC, WHA/AND  USAID FOR LAC/SA  JUSTICE FOR OIA, AFMLA AND NDDS  CUSTOMS FOR LA OPS, INTELLIGENCE  DEA FOR OEL   E.O. 12958: N/A  TAGS: SNAR BL KJUS PHUM SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: COUNTER-NARCOTICS NEWS AND TRENDS   REF: LA PAZ 1589   ¶1. 1. Summary and comment: Bolivian Counternarcotics (CN)  officials have voiced public concern over a number of negative  trends, including a sharp rise in the number of cocaine  laboratories seized, the GOB's inability to track the rising number  of small aircraft used to transport drugs to neighboring countries,  the increasing presence of foreign drug cartels, and increased coca  cultivation. Despite positive interdiction and eradication  statistics (septel), local contacts believe these trends will  worsen without immediate GOB attention. GOB officials recognize  the problems, and the overwhelming victory of the ruling Movement  Toward Socialism (MAS) party (reftel) will give President Morales  additional power to shape CN policy. Still, he will face  challenges in stepping up eradication and interdiction efforts,  risking the anger of coca farmers, the core of his political base.  This is the first in a series of NAS reports on counternarcotics  trends and policy in Bolivia. End summary and comment.   Proliferation Of Cocaine Laboratories   ¶2. 2. The Department of Cochabamba has become a center for the  production of cocaine base, according to statements made by FELCN  commanders to Bolivian press. FELCN Cochabamba Director Colonel  Elvin Baptista told reporters November 30 that FELCN destroyed 600  cocaine factories in Cochabamba during 2009. Baptista explained  that most were found in rural areas, close to rivers or other  sources of water, and used Colombian methods, which consist of  grinding up coca using electric motors, and then mixing it with  precursor chemicals in rigid plastic containers.   ¶3. 3. FELCN director Colonel Oscar Nina said on November 12  that the Department of Santa Cruz has become a major center for  crystallization (purification) of cocaine that is processed in  other regions of Bolivia. He explained that FELCN had discovered  16 cocaine crystallization labs during recent operations, one of  which had the capacity to produce 100 kilos per day of high purity  cocaine. The cocaine is produced in Santa Cruz, and the drug is  then exported to Europe and the United States through ports in  Chile and Brazil, according to Nina. (Note: DEA estimates less than  one percent of cocaine seized in the U.S. can be chemically traced  back to Bolivia. End Note).   ¶4. 4. FELCN reported that it destroyed an average of two labs  per day in the Department of La Paz in 2009. El Alto, the  sprawling city of mostly poor immigrants that sits on the high  plain above the city of La Paz, has become a major center of lab  activity. FELCN La Paz commander Colonel Fernando Amurrio reported  that FELCN destroyed 133 factories in El Alto during the first 10  months of the year. Many of these labs are small Colombian-style  labs hidden inside houses, making them difficult to detect. La Paz   is considered a transit point where coca is converted into cocaine  base paste and cocaine and then shipped to Santa Cruz or other  areas of Bolivia to be exported. During a series of coordinated  operations in the Department of La Paz November 20-26, FELCN seized  93 kilos of cocaine and five tons of marijuana, detained 17 people,  and seized five vehicles.   ¶5. 5. FELCN destroyed two large-scale cocaine factories on  November 25 in the Sicaya municipality in the Department of  Cochabamba. FELCN estimated that during their three months of  operation the factories had produced 180 kilos of cocaine base  paste, and estimated that they could have produced one ton per year  if they had remained in operation. The seizures brought the total  number of seized factories in the region to 12 during the month.  Cochabamba and MAS deputy Edmundo Novillo noted that increasing  middle class involvement in coca production and ancillary  activities, in Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, will require greater GOB  response.   ¶6.   Growing Community Involvement in Production and Trafficking   ¶7. 6. The current rise in the net amount of coca grown and  cocaine produced in Bolivia has deepened rural community  involvement in the drug trade, according to numerous NAS contacts  in FELCN and the GOB's Directorate of Coca Production (DIGPRO  COCA). Contacts report that drug traffickers pay between $8,000 to  $10,000 to small rural communities, to buy their cooperation in  establishing cocaine factories, and then share profits with the  community to retain acceptance and trust.   ¶8. 7. In a November 26 operation in the indigenous community  of Machak Marca de Pocona (in Cochabamba Department), FELCN  destroyed 32 Colombian-style labs but was able to make only one  arrest because the entire community fled when tipped off about the  raid. (Note: Locals in such remote areas can often easily spot  official vehicles from miles away, due to the lack of vegetation  and building development. End note.) The local FELCN commander  expressed his amazement to Bolivian reporters at the degree of  involvement of the entire community in the production activities.   CN Police Concerned About Trafficking Via Small Aircraft   ¶9. 8. FELCN Director Colonel Oscar Nina told reporters  November 1 that Bolivia CN forces lack the capacity to detect the  high and rising number of small aircraft that transport drugs to  neighboring countries. Nina explained that FELCN lacks radar or  other technological equipment to confront the problem. Vice  Minister of Social Defense Felipe Caceres told reporters November 9  that the GOB's "weakness" in its war against drugs was on the  country's borders. Caceres noted that President Morales had  instructed the Defense Minister to work on acquiring additional   planes, helicopters and radars to close this gap. (Many of our  Bolivian CN contacts in the Department of Santa Cruz have told us  frequently that Bolivia's lack of control over its airspace results  in near free rein for air trafficking. Sources tell us that 175  suspicious flights were tracked by Brazilian government mobile  radar on the border between Bolivia and Brazil in a two-month  period last fall.)   Involvement of Foreign Drug Cartels   ¶10. 9. Bolivian press reported extensively on FELCN Commander  General Oscar Nina's October 28 statement that Mexican drug cartels  are investing in cocaine manufacturing in Bolivia to secure  sufficient supply to satisfy market demand. Nina stated that  Mexicans employ Colombian drug mafias, which in turn hire local  drug gangs. He also stated that Colombians have taken the place of  Peruvians, who until recently dominated the Bolivian cocaine  market.   ¶11.   ¶12. 10. The District Prosecutor's Office in Santa Cruz recently  expressed concern about the presence of foreign assassins who are  hired by drug traffickers to commit murders in Bolivia.  Anti-corruption Special Prosecutor Alex Oswaldo Cespedes told  reporters November 16 that seven people had been killed in Santa  Cruz over the preceding 59 days, and that he believed foreign  assassins ("sicarios") bore responsibility. Cespedes said that a  major increase in drug trafficking activities in the city had made  conditions ripe for the creation of drug trafficking organizations.  The commander of Bolivia's Special Anti-Crime Police Force, Colonel  Miguel Gonzalez, said it is too early to conclude that foreign  assassins were involved.   Increase in Coca Cultivation   ¶13. 11. The GOB announced December 9 that coca cultivation had  increased 6% in 2009 compared to the prior year, or by roughly  1,830 hectares. Vice Minister of Social Defense Felipe Caceres  told NAS Director that the two main national parks have more than  2,000 hectares of illegal coca - 1,081 hectares in Isiboro-Secure  and 972 hectares in Carrasco. He said the GOB knows it will have  to resort to forced eradication in 2010, noting that many cocaleros  do not respect the limits on cultivation set by the GOB. 

Coca Union Says Much Coca Circumvents Legal Markets  ¶14. 12. The Yungas Coca Producers' Association (ADEPCOCA), the  union formed by 30,000 coca growers from twelve provinces of Los  Yungas, released a report on November 10 that stated that of the  16,127 metric tons of coca leaf grown annually in the Yungas, only   4,887 metric tons (30 percent) arrives at the legal coca market in  Villa Fatima in La Paz. The destination of the remaining 11,240  metric tons is unknown, according to the report. The ADEPCOCA  report also stated that of the 54,000 metric tons of coca grown  nationwide each year, only 21,778 metric tons (40 percent) reaches  the two legally sanctioned markets -- Villa Fatima in La Paz and  Sacaba in Cochabamba.  Lobbying For A New Legal Coca Marketplace   ¶15. 13. Coca growers of the Munecas Province in the Department of  La Paz presented to Congress a draft bill to create a new legal  coca market in the city of El Alto, next to La Paz, and branches in  La Paz and Cochabamba. Currently, there are two legal markets -  Villa Fatima in Los Yungas and Sacaba in Cochabamba.   Bolivians Polled On Views Of Coca Situation   ¶16. 14. Equipos Mori conducted a November poll in Bolivia's nine  departments that found:  * 60% of Bolivians believe that coca cultivation has  increased since Evo Morales became President;  * 75% believe coca eradication should continue;  * 61% believe that there should be additional government  control over coca production; and  * 55% believe the state should control production and  commercialization of coca.   ¶17. 15. Comment: It may not be surprising that many Bolivians are  concerned about coca expansion and support eradication. Those  directly involved in coca production are a relatively small, but  influential, percentage of the overall Bolivian population. There  are approximately 44,000 families in the Chapare (an average of  five people per family) that are directly involved in growing coca,  and 26,000 families in the Yungas (an average of four people per  family). The total Bolivian population is approximately 9 million.   ¶18.  Creamer

EU WEIGHS ITS COUNTER-NARCOTICS EFFORTS IN BOLIVIA

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09LAPAZ1541	2009-11-10 15:03	2010-12-03 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz

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C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 001541   SIPDIS   E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2019  TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR EU BO SUBJECT: EU WEIGHS ITS COUNTER-NARCOTICS EFFORTS IN BOLIVIA   REF: LA PAZ 1494   Classified By: Charge John Creamer, reasons 1.4 b and d.   ¶1. (C) Summary: Our exchanges with European Union  representatives and an EU working group paper underscore  growing European recognition of the need for intensified  cooperation on counter-narcotics in Bolivia. The Europeans  note increases in coca production, fear the introduction of  third country criminal organizations, and recognize the loss  in GOB capabilities with the expulsion of DEA last year.  Among proposals under consideration by the EU are increases  in technical assistance and alternative development,  development of EU member state law enforcement cooperation,  better internal coordination, and strengthening CN  cooperation with neighboring countries. EU officials are  also keen to reopen the UNODC office in La Paz, and seek U.S.  assistance in pressing the UN to do so quickly. Although EU  counter-narcotics efforts have so far been relatively modest  and focused on alternative development, EU officials  generally share our assessments and are considering stepping  up their engagement, including on law enforcement (by  individual member states) and by pushing GOB reductions in  coca cultivation. End summary.   ¶2. (C) An internal policy paper prepared by the  recently-formed EU Drugs Working Group (made up of  representatives from local EU missions) highlights European  concerns about the worsening counter-narcotics situation in  Bolivia and the Europeans' interest in doing more. The EU  paper notes the growth of cocaine use in Europe -- the  ultimate destination for most Bolivian cocaine -- and the  troubling increase in coca production in Bolivia and other  Andean countries (the EU estimates 32-34,000 hectares under  production in Bolivia, slightly higher than the UNODC's  figure of 30,500). GOB efforts to control the legal coca  market are seriously flawed, the EU notes, while Bolivian  government interdiction remains hampered by the loss of DEA's  logistical and intelligence support (following DEA's  expulsion in November 2008). A major European concern --  also voiced by EU Ambassador Bell and others to the Charge --  is that Colombian and Mexican cartels will enter the Bolivian  market, expanding production and increasing  trafficking-related violence.   ¶3. (C) Amid sustained domestic pressure for increases in  legal production, the EU has provided one million euros to  fund a GOB survey of legal coca demand and other related  studies (the "Comprehensive Study on the Coca Leaf in  Bolivia"). Ambassador Bell explained that the full results  of the legal demand survey will not be available before July  2010, although the GOB may attempt to revise its legislation  governing legal production (including an increase from the  current 12,000 hectares authorized) before then. Bell  suggested that any estimate of 20,000 hectares or less should  prove useful in pressing the GOB to cut coca cultivation.  Separately, UK Ambassador Baker voiced disappointment that  the study will not be ready until next summer, but stressed  that the international community should not wait until then  to press the Bolivians on this issue.   ¶4. (C) EU officials acknowledge that their counter-narcotics  assistance is small scale compared to the aid the U.S. has  provided. According to their policy paper, most assistance  has gone toward alternative development (the European  Commission has provided nearly 50 million euros, Belgium and  Spain several million euros each), with lesser amounts in  equipment donations (the U.K. gave the GOB $500,000 in  forensics equipment this year; Germany and Italy have also  provided small amounts of in-kind aid). The UK, Spain,  Italy, the Netherlands and France have provided limited CN  training to Bolivian police in recent years. Ambassador Bell  maintains that the EU cannot be involved directly in  eradication, but allowed that some eradication-related aid  may be possible (e.g., covering ancillary costs).   ¶5. (C) More critically, Ambassador Bell noted, the EU lacks  the capability to fill the law enforcement vacuum left by  DEA's expulsion, but EU members states can and should be  pressed to strengthen such cooperation, he said. The UK,  Spanish and visiting Swedish ambassadors have all  acknowledged privately that the EU's limited CN approach has  proven insufficient and needs to be expanded to include  direct support for law enforcement. Ambassador Baker  reported that the UK is currently undergoing an internal  review of its regional CN policy, to be completed by early  December, that will include consideration of new efforts in  this area. Additionally, the Europeans indicate that they  intend to step up consultation with neighboring states such  as Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina, which are strengthening  their own cross-border counter-narcotics cooperation with the  GOB.   ¶6. (C) The EU's paper proposes a number of CN measures for  the near term, including increased funding for technical  assistance (e.g., on money laundering and judicial support),  expansion of alternative development aid, and creation of  mechanisms to aid the GOB in evaluating both its CN successes  and shortcomings. The EU working group also identified as a  priority better CN coordination, both internally and with  other international partners. Ambassador Baker amplified  that point, maintaining that a coordinated, united stance  will be critical to overcoming Bolivian President Morales's  apparent resistance to reversing the growth in coca  cultivation. The Europeans also see the re-opening of the  UNODC office in La Paz (closed for budgetary reasons) as key  to strengthened coordination. Ambassador Bell reported that  the EU has contributed 500,000 euros for UNODC projects and  office funding and asked for U.S. help in pushing the UN to  open the office as soon as possible. (Note: We understand  from the UN that donor support will determine whether the  UNODC can return.)   ¶7. (C) Comment: We see a welcome evolution in the EU's  approach toward counter-narcotics in Bolivia, as EU and EU  member state officials evince recognition of the need to move  beyond their relatively modest and narrowly-focused efforts  to date. The Europeans may be convinced that Morales does  not want Bolivia to be categorized as a narco-state, but they  are also clear-eyed about GOB shortcomings (in terms of  political will, capabilities and corruption), and understand  that the EU has to shoulder a greater share of the burden in  confronting these challenges. With policy limitations on  what the EU can do collectively, however, translating this  recognition into concrete action will take time, as well as  leadership from individual member states.  CREAMER

BOLIVIA'S REFERENDUM: MARGIN OF VICTORY MATTERS

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09LAPAZ96	2009-01-23 13:01	2010-11-30 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PHUM PINR ENVR BL SUBJECT: BOLIVIA'S REFERENDUM: MARGIN OF VICTORY MATTERS

REF: A. 08 LAPAZ 2606
¶B. LA PAZ 6
 ¶C. LA PAZ 11
¶D. LA PAZ 62
¶E. LA PAZ 90

Classified By: A/EcoPol Chief Joe Relk for reasons 1.4 (b, d)

¶1. (C) Summary:  With the January 25 constitutional
referendum rapidly approaching, all signs point to victory
for President Morales and his ruling Movement Toward
Socialism (MAS) party.  Although the opposition has made
 inroads into the MAS lead, most national polls point to
between 54 and 60 percent support for the proposed
constitution (with one government poll showing 66 percent),
and the MAS appears set to leverage its considerable rural
base to victory.  After a series of national news articles
raised questions about significant fraud in the August 2008
recall referendum, the National Electoral Court has taken
pains to advertise the electoral rolls as secure.  However, a
recent poll shows less than half of the public shares the
 court's confidence, and the opposition believes significant
electoral fraud is likely.  While cheating seems unnecessary
to secure victory for the MAS, padding their lead would give
the party leverage in congressional negotiations regarding
legislation implementing hundreds of vague constitutional
clauses.  Opposition leaders continue to fear the MAS will
use any stalemate in these negotiations to close congress and
institute rule by decree.  At both the national and regional
levels, the margin of victory matters.  A landslide for the
 MAS nationally, or large victories for the opposition in the
eastern departments, could spark more conflict.  End summary.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -
MAS Victory Seems Assured
- - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶2. (C) With the January 25 constitutional referendum rapidly
approaching, all signs point to victory for President Morales
and his ruling Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party.
 Although the opposition has made inroads into their lead,
causing the MAS to tone down its rhetoric, national polls
point to between 54 and 60 percent support for the proposed
constitution.  (One government poll shows the "yes" vote
winning by 66 percent.)  However, many polls downplay or
ignore the MAS' rural base.  Almost as importantly, the MAS
seems prepared to take at least five of the nine departments,
including La Paz, Potosi, Oruro, Cochabamba, and Pando, with
Beni a distinct possibility.  If the MAS can win at levels
 similar to their August 2008 referendum victory (i.e. 67
percent or more) and can make inroads into the "Media Luna"
or eastern half of the country, they will have much more
leverage in upcoming congressional negotiations over
implementing legislation.

- - - - - -
Polling Data
- - - - - -

¶3. (C) Polling data has varied widely over the past two
weeks, due to a combination of a tightening race and polling
methodologies (i.e. city vs. rural).  Recent national polls
by Gallup and Apoyo within the last week show approval for
the constitution with a much slimmer lead than many expected,
ahead only 48 to 42 percent and 49 to 43 percent,
respectively.  Ipsos and Mori both conducted polls of capital
cities and both found the "yes" vote ahead, with Ipsos
 showing a 59 to 35 percent lead and Mori reporting 60 to 40
percent.  However, our contacts tell us all these polls
partially or totally ignored the rural vote, where the MAS
has much of its base.  A poll by Observatorio de Gestion
Publica, publicized by government-friendly Radio Patria
Nueva, marked the constitution's lead at 66 percent, versus
31 percent against.  Some estimate a six percent "bump" when
the rural vote is included.

 ¶4. (U) Polls showing a breakdown
by city or region indicate
the constitution will easily win in at least four
departments: La Paz, Potosi, Oruro, and Cochabamba, likely
with at least 70 percent support in each.  The MAS has a
distinct chance to capture both Pando and Beni as well.  In
Pando, the Observatorio poll shows Pando department split
evenly, and the Ipsos poll shows the capital city of Cobija
supporting the constitution by a ratio of 64 to 36.  Polling
 data for Beni has been more scattershot, but although its
capital city of Trinidad is firmly against the constitution,
by as much as 88 percent, the larger city of Riberalta is
leaning for approval of the constitution.  The Observatorio
poll shows Beni evenly split as a department.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -
Rural and Indigenous Role
- - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶5. (SBU) Although the opposition is making a mighty effort
across the country to rally against the constitution, the
forces of inertia seem to be conspiring against them,
particularly in the form of a largely uneducated rural base
in the Altiplano.  Leading daily La Razon interviewed several
community leaders from the Altiplano, and their supporters,
and reported on January 18 that neither the leaders nor the
supporters had read the Constitution.  Instead, the repeated
 message was that rural communities would take their marching
orders from the MAS, and vote for the constitution. According
to the Ipso poll of capital cities, only four percent of
respondents said they had read much or all of the
constitution, 45 percent of respondents said they have read
some, and 50 percent said they had read none of the draft
text.  In the countryside, the number of those reading the
constitution is much lower.  Post suspects disinterest, blind
faith in Evo Morales' political project, and illiteracy,
 despite the Cuban literacy program, all play a role.  In
addition, the sheer volume of the 411-article constitution
probably scares some potential readership away.

¶6. (C) However, despite the overall level of MAS dominance
among campesinos and indigenous voters, some opposition does
exist, albeit for a variety of reasons.  The xxxxxxxxxxxx, has tried to rally
support against the MAS and the proposed constitution (Reftel
 A).  In a meeting with PolOffs, they lamented the way the MAS
had "cheated" and "fooled" campesinos into believing Morales
was himself truly indigenous or cared about indigenous
issues.  Although they held a national meeting on January 17
and tried to reach out to the press, they sounded defeated
when they acknowledged that the MAS, through a combination of
funding and pressure on local social and business leaders,
held a "vertical control" in the countryside that would be
difficult to break.  They also noted rural communities tended
 to vote in blocks, supporting one political party until they
discarded it to vote en masse for another.

¶7. (C) Going in a completely different direction, some rural
social groups and far-left leaders, such as Achacachi Mayor
Eugenio Rojas and El Alto City Councilor Roberto de La Cruz
also publicly recommended voting against it because it was
seen as not revolutionary enough.  They criticized the
government for making too many concessions to the opposition
 during the constitutional compromise reached on October 21,
including the agreement to not make land reform retroactive.
However, they have a relatively small following, and some,
like de La Cruz, eventually reversed course as the projected
MAS margin of victory shrunk in January.  Edgar Patana,
leader of the regional workers union (COR), other El Alto
union leaders, and the majority of social groups have
recommended voting for the constitution.

 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Opposition Feisty, But Realistic
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶8. (C) The opposition has not given up, but seems to be
battling
more to limit the margin of defeat than to win.  In
Santa Cruz,xxxxxxxxxxxx
told EmbOff that polls show an overwhelming victory for the
 "No" vote in Santa Cruz, but that he is worried about the
opposition's goal of winning in five of Bolivia's nine
departments (Reftel E).  Although a current
privately-commissioned opposition poll showed the
constitution ahead by a margin of only five points, 39 to 34
percent (with 20 percent undecided), opposition alternate
xxxxxxxxxxxx doubted the opposition would be able to
win the referendum outright even under the most optimistic
scenario.  He predicted that Morales would succeed in
 personalizing the constitution as "Evo's constitution" and
leverage his cult of personality.  Ultimately xxxxxxxxxxxx was more
concerned with the margin of the opposition's defeat and
discrediting the results of "any election that uses this
voter roll" (Reftel C).

¶9. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx has been
criss-crossing the country with opposition xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx, campaigning against the proposed constitution, but
 also building a foundation for a likely run for the
presidency. xxxxxxxxxxxx claimed opposition leaders put aside
jockeying to be the 2009 opposition unity presidential
candidate in the final days of the "no" campaign to "attack
the government from three sides:" the prefects (governors)
who been traveling around the Media Luna to show &they are
not afraid" of government threats to arrest them and
galvanize support in opposition departments, a group of three
 presidential contenders to show opposition unity and
xxxxxxxxxxxx, who is used for more cerebral attacks on the CPE
and to &dismiss the governments mythology that they
exclusively represent the indigenous.8  xxxxxxxxxxxx noted that
opposition parties Podemos and MNR are playing a deliberately
muted role, recognizing that their unpopular association with
the &old regimes8 would play into MAS strategy.  "Political
 parties are bad words in Bolivia," xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx La
Paz-based group of mostly young professionals who focus on
issues and distance themselves from the party moniker.  "We
need parties, but we need to start from scratch, without the
old leaders.  This will take time."

¶10. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx told
PolOff the opposition is chipping away at the MAS referendum
 lead despite the government's leviathan advantage in
resources by de-personalizing the constitution and
"convincing people on the street that is not in their best
interests."  Although he conceded the "no" campaign would
ultimately be a losing effort, he cited the emerging feud
between Morales and Church, corruption charges against
government officials, and the increasingly precarious economy
as emerging factors in December and January that created an
opposition "surge" after "we were so depressed" in the fall.
xxxxxxxxxxxx said that the government's newfound mobilization of
congressmen and deputies to challenge the opposition view on
television and radio shows is proof of government panic.
"Before they just thought they could ignore us (and win),"
said xxxxxxxxxxxx.  "They said there was no opposition." xxxxxxxxxxxx
agreed, and added that this is playing into the opposition's
hands, because they "are forced to defend a constitution they
often know little about."  According to xxxxxxxxxxxx has
been challenging MAS supporters to debate him during his
 speaking tours and embarrassed Vice Minister of Social Groups
Sacha Llorenti in a January 20 debate when he started talking
in fluent Aymara.  He asked the dumbstruck Llorenti what he
planned to do if the constitution passed, since all public
officials will be required to speak one of Bolivia's
indigenous languages.  Later he challenged President Morales
to debate him in Aymara, which the president allegedly speaks
poorly.

 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Fraud, Doubts, and Questions
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -


¶11. (C) The National Electoral Court (CNE), which will
oversee and ratify the results of the referendum, has
undertaken a public relations campaign to assure the public
of the security of the election rolls, which came under
scrutiny after leading daily La Razon published a series of
 articles questioning the validity of the August 10, 2008
recall referendum.  Several contacts, including xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx, told us the MAS padded their
August referendum victory by five to seven points through
fraud at several levels (reftel C).  While many international
observers groups are expected to view the January 25
constitutional referendum -- including the European Union,
the OAS, the Carter Center, the UN, the CAN, the
South-American and Andean parliaments, and UNASUR (septel) --
 the depth of the earlier fraud has muted the opposition's
confidence in observers' ability to ensure the results are
fair.  Members of the Santa Cruz civic committee told EmbOff
that they have no faith in international observers.  The
committee has met with the OAS team already and "told our
side of the story", describing the discoveries of tens of
thousands of false voter cards and the statistical signs of
fraud in areas that managed to vote 100 percent for President
Morales in the August 2008 referendum.  However, the civic
 committee said that the fact that international observers
blessed the August referendum means they do not expect an
honest review of the constitutional referendum.  Civic
committee members also noted that small numbers of observers,
generally based in the city, will not be able to stop
widespread fraud in the countryside, which is where they
believe most of the August 10 fraud took place.

¶12. (C) In a press conference designed to bolster confidence
 in the security of the electoral rolls, National Electoral
Court (CNE) President Jose Luis Exeni presented a PowerPoint
describing the bill of clean health given by the OAS.  As
part of the presentation, he showed the number of voters
dropped from the rolls for not participating in prior
elections and the number added during this cycle.  While all
departments projected to vote against the constitution had a
net reduction in the voter rolls, including 85,000 Crucenos
and 17,000 Benianos, MAS strongholds including La Paz
 (38,000) and Potosi (16,000) saw substantial gains -- a
curious reckoning, considering population and migration
trends to the contrary.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Pando At Center of Storm, Again
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶13. (C) While it is possible the constitution could pass in
Beni, most opposition leaders tell us the MAS has set its
 sights on lightly-populated Pando department as its best
chance to win in five departments.  By winning the popular
vote and a majority of the departments, the MAS could more
credibly claim to have support throughout the country.  Pando
has also traditionally aligned with the opposition, so a
breakthrough win there would send a strong signal that the
strength of the MAS continues to rise.  And with fewer than
32,000 registered voters, or less than one percent of the
country's voting population, Pando is the most vulnerable
 department to even small amounts of fraud or voter
registration changes.

¶14. (C) In a conversation with PolOff, xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx alleged the MAS deliberately fomented unrest in Pando
in September to justify a military siege, depose Prefect
Leopoldo Fernandez, and arrest opposition-aligned leaders to
swing the balance of power to the MAS in the Senate.  Besides
disabling the opposition's ability to campaign by arresting
 many of its leaders,xxxxxxxxxxxx alleged the government crackdown
changed Pando's electoral map by causing hundreds of
opposition voters to flee to Brazil while importing 2,000 new
security forces, which xxxxxxxxxxxx claimed were likely MAS voters
from the Altiplano (Reftel B).  xxxxxxxxxxxx added
that in the run-up to the August 2008 referendum, Government
Minister Alfredo Rada facilitated the establishment of fake
identities via the police role in issuing national identity
cards (which can then be used to vote).  (Reftel C).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
January 26: What Happens Next?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶15. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx told PolOff December 31 that
a general election prompted by passage of the new
constitution requires a plethora of enabling legislation that
the opposition-controlled Senate will block, at least in the
forms likely to be proposed by the MAS (Reftel B).  xxxxxxxxxxxx
 said the new draft constitution is deliberately vague, which
grants MAS legislators wide discretion to "fill in the
blanks" with new implementing legislation.  He also said the
Senate would clash with the government on assigning new
borders for electoral districts, needed for the general
election.  xxxxxxxxxxxx added that Morales' MAS party is
already injecting "ridiculous" interpretations of the
constitution into a wide gamut of implementing legislation
that "the Senate cannot in good conscious agree to."  He said
 Senate rejection of MAS proposals provides a ready excuse for
Morales to dismiss congress for "rejecting the will of the
people" and then have President Morales rule by decree
(Reftel D).

¶16. (C) Despite the official government position that
President Morales will undergo treatment to correct a
deviated septum immediately following the referendum, several
contacts confirm that the problem is actually a tumor in the
 pituitary near the sella turcica and that Morales will travel
to Spain for the operation.  xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx told us Morales' first choice, Cuba, could not
perform the surgery.  Article 238 is also of consequence to
the post-January 25 political landscape.  It would establish
that all other government officials must stand down three
months before general elections expected in 2009, with the
notable exception of the president and vice president.
Besides providing the MAS the advantage of ruling during the
 campaign, it also ensures leadership cannot pass to the
opposition-controlled Senate.  It is unclear why the
opposition waited until the final week before the referendum
to complain about the article or why they accepted it during
marathon sessions in October to arrive at a "compromise
text," which, it should be noted, the opposition agreed to
under duress, with thousands of MAS-aligned protesters
surrounding the congress and threatening violence.

 - - - -
Comment
- - - -

¶17. (C) It is likely there will be some amount of fraud in a
referendum the MAS seems likely to win legitimately anyway.
While it can be difficult to separate fact from fiction, the
Morales administration has a reputation of doing exactly what
they announce they will do.  In this case, 66 percent seems
 to be the target number, and the MAS is likely to pull out
all the stops to reach that level.  With at least two-thirds
support across the country and a minimum of five of the nine
departments under his belt, President Morales would be able
to claim a political mandate to implement the constitution
quickly.  Practically speaking, this will put great pressure
on the Congress, especially the opposition-controlled Senate,
to acquiesce in negotiations and accept MAS versions of
implementation legislation.  If they do not, Morales and
 others in the MAS have spoken of rule by decree.  Using
similar logic, Morales could call for early elections to more
quickly advance the "democratic revolution" in Bolivia.
Early elections would also help the MAS avoid dealing with
the quickly-crumbling economy, which would likely be more of
an issue in December.

¶18. (C) Both sides seem to be angling over the margin of the
MAS victory, not the victory itself.  While Morales continues
 to predict a victory of up to 80 percent, Vice President
Garcia
Linera tried to manage expectations with a 66 percent
estimate on January 21.  The margin matters.  If the
constitution gets less than two-thirds support, many
observers feel this would represent a relative defeat,
especially when Morales himself has set such high
expectations.  On the other hand, we are equally concerned
that large-margin victories in media luna departments could
 lead opposition leaders to ignore the national results and
resume a course for autonomy on their own terms -- putting
them on a collision course with the national government.  A
solid but not overwhelming MAS victory, perhaps around 56 to
60 percent, might be the best outcome to keep both sides from
claiming a strong mandate for extreme measures.
URS  

MORALES BASHES GOLDBERG PINATA ONE MORE TIME

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08LAPAZ2670	2008-12-31 16:04	2010-12-03 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz

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C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 002670   SIPDIS   E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2019  TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PINR OPDC OPRC BL SUBJECT: MORALES BASHES GOLDBERG PINATA ONE MORE TIME   Classified By: Acting EcoPol Chief Brian Quigley for reasons 1.4 (b, d)   ¶1. (C) Summary: Meeting with cabinet on December 30 to  evaluate his third year in office, Bolivian President Evo  Morales justified once again his decision to expel Ambassador  Philip S. Goldberg. Morales noted that with the departure of  Ambassador Goldberg, the political opposition had "bottomed  out," and concluded that Goldberg was "clearly commanding the  conspiracy against democracy" in Bolivia. Morales went on to  praise Bolivia's efforts against narco-trafficking, calling  Bolivia the "most outstanding country in Latin America" in  the fight against drugs. Nevertheless, Morales restated his  hope that bilateral relations would improve under  President-elect Obama. Post questions Morales' logic, but  understands that in the face of declining natural gas prices  and corruption scandals within his administration, Morales  needs to distract domestic attention by using the U.S. as his  strawman once again. End summary.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  Should Old Acquaintance Be Forgot  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -   ¶2. (U) In a year-end meeting December 30 to evaluate his  third year in office, President Evo Morales took time to  validate and celebrate his decision on September 11 to expel  Ambassador Philip Goldberg, whom he accused of leading a  conspiracy to topple the Morales regime. "After suffering  that attack of the (political) right, of the empire, I was  not wrong in that moment when I decided the Ambassador had to  leave. The Ambassador leaves, the opposition bottoms out --  clearly someone was commanding the conspiracy against  democracy, even against the national government itself."   ¶3. (U) Morales went on to accuse the Bush administration of  violating its international commitments in the fight against  narco-trafficking, saying Bolivia "is the most outstanding  country in Latin America in the fight against drug  trafficking." Local press reports and even the government's  own media service noted that the precipitous fall in  relations had been exacerbated by Morales' "personal  decision" to suspend Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)  activities in the country. The official media service went a  step further, adding that Morales also suspended CIA  activity, and that the U.S. brought the suspension on itself  by "meddling in internal affairs." Despite his attacks on  Ambassador Goldberg, the Bush administration, and the "empire  of the north" generally, Morales was quick to state once  again that bilateral relations would be re-evaluated once  President-elect Obama was in office.   - - - -  Comment  - - - -   ¶4. (C) True to form, Morales' mention of declaring Ambassador  Goldberg persona non grata grabbed media attention and  distracted focus from more pressing matters, including the  Quintana corruption scandal, the falling price of natural gas  (and with it the possible reduction of Morales' popular Renta  Dignidad program), and his recent admission that some  cocaleros are selling their coca to be processed into  cocaine. As illogical as Morales' diatribes arguments are,  as long as he can get mileage out of such attacks, the  administration will continue to spread its vitriol.  LAMBERT

MORALES MANIPULATES MEDIA OWNERS

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08LAPAZ2623	2008-12-22 15:03	2010-12-03 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz

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C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 002623  SIPDIS  E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL ODIP OIIP KPAO EAID BL SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: MORALES MANIPULATES MEDIA OWNERS  REF: LA PAZ 2569  Classified By: PAS Couselor Denise Urs for reasons 1.4 b,d  ¶1. (C) Summary: Bolivian President Evo Morales continues on the offensive against the media, part of a long-running campaign against the Bolivian media. Through verbal and financial assaults, the Bolivian Government is attempting to manipulate the way news is reported in this country. The GOB uses financial tactics, such as hitting media with tax bills or spending large sums of money on advertising, to influence editorial lines and to create a fog about truthfulness. It is also using its own media to expand and reinforce a cult following around Morales. End summary.  GOB on the Attack  ¶2. (SBU) The latest round of political attacks against the media (reftel) is part of an ongoing battle. President Evo Morales regularly calls the media his "principal opposition," and his "enemies." Notwithstanding his latest barbs, however, Morales usually adds that he is not against journalists, but against media owners. Rumors have been floating for months that in order to attempt to protect the President from his "enemies," Venezuelan investors are trying to purchase various outlets including La Paz's second-largest daily La Prensa, but so far there is no evidence that any sales have been concluded.  ¶3. (C) Instead, the GOB is intimidating media outlets through legal proceedings and showing favoritism in the distribution of its significant ad budget to push the press toward a more favorable view of its policies. In one example, the GOB sent La Razon, the largest newspaper in La Paz, a tax bill for nearly $5 million for having "avoided taxes during 2006." High-level officials at La Razon speculated to Public Affairs Section officers that this tax bill may have been an attempt to intimidate the paper to move from its generally anti-GOB editorial stance. The tax liability would also lower the value of the paper so that it could be sold at a lower price.  ¶4. (C) Nationalization of certain companies has also helped the GOB push its press agenda forward. On May 1, President Morales nationalized communications giant Entel, one of the largest advertisers in Bolivia. The GOB has been accused of using the enormous advertising budgets of the companies it has nationalized, including Entel, to reward media that publish pro-GOB articles and to punish those that do not.  ¶5. (C) With only one exception, anti-GOB television network Unitel, all of the major media in Bolivia accept direct paid advertising from the Government, including spots that label the media as "liars" and suggest that Bolivians should not trust what they read, see, or hear from the press. Ironically, these same media often editorialize against the GOB during the same broadcasts or in the same newspapers that carry anti-media ads. PAS officers have asked media directors why they continue to carry the GOB ads, and all have stated that without the income it would be more difficult to survive in the very competitive market.  Who owns the Media?  ¶6. (SBU) Although the majority of media in Bolivia are privately owned, it is difficult to determine who the owners are. There are no public records that prove ownership, and companies or individuals who own majority stakes can sell without a public paper trail. There are regular rumors about the possible sale of outlets, but proof of such sales is nil and the rumors usually fade quickly.  ¶7. (C) Another issue of concern is the influence of Venezuelan money in the media. PAS regularly hears that Venezuelan businessmen are negotiating the purchase of one of the television networks (usually cash-strapped ATB) as well as numerous newspapers that are in financial trouble. Others claim it is mere speculation. Nevertheless, Venezuelan money has built a technically stronger, pro-government, populist media network in the main Bolivian cities, called Radio y Television Popular.  ¶8. (C) La Paz,s second largest daily La Prensa reported that Morales has reformed state-owned media outlets in an effort to expand the popularity and cult following of the President. The GOB created a network of community radio stations, an internet wire agency (ABI), and expanded the reach of the Government-owned TV Channel 7 using a $9 million donation from Venezuela to install 120 repeaters. There are also reports that the budget for Channel 7 operations has expanded by $3.8 million and that the normal procurement protocols have been dropped. The political opposition claims that the President is advised by a team of communications experts from Venezuela as well as other countries.  ¶9. (C) Under the Morales administration, Channel 7, Empresa Nacional de Television, has become one of the government's primary media tools, often presenting biased and misleading information, openly propagandizing for the President and his policies, and discrediting the opposition. Channel 7 is intent on expanding its reach and influence throughout the country. The manager of Channel 7 announced that it is upgrading to digital technology, a costly investment by Bolivian standards. A year ago, Channel 7 announced the receipt of a donation of equipment from unknown sources to improve its reach in the departments of La Paz and Santa Cruz, and that it had purchased 50 new repeaters to be distributed to remote locations in the west and the Amazon region. After the Iranian President's visit to Bolivia early in 2007, some publications reported that Channel 7 would get a large donation (some reported the intended donation would be a multi-million dollar investment) to strengthen the state TV network, but there has been no indication that this is going to materialize. Iranian media are now reporting that the donation will be in the form of Spanish-language programming. Channel 7 also airs Venezuelan Government-owned Telesur programming as part of its regular daily schedule.  Who Owns the Print Media?  ¶10. (SBU) Two major media conglomerates appear to own most of the media in Bolivia. Spanish group Prisa (owners of the Spanish daily El Diario) owns La Razon; ATB, a private TV network; and &Extra8 a cheap sensationalist daily. The other media conglomerate, the Canelas and Rivero families, owns most of the national major dailies throughout the country. In La Paz, they own La Prensa; in Santa Cruz, leading daily El Deber; in Cochabamba leading daily Los Tiempos; they also own the only daily in El Alto, El Alteo; in Sucre, Correo del Sur; in Potosi, El Potosi; and in Tarija, El Nuevo Sur. The Canelas-Rivero Group papers are generally critical of the Government. Other smaller, independently owned newspapers fight for ever-shrinking private-sector advertising revenues and often accept GOB advertising to continue printing.  Comment  ¶11. (C) Bolivia's media environment is increasingly difficult. The GOB, aided by large Venezuelan investments, has used financial pressures in an attempt to change the editorial line of the media, and to hasten or provoke the sale of media outlets. The regular rumors about the impending sales of media may be a smoke screen to cover an actual sale, they may be a rouse to frighten the media, or they may simply be the imagination of media owners. It is always possible, however, that media will be sold without public knowledge, changing the opinion-leader landscape in the country. End comment. LAMBERT

BOLIVIA: BEFORE U.S. VISIT, EVO LASHES OUT

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08LAPAZ2458	2008-11-18 13:01	2010-12-03 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz

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C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 002458   SIPDIS   E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2018  TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR BL SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: BEFORE U.S. VISIT, EVO LASHES OUT   REF: LA PAZ 2370   Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 b,d   ¶1. (SBU) Summary: In the days before his November 16  departure for the United States, where he will speak at the  OAS and UN and meet with U.S. representatives (Dodd, Lugar,  Baukus and possibly others), President Evo Morales and his  closest cabinet advisors lashed out at a wide selection of  USG targets, claiming that the USG has a strategy of  supporting a united opposition front against Evo for the  December 2009 elections. Following the November 1 expulsion  of DEA, Government Minister Alfredo Rada described the DEA as  "insignificant" and said, "the world will not end with the  end of the presence of the DEA." Evo announced that he is  "after the CIA" last week, and in a November 14 interview the  state news agency ABI cited Presidency Minister Quintana as  saying that the "civic prefectural conspiracy" was "fed by  the empire (the United States), financed by organizations  that originate in USAID, the CIA, and the DEA." Speaking from  Venezuela, Quintana added MILGROUP to the mix, saying that  state security fired on civilians in 2003 (during the riots  that led to the fall of ex-President Gonzalo "Goni" Sanchez  de Lozada) because "no state security institution is not  taught, indoctrinated, and intervened by the DEA, the CIA,  and by MILGROUP." End summary.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  Evo Accuses USG of Trying to Unite the Opposition  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -   ¶2. (SBU) At a November 15 rally in Cochabamba, Morales  accused the USG of trying to help form an opposition "front"  to oppose his next presidential run: "I am almost sure,  sisters and brothers, that the next elections (December 2009  if the draft constitution passes in January), all the right  will unite on instructions from the Government of the United  States." At the same time, Evo reiterated his allegations  that USAID finances "the opposition".   ¶3. (SBU) Meanwhile, analysts are weighing in on the issue of  a combined front against Evo, whether comprised solely of the  "moderate left" (that is, the left without Evo's Movement  Toward Socialism party) or united with less- conservative  elements of what is now the conservative opposition party  Podemos. Former president Carlos Mesa (an oft-mentioned  contender for leader of the elusive non-Evo front) opined  recently that "a single front (combining left and right) is  not viable in the sense that there are very distinct  ideological positions between which, eventually, there would  be opposition, but this doesn't eliminate the possibility of  a front..."   ¶4. (C) Comment: Evo's pre-emptive strike against a potential  opposition front--aligning them without evidence with "the  empire"--appears to be an effort to set the stage for  discrediting anyone who runs against him as a U.S. stooge.  As of now the opposition is far from united, with as many as  seven potential presidential candidates: former president  Carlos Mesa, former prefect Manfred Reyes Villa, Tarija  Prefect Mario Cossio, Potosi Mayor Rene Joaquino, Unidad  Nacional party leader Samuel Doria Medina, former president  Tuto Quiroga and even indigenous guerrilla Felipe Quispe. It  is hard to envision how this disparate group would come  together, in fact, many of the strategists for potential  candidates complain to us that other groups and leaders will  not step aside for the good of the opposition as a whole. End  comment.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  Continued Accusations Against USG Agencies  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -   ¶5. (SBU) According to press reports, Minister of Presidency  Juan Ramon Quintana met in Venezuela on November 14 to  propose a multilateral "strategic alliance" of governments  and academics to defend the process of revolutionary change.  Quintana reminded his audience of Bolivia's recent "torturous  civic prefectural conspiracy" which he claimed had been "fed  by the empire (the United States), financed by organizations  that originate in USAID, the CIA, and the DEA." Back in  Bolivia, Minister of Government Alfredo Rada was also  leveling accusations at USG agencies, claiming that the  Bolivian government must deeply review the actions of  agencies such as USAID and DEA: "it is a process that demands  a more-global evaluation to take the decision to normalize  this relation, and that means new rules of pay, transparency  in relations and respect for sovereignty." Rada said that  DEA was welcome to share information in the counternarcotics  fight, but the DEA is mistaken if it thinks it can "continue  in the country or will return to the country to continue  diverting resources of the fight against drugs to work of  political destabilization or political investigation--that  can't continue."   ¶6. (SBU) Rada announced on November 16 that the Bolivian  National Police who worked with DEA will be reviewed and  those that might have worked "on the margin of the interests  of the country" will be fired. Rada warned that if "the  police acted as a foreign embassy in their own institution,  there will be a separation of these people." He added, "If  there are police who worked correctly, with good results, you  can be secure that...they will be able to continue their  work."   ¶7. (SBU) From Venezuela, Presidency Minister Quintana added  new accusations against U.S. agencies, claiming that US  agencies were behind the 2003 decision of the government of  then-president Gonzalo "Goni" Sanchez de Lozada to fire on  civilians. "They consummated the most repugnant genocide in  Bolivia, which was the genocide of the year 2003, when  Sanchez de Lozada was expelled from the country. In the face  of a lack of moderation, in the face of the doubts of the  high military command to massacre the comrades en El Alto,  the Military Group (MILGROUP) occupied the highest levels of  the armed forces and took the decision that the armed forces  had to massacre the people of El Alto to liberate a caravan  that had to supply the city of La Paz with fuel. Therefore,  this is not indirect intervention, this is not interference,  (it is) direct participation in the genocide of the year  2003." (Note: Over 60 people were killed in clashes between  followers of Evo Morales--who had blockaded the capital city  of La Paz--and government forces. The Morales government has  repeatedly accused Sanchez de Lozada of genocide and recently  began processing papers to request the former president's  extradition. End note.)   ¶8. (SBU) Following President Morales' November 11 statement  that he and the government "are after the CIA too," Vice  Minister of Social Movements Sacha Llorenti announced on  November 17 that the presence of CIA agents is "prohibited"  in Bolivia: "there exists no norm that would allow the  presence of those agents in the national territory and to  verify their presence in the country would be a grave action  against our sovereignty." According to Llorenti, the  government is investigating the possible presence of  "external agents or of Bolivians who serve external  agents....the government is decided, and in this there will  be no step backwards, on the dignification of our country and  of its institutions."   - - - -  Comment  - - - -   ¶8. (C) Morales is already campaigning hard for both the  constitution and his re-election, as can be seen by his  standard attacks on the USG. His rhetorical attacks have now  led to the expulsion of both the Ambassador and the DEA, and  cannot be ignored as mere campaign stumping. USAID could be  next, as there have been repeated high-level attacks and  social-movement calls for its expulsion. Morales' new focus  on Bolivian "co-conspirators" (either police working with the  DEA or any political enemy Evo decides to describe as a CIA  collaborator) will almost certainly instill fear among our  contacts, who may become more cautious about meeting with us.  His threat to expel the CIA from Bolivia means that any one  of us can be (mis)identified as a spy and kicked out should  we do--or be falsely accused of doing--anything that  displeases Evo. End comment.  URS

SHANNON MEETING WITH PRESIDENT EVO MORALES

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08LAPAZ1667	2008-08-04 17:05	2010-12-03 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LA PAZ 001667   SIPDIS   PASS TO USAID/LAC DAVID JOHNSON, JOANN LAWRENCE   E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2018  TAGS: ASEC EAID ECON PGOV PREL PTER SNAR BL SUBJECT: A/S SHANNON MEETING WITH PRESIDENT EVO MORALES   REF: LA PAZ 1498   Classified By: Amb. Philip S. Goldberg for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).   ¶1. (C) Summary: WHA A/S Shannon, accompanied by INL PDAS  McGlynn, the Ambassador, DCM, and Emboff, met at 5 a.m. on  July 23 with Bolivian President Evo Morales, who was  accompanied by Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca, Minister  of Government Alfredo Rada, Presidential Spokesman Ivan  Canelas, and Bolivian Ambassador to the U.S. Mario Gustavo  Guzman. Morales expressed his regret for the June 9 march on  the Embassy and its aftermath and acknowledged that Bolivia  "needs" the U.S. However, he also cited "proofs" of a USG  conspiracy against him and his government. Assuring Morales  that there was no USG conspiracy against him, A/S Shannon  agreed that the two countries should work together to build a  climate of confidence, using bilateral consultations as a  mechanism to achieve this end. After the Morales meeting A/S  Shannon and delegation held meetings with Bolivian Senate  President Oscar Ortiz and President of the Congress Edmundo  Novillo. End summary.   EVO FEARS A CONSPIRACY  ----------------------   ¶2. (C) President Morales opened the meeting by saying he  viewed this as a chance to improve relations with the USG.  Evo said he wanted to be "sincere" and to say up front "I do  not believe in the capitalist system." He remarked that his  government is one of dialogue and then went on to talk  about his belief that the United States was conspiring  against his government. Morales complained that "since the  90s the Department of State has described me as a  narco-trafficker as a narco mafia, and I have been called the  Andean Bin Laden" by former Ambassador Rocha. He then cited  a litany of events that he argued proved the hostile intent  of the United States. Morales also expressed concern about  how USAID's resources are spent. Morales said he had been  told that USAID offers money to Movement Toward Socialism  (MAS) mayors for them to switch to opposition party Podemos.  According to Morales, "Bolivian employees of USAID go  door-to-door in northern Potosi telling people if they get  rid of Evo the economy is going to get better." Evo said  that one mayor told him that USAID offered him $15,000 to  $25,000 dollars to oppose Evo. Evo closed his opening  remarks by saying "currently there is a conspiracy led by the  U.S. Embassy against my security, against my government.   A/S SHANNON RESPONDS  --------------------   ¶3. (C) A/S Shannon said that the United States was  committed to the success of Bolivian democracy and the  Bolivian people and had no interest that would justify a  conspiracy against the Morales government. He noted that he  had no interest in receiving Morales, list of supposed  conspiratorial behavior, but rather would like to point out  how the USG has been trying to work with the Morales  administration. Shannon mentioned President Bush's  congratulatory phone call after Morales' election and the  meeting held with Secretary Rice. The A/S highlighted how  the USG has modified its anti-narcotics tactics to work with  the GOB, re-certified the GOB, and extended ATPDA benefits.  He also noted that the USG had worked with multilateral  development banks to forgive $1 billion in loans owed by  Bolivia. Shannon told Morales that "we have no interest in  creating conflicts or political chaos in Bolivia. Our  Ambassador and officers will meet with various groups, but it  is not to conspire against you." Shannon said that Bolivia   LA PAZ 00001667 002 OF 003    and the United States are in a "critical moment in our  relationship" and that he wanted security guarantees for  USAID and the Peace Corps so as "to be able to continue with  these programs."   STOP THE CONSPIRACY AND GIVE US THE CASH  ----------------------------------------   ¶4. (C) President Morales responded that "if the conspiracy  stops then we can begin a new relationship based on our  proposed agenda." Evo said that "only 20% to 30% of USAID  money reaches the people, why don't you support the 'Bolivia  Cambia, Evo Cumple' (Bolivia Changes, Evo Delivers) program  instead?" Evo insisted that the Venezuelan-supported program  is "sound and transparent" and that USAID should redirect its  money there. The president brought up ATPDA and asked for a  five year extension and an eventual "just and beneficial"  long term trade deal. With regard to Millennium Challenge  Account (MCC), Evo asked the A/S "to just tell me the truth"  about the political decision to freeze the program. Morales  said that Brazil and Hugo Chavez are allies that will help  with the road projects but that he hasn't given up hope on  MCC.   DRUGS, USAID, AND THE CHAPARE  -----------------------------   ¶5. (C) Morales complained that people are trying to link  his government to the FARC and that his government is not  being noticed for its respect for human rights. Evo told  Shannon, "I recognize that in the Yungas there has been an  increase in coca production. For political reasons there is  not much we can do." Morales also said that he regrets the  amount of drugs leaving the country. He criticized  USAID's involvement in the Chapare, saying that USAID set up  parallel organizations to the coca unions and that it works  with local mayors against the coca federation. The president  says that he receives letters "from all over the country  asking me to remove USAID."   AMERICAN JUSTICE  ----------------   ¶6. (C) Evo said that people speak well of the American  justice system so therefore he "cannot believe that you would  have those two delinquents (Sanchez de Lozada and Sanchez  Berzain) there. "People are upset, you should expel them. I  tell you this, send back Goni and you will become the mayor  of El Alto."   CHOQUEHUANCA SPEAKS  -------------------   ¶7. (C) Foreign Minister Choquehuanca said "we want to  reestablish confidence. We want American cooperation to be  strictly economic and to be part of the 'Bolivia Cambia, Evo  Cumple' program." Choquehuanca said the GOB was finishing  the Sanchez de Lozada (Goni) extradition request and that it  should be ready by August. He asked that Bolivia be  re-certified and that "our efforts be recognized, especially  our respect for human rights." The Foreign Minister  mentioned establishing exchange programs because the current  USG programs "are not transparent and we are suspicious when  scholarship students are asked to spy on us."   LET'S START ANEW  ----------------   ¶8. (C) A/S Shannon ended the meeting by saying that we   LA PAZ 00001667 003 OF 003    would study the GOB's proposed agenda and add our own points.  He suggested that subsequently dates for bilateral  consultations could be established. Evo said that his friend  President Lula gave him some good advice, "have lots of  patience. If you tell me to separate out the conspiracies  than that's what we will do. We will not break relations.  We will continue to put up with and bear these things. I  regret that my brothers and sisters from El Alto went down to  the Embassy (to try and break into the compound on June 9)  and I recognize that my country needs you."   SENATE PRESIDENT OSCAR ORTIZ  ----------------------------   ¶9. (C) Immediately following the Morales meeting A/S  Shannon and delegation met with Senate President Oscar Ortiz  (Podemos - Santa Cruz). Ortiz stressed the importance of the  senate being "one of the only institutions not in the hands  of the MAS." He told Shannon that "democracy is under heavy  attack" and that time is passing by quickly. The August 10  revoking referendum "will only ratify the deep divisions in  the country and Evo will lose in five departments." The  senator expressed concern about "overt" Venezuelan influence  and the possibility of voter registration fraud. He  chastised the OAS for "coming here last week and making  irresponsible declarations regarding voter registration  records." Ortiz predicted that "eventually the economic  crisis in the country will overtake any political crisis."  When asked about dialogue to find a solution to the current  political crisis Ortiz responded that the opposition wanted a  solution through dialogue and that he had spoken to Vice  President Garcia Linera about this. "However," Ortiz said,  "it takes two to tango." He hopes the "friends of Bolivia"  would be expanded to include the European Union and lamented  the increase in drug trafficking and the fact that "the  Brazilians and the European Union tolerate it."   PRESIDENT OF THE CONGRESS EDMUNDO NOVILLO  -----------------------------------------   ¶10. (C) A/S Shannon also met with the President of the  Congress Edmundo Novillo (MAS - Cochabamba). Novillo said  that the August 10 referendum "will not solve the political  crisis" and that the people do not understand what it is  because "a revoking referendum is something new for the  country." He admitted that "this process of change has  generated uncertainty." When asked what role the congress  could play in resolving the crisis Novillo was pessimistic,  saying that "the polarization is strong, too strong, within  the congress." Regarding Bolivia - U.S. relations Novillo  said he thought it is a good time to reevaluate all aspects  of the relationship with an eye toward common interests. He  said the U.S. should realize "there are suspicions within the  government and within the population because the  relationships with past governments." Novillo said that  anti-narcotics cooperation "is a difficult topic" and that it  is necessary to have a mutually agreed upon agenda. He  recognized that USAID's alternative development programs have  had "a certain amount of success" but that the money could  and should be better invested.   ¶11. (U) Assistant Secretary Shannon has cleared this cable.  GOLDBERG