EVISMO o CRETINISMO?

Seguridad Alimentaria Marx-MASista

2012-01-05T03:58:00.003-04:00

Estupideces de plurinacionales:

eju.tv/2012/01/choquehuanca-presentar-ante-oea-declaracin-boliviana-sobre-seguridad-alimentaria/

La producción de alimentos para asegurar "seguridad alimentaria en un estado" no es política de producir productos agropecuarios bajo planificación de un gobierno marx-mas-ista.

El ejemplo clave fue la pudrición (exacto: enmohecido) de la campaña gubernamental de hace dos años para la siembra de arroz.

El gobierno +ista debe construir silos adecuados y sistemas industriales de cosecha, transporte, almacenado y procesado... No simplemente repartir sacos de semillas a sus campesinos masistas.

Bueno. la ventaja de un país de productores dirigidos a masificar la cantidad de un producto es que los consumidores ignorantes no tienen idea de lo que significa cualquier grano mal cosechado, mal transportado, mal almacenado y mal procesado y sobre todo sin control de calidad (alimentaria).

Es que nadie se imagina la cantidad de aflatoxinas que producen diferentes especies de moho en un par de días húmedos en casi todo grano?

Tanta gente que aprovechó la basura de arroz a 3 - 4 Bs/kg que se vende pulido, pero todo destruido por los hongos... El arroz no es blanco, es transparente o amarillento... el resto (blanco y quebradizo) es basura enmohecida, que ni caballos, ni puercos, ni gallinas deben ser alimentados con ella, puesto que dosis mayores de 10 ppm de aflatoxina es contraproducente para la producción pecuaria.

Pobres plurinacionales!

Que tomen ejemplo de planificación comunista
en la "república popular" de China con 30 millones de chinos muertos de hambre por un error de planificación dirigida personalmente por mao-tse-tung para la matanza de unas especies de pájaros granívoros que se comían un quinto de la cosecha. Maximizar la cosecha fue un error ecológico.
O Korea del Norte, donde murieron de hambre como 2,5- 3 millones de coreanos, pese a tanta planificación de Kim Jon Il para la seguridad alimentaria de "su querido pueblo"... Y como absurdo extra, el arroz para los festines del líder era inspeccionado (ya no vive el cerdo comunista por comer demasiado bien y fino) grano por grano (debían ser perfectos en su estructura) por mujeres dedicadas a dar gusto al dictador.

O las locuras agropecuarias de Mugave en Zimbabwe.

Pero claro que cuando hay hambre, cualquier basura sirve para llenar la olla...

Aunque lo pague el hígado... en el caso de las aflatoxinas.
No hablaban los castro y habla chavez de lo mismo?
Cuando en realidad los cubanos no tienen ni siquiera suficiente azúcar para endulzar sus famélica existencia
Y los venezolanos importan hoy lo que antes del chavismo exportaban al resto del mundo.
Vaya cuento ese de la soberanía alimentaria!

Peripecias griegas del fin del año 2005

2011-09-01T04:21:00.005-04:00

Nico's diary, 1 january 2006 (Excerpts)

"anyone going to orinoca to see evo?"

there was loud laughter and affirmative gesturing...

of course they were going to see evo in orinoca, these were his people, the ones who helped to carry him to victory, and besides that, bolivian history was being written.

sensing from the response that the crowds of willing and deserving people would likely have been more than the capacity of available transportation, the next question i asked was more of a prayer than a serious inquiry...

"…and is there any possibility of us joining any of the trucks to orinoca?"

silence...

"well", came the doubtful response, "not unless you are part of the international press corps; we have limited special transportation for international press in the caravan of evo morales. you are not press are you?"

"we certainly are", lejla quickly and confidently responded, "for what other reason do you think we would come to oruro the day before evo arrives to make his pilgrimage to orinoca?"

again, silence...

"well then, you must talk with mr. miranda, present your credentials, and hope for the best..."

several hours later miranda arrived. and, not in the mindset to miss such an historic opportunity, we were also present, "credentials" in hand.

"fine, very good," says mr. miranda to a very stunned and surprised nico and Lejla, “but I must know…are you imperialistas, or anti-imperialists?”

sensing that everything was on the line, we responded:
“anti-imperialistas”, sir.

"good”, miranda responded,
“ then you will meet the others at 4am tomorrow in the plaza under "the clock" and will travel to orinoca in the presidential caravan..."

[...]

Lejla (the wife of Nico Mavris) in the little house where Evo was born

MacMorales's Plurinational Index

2011-02-04T14:33:00.007-04:00

La ventaja de no tener una multinacional de hamburguesas

Según El Gran Jefe de los Masistas, no subirían los precios de todos esos ingredientes pues estarán en parte subsidiados y sobre todo regulados hasta que se adecúe nuevamente sus precios (como ejemplo: el azúcar)
Pero algo es seguro... faltarán todos!

www.economist.com/markets/bigmac

economy.blogs.ie.edu/archives

El índice Big Mac fue creado como una guía divertida para indicar si las monedas están en su nivel correcto de paridad con respecto a las demás divisas. Algunos pueden pensar que este índice es una frivolidad pero, además de que se han escrito libros y se han hecho varias tesis doctorales sobre él, ha sabido predecir las tendencias de los tipos de cambio.

Desde 1986, la revista “The Economist” publica periódicamente (dos veces al año) el índice “Big-Mac”. El enfoque teórico del índice Big-Mac se deriva de la teoría de la paridad del poder adquisitivo (PPA) que establece que productos similares, situados en diferentes países, deben tener igual precio (ley de un sólo precio). Es decir, el tipo de cambio debe igualar los precios de una cesta de bienes y servicios en dos países. Si se cumpliese la teoría de la PPA un dólar debería servir para comprar lo mismo, o la misma cantidad de productos, en todos los países del mundo. Sin embargo, esto no siempre ocurre ya que con una misma suma de dinero en algunos países se puede adquirir un volumen físico de bienes y servicios muy superior al que se puede comprar en otros. Los analistas tienden a considerar que esta teoría se cumple en el largo plazo, y, por tanto, es un indicador de la tendencia que seguirá el tipo de cambio en el futuro.

Fuente

Hay un índice usado para comparar divisas y medir el valor de las monedas. Este índice es el índice Big-Mac y sencillamente comparar el valor de esta (magnífica) hamburguesa en las diferentes partes del mundo. Este índice toma como premisa que los costes del Big-Mac son los mismos en todas partes, en las mismas cantidades y que por lo tanto el precio final es comparable. Más de 3000 puntos de venta y presencia en 120 países avalan este dato. Podéis ver más información sobre esto en este artículo de Rafael Pampillón.

Ayer publicaba El Mundo algo parecido a este índice, pero lo que se representaba era el aumento del coste de un Big-Mac en España. La siguiente imagen muestra el aumento en el precio de los ingredientes de la hamburguesa. Una vez más, lo relevante no este dato concreto sino su extrapolación a la situación general.

Imagen del artículo del periódico El Mundo, 25 junio 2008

A tener en cuenta también que estos son precios para McDonnalds, que tendrá sus proveedores y que como es lógico aplicará una dura negociación con estos. Este poder de negociación no está tan claro en el comprador individual, aunque este dispone a cambio de mayor flexibilidad para el cambio de proveedor.

El índice Big-Mac es un indicador que toma como base el precio de una hamburguesa consumida en los establecimientos McDonald’s en los diferentes países del mundo. El índice Big-Mac sirve para saber si los tipos de cambio de las monedas están bien valorados o si, por el contrario, están infravalorados o sobrevalorados. Es decir, el índice ofrece una guía para saber si una divisa se encuentra en su paridad “correcta” o no. Ello se debe a que el tipo de cambio entre dos monedas está en equilibrio cuando el precio de dos cestas idénticas, compuestas por determinados bienes y servicios, es igual en los dos países. El índice Big-Mac supone que una hamburguesa Big-Mac de los establecimientos McDonald’s es una cesta de bienes representativos, ya que mantiene unas características similares a nivel internacional. El que se comercialice en 3000 establecimientos de 120 países usando los mismos ingredientes, hace posible comparar los precios de los países a nivel mundial. El precio base es siempre el de EEUU y se obtiene como promedio de cuatro ciudades americanas (Atlanta, Chicago, Nueva York y San Francisco).

economist.com/node/17257797?story_id=17257797

Indice del 14 de octubre de 2010

Pequeñeces de un hombre de estado

2011-01-28T09:36:00.002-04:00

JEMA y un Zapatero primeros contactos...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LDhzmqwpj_M
JEMA hablando de democracia socialista en la cultura del diálogo
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v44yCj7CNbg
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ejx94RISH6o (biocombustibles, "no somos de la cultura de la muerte" "Irán, por el momento, no es un país que manda tropas, para acabar vidas. Cuba....etc.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xzkoukhqz2s
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gh22laLZHDI
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WkFNMFsQThg
...quienes masacran al pueblo, quienes violan los derechos humanos, quienes hacen daño económico al estado tienen que ir a la carcel!
P. Piensa Ud. que el líder de un pais, no importa cómo progrese, deba estar un tiempo ilimitado en el poder?
eeeh... el LIMITADO no sería tan democrático...y aquí es importante la conciencia del pueblo, y nuestra propuesta es que tiene que haber revocatorio como también ratificatorio
...si el alcalde, prefecto, gobernador o presidente no tiene apoyo del pueblo, debe ser revocatorio [revocado del poder] antes que cumpla su mandato...
en Irán...no puede seguir una matanza en un pueblo como Irán [JEMA cree que EEUU tiene una cruenta guerra en Irán, el traductor nota de forma impensada el error y traduce: Irán...IRAK] [el presidente MASista no sabe ni lo que hace militarmente "su pueblo hermano" iraní..]

JEMA en su repetitivo pututo de conceptos y acepciones en la Asamblea General de la UNO en 1996, expresando y exigiendo estupideces

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zwigM-WDyvw

Recomiendo una media docena de ghost writer para JEMA, aunque sean quechuo-aymaras, pero con algo de cultura política universal y mejor estructura de ideas. Eso sí, sugiero que alguien le enseñe a leerlos correctamente Que logre leer esos discursos debe ser una hazaña,
Para evitar mayores vergüenzas recomiendo que en el futuro se exprese en todo acontecimiento seguido por prensa internacional. en su lengua materna, espero que sus ideas tengan más estructura.
Parece que lo único claro que tiene es que cuba tiene la mejor democracia, y chavez está consolidando su imperio socialista y por lo visto en Bolivia implantará su democracia comunistaria de movimientos sociales donde su Estado decidirá lo mejor para nuestra felicidad, tanto cultural, social y económica...

La estatura del jefazo

2011-01-25T12:32:00.002-04:00

Después de leer sobre los 190 cm del Gran Jefe Indígena del Estado Plurinacional considero necesario desmitificar tamaños antes que hagan de él un huno de D' Artagnan de más de 2 m.

Dimitry Medvedev no tiene más de 165 cm y lo único que parece más grande que el ruso es el tupé y la nariz torva del plurinashional

Y por si dudan:

http://massatira.blogspot.com/2010/10/reconociendo-colores.html

Cristina mide aproximadamente no más de 165 cm + 5 cm de tacos = 170 cm
El Jefazo no tiene más de 171 cm
Punto!

BOLIVIA: COUNTER-NARCOTICS NEWS AND TRENDS

2010-12-08T08:58:00.003-04:00

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09LAPAZ1784	2009-12-17 21:09	2010-12-03 21:09	UNCLASSIFIED	Embassy La Paz

VZCZCXYZ0000 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHLP #1784/01 3512151 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 172150Z DEC 09 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0260 INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/DIRJIATF SOUTH RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/NATIONAL DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENTER JOHNSTOWN PA RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC RHMFIUU/DEPT OF STATE AIR WING PATRICK AFB FL RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0023 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS LA PAZ 001784 SIPDIS STATE PASS TO CNC LINEAR WASHINGTON DC JIATF SOUTH FOR USCINCSO MIAMI FL//SCJ2/SCJ3/SCJ5/SCFA DEPT FOR INL, WHA/PPC, WHA/AND USAID FOR LAC/SA JUSTICE FOR OIA, AFMLA AND NDDS CUSTOMS FOR LA OPS, INTELLIGENCE DEA FOR OEL E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: SNAR BL KJUS PHUM SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: COUNTER-NARCOTICS NEWS AND TRENDS REF: LA PAZ 1589 ¶1. 1. Summary and comment: Bolivian Counternarcotics (CN) officials have voiced public concern over a number of negative trends, including a sharp rise in the number of cocaine laboratories seized, the GOB's inability to track the rising number of small aircraft used to transport drugs to neighboring countries, the increasing presence of foreign drug cartels, and increased coca cultivation. Despite positive interdiction and eradication statistics (septel), local contacts believe these trends will worsen without immediate GOB attention. GOB officials recognize the problems, and the overwhelming victory of the ruling Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party (reftel) will give President Morales additional power to shape CN policy. Still, he will face challenges in stepping up eradication and interdiction efforts, risking the anger of coca farmers, the core of his political base. This is the first in a series of NAS reports on counternarcotics trends and policy in Bolivia. End summary and comment. Proliferation Of Cocaine Laboratories ¶2. 2. The Department of Cochabamba has become a center for the production of cocaine base, according to statements made by FELCN commanders to Bolivian press. FELCN Cochabamba Director Colonel Elvin Baptista told reporters November 30 that FELCN destroyed 600 cocaine factories in Cochabamba during 2009. Baptista explained that most were found in rural areas, close to rivers or other sources of water, and used Colombian methods, which consist of grinding up coca using electric motors, and then mixing it with precursor chemicals in rigid plastic containers. ¶3. 3. FELCN director Colonel Oscar Nina said on November 12 that the Department of Santa Cruz has become a major center for crystallization (purification) of cocaine that is processed in other regions of Bolivia. He explained that FELCN had discovered 16 cocaine crystallization labs during recent operations, one of which had the capacity to produce 100 kilos per day of high purity cocaine. The cocaine is produced in Santa Cruz, and the drug is then exported to Europe and the United States through ports in Chile and Brazil, according to Nina. (Note: DEA estimates less than one percent of cocaine seized in the U.S. can be chemically traced back to Bolivia. End Note). ¶4. 4. FELCN reported that it destroyed an average of two labs per day in the Department of La Paz in 2009. El Alto, the sprawling city of mostly poor immigrants that sits on the high plain above the city of La Paz, has become a major center of lab activity. FELCN La Paz commander Colonel Fernando Amurrio reported that FELCN destroyed 133 factories in El Alto during the first 10 months of the year. Many of these labs are small Colombian-style labs hidden inside houses, making them difficult to detect. La Paz is considered a transit point where coca is converted into cocaine base paste and cocaine and then shipped to Santa Cruz or other areas of Bolivia to be exported. During a series of coordinated operations in the Department of La Paz November 20-26, FELCN seized 93 kilos of cocaine and five tons of marijuana, detained 17 people, and seized five vehicles. ¶5. 5. FELCN destroyed two large-scale cocaine factories on November 25 in the Sicaya municipality in the Department of Cochabamba. FELCN estimated that during their three months of operation the factories had produced 180 kilos of cocaine base paste, and estimated that they could have produced one ton per year if they had remained in operation. The seizures brought the total number of seized factories in the region to 12 during the month. Cochabamba and MAS deputy Edmundo Novillo noted that increasing middle class involvement in coca production and ancillary activities, in Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, will require greater GOB response. ¶6. Growing Community Involvement in Production and Trafficking ¶7. 6. The current rise in the net amount of coca grown and cocaine produced in Bolivia has deepened rural community involvement in the drug trade, according to numerous NAS contacts in FELCN and the GOB's Directorate of Coca Production (DIGPRO COCA). Contacts report that drug traffickers pay between $8,000 to $10,000 to small rural communities, to buy their cooperation in establishing cocaine factories, and then share profits with the community to retain acceptance and trust. ¶8. 7. In a November 26 operation in the indigenous community of Machak Marca de Pocona (in Cochabamba Department), FELCN destroyed 32 Colombian-style labs but was able to make only one arrest because the entire community fled when tipped off about the raid. (Note: Locals in such remote areas can often easily spot official vehicles from miles away, due to the lack of vegetation and building development. End note.) The local FELCN commander expressed his amazement to Bolivian reporters at the degree of involvement of the entire community in the production activities. CN Police Concerned About Trafficking Via Small Aircraft ¶9. 8. FELCN Director Colonel Oscar Nina told reporters November 1 that Bolivia CN forces lack the capacity to detect the high and rising number of small aircraft that transport drugs to neighboring countries. Nina explained that FELCN lacks radar or other technological equipment to confront the problem. Vice Minister of Social Defense Felipe Caceres told reporters November 9 that the GOB's "weakness" in its war against drugs was on the country's borders. Caceres noted that President Morales had instructed the Defense Minister to work on acquiring additional planes, helicopters and radars to close this gap. (Many of our Bolivian CN contacts in the Department of Santa Cruz have told us frequently that Bolivia's lack of control over its airspace results in near free rein for air trafficking. Sources tell us that 175 suspicious flights were tracked by Brazilian government mobile radar on the border between Bolivia and Brazil in a two-month period last fall.) Involvement of Foreign Drug Cartels ¶10. 9. Bolivian press reported extensively on FELCN Commander General Oscar Nina's October 28 statement that Mexican drug cartels are investing in cocaine manufacturing in Bolivia to secure sufficient supply to satisfy market demand. Nina stated that Mexicans employ Colombian drug mafias, which in turn hire local drug gangs. He also stated that Colombians have taken the place of Peruvians, who until recently dominated the Bolivian cocaine market. ¶11. ¶12. 10. The District Prosecutor's Office in Santa Cruz recently expressed concern about the presence of foreign assassins who are hired by drug traffickers to commit murders in Bolivia. Anti-corruption Special Prosecutor Alex Oswaldo Cespedes told reporters November 16 that seven people had been killed in Santa Cruz over the preceding 59 days, and that he believed foreign assassins ("sicarios") bore responsibility. Cespedes said that a major increase in drug trafficking activities in the city had made conditions ripe for the creation of drug trafficking organizations. The commander of Bolivia's Special Anti-Crime Police Force, Colonel Miguel Gonzalez, said it is too early to conclude that foreign assassins were involved. Increase in Coca Cultivation ¶13. 11. The GOB announced December 9 that coca cultivation had increased 6% in 2009 compared to the prior year, or by roughly 1,830 hectares. Vice Minister of Social Defense Felipe Caceres told NAS Director that the two main national parks have more than 2,000 hectares of illegal coca - 1,081 hectares in Isiboro-Secure and 972 hectares in Carrasco. He said the GOB knows it will have to resort to forced eradication in 2010, noting that many cocaleros do not respect the limits on cultivation set by the GOB.

Coca Union Says Much Coca Circumvents Legal Markets ¶14. 12. The Yungas Coca Producers' Association (ADEPCOCA), the union formed by 30,000 coca growers from twelve provinces of Los Yungas, released a report on November 10 that stated that of the 16,127 metric tons of coca leaf grown annually in the Yungas, only 4,887 metric tons (30 percent) arrives at the legal coca market in Villa Fatima in La Paz. The destination of the remaining 11,240 metric tons is unknown, according to the report. The ADEPCOCA report also stated that of the 54,000 metric tons of coca grown nationwide each year, only 21,778 metric tons (40 percent) reaches the two legally sanctioned markets -- Villa Fatima in La Paz and Sacaba in Cochabamba. Lobbying For A New Legal Coca Marketplace ¶15. 13. Coca growers of the Munecas Province in the Department of La Paz presented to Congress a draft bill to create a new legal coca market in the city of El Alto, next to La Paz, and branches in La Paz and Cochabamba. Currently, there are two legal markets - Villa Fatima in Los Yungas and Sacaba in Cochabamba. Bolivians Polled On Views Of Coca Situation ¶16. 14. Equipos Mori conducted a November poll in Bolivia's nine departments that found: * 60% of Bolivians believe that coca cultivation has increased since Evo Morales became President; * 75% believe coca eradication should continue; * 61% believe that there should be additional government control over coca production; and * 55% believe the state should control production and commercialization of coca. ¶17. 15. Comment: It may not be surprising that many Bolivians are concerned about coca expansion and support eradication. Those directly involved in coca production are a relatively small, but influential, percentage of the overall Bolivian population. There are approximately 44,000 families in the Chapare (an average of five people per family) that are directly involved in growing coca, and 26,000 families in the Yungas (an average of four people per family). The total Bolivian population is approximately 9 million. ¶18. Creamer

EU WEIGHS ITS COUNTER-NARCOTICS EFFORTS IN BOLIVIA

2010-12-08T08:58:00.001-04:00

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09LAPAZ1541	2009-11-10 15:03	2010-12-03 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz

VZCZCXYZ0000 RR RUEHWEB  DE RUEHLP #1541/01 3141534 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 101534Z NOV 09 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1953 INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 6643 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0602 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 7808 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4853 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 0018 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 4412 RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 2562 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 0009 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 0084 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0083 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIB/CNC LINEAR WASHINGTON DC RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC RHEHOND/DIR ONDCP WASHINGTON DC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 001541 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR EU BO SUBJECT: EU WEIGHS ITS COUNTER-NARCOTICS EFFORTS IN BOLIVIA REF: LA PAZ 1494 Classified By: Charge John Creamer, reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary: Our exchanges with European Union representatives and an EU working group paper underscore growing European recognition of the need for intensified cooperation on counter-narcotics in Bolivia. The Europeans note increases in coca production, fear the introduction of third country criminal organizations, and recognize the loss in GOB capabilities with the expulsion of DEA last year. Among proposals under consideration by the EU are increases in technical assistance and alternative development, development of EU member state law enforcement cooperation, better internal coordination, and strengthening CN cooperation with neighboring countries. EU officials are also keen to reopen the UNODC office in La Paz, and seek U.S. assistance in pressing the UN to do so quickly. Although EU counter-narcotics efforts have so far been relatively modest and focused on alternative development, EU officials generally share our assessments and are considering stepping up their engagement, including on law enforcement (by individual member states) and by pushing GOB reductions in coca cultivation. End summary. ¶2. (C) An internal policy paper prepared by the recently-formed EU Drugs Working Group (made up of representatives from local EU missions) highlights European concerns about the worsening counter-narcotics situation in Bolivia and the Europeans' interest in doing more. The EU paper notes the growth of cocaine use in Europe -- the ultimate destination for most Bolivian cocaine -- and the troubling increase in coca production in Bolivia and other Andean countries (the EU estimates 32-34,000 hectares under production in Bolivia, slightly higher than the UNODC's figure of 30,500). GOB efforts to control the legal coca market are seriously flawed, the EU notes, while Bolivian government interdiction remains hampered by the loss of DEA's logistical and intelligence support (following DEA's expulsion in November 2008). A major European concern -- also voiced by EU Ambassador Bell and others to the Charge -- is that Colombian and Mexican cartels will enter the Bolivian market, expanding production and increasing trafficking-related violence. ¶3. (C) Amid sustained domestic pressure for increases in legal production, the EU has provided one million euros to fund a GOB survey of legal coca demand and other related studies (the "Comprehensive Study on the Coca Leaf in Bolivia"). Ambassador Bell explained that the full results of the legal demand survey will not be available before July 2010, although the GOB may attempt to revise its legislation governing legal production (including an increase from the current 12,000 hectares authorized) before then. Bell suggested that any estimate of 20,000 hectares or less should prove useful in pressing the GOB to cut coca cultivation. Separately, UK Ambassador Baker voiced disappointment that the study will not be ready until next summer, but stressed that the international community should not wait until then to press the Bolivians on this issue. ¶4. (C) EU officials acknowledge that their counter-narcotics assistance is small scale compared to the aid the U.S. has provided. According to their policy paper, most assistance has gone toward alternative development (the European Commission has provided nearly 50 million euros, Belgium and Spain several million euros each), with lesser amounts in equipment donations (the U.K. gave the GOB $500,000 in forensics equipment this year; Germany and Italy have also provided small amounts of in-kind aid). The UK, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and France have provided limited CN training to Bolivian police in recent years. Ambassador Bell maintains that the EU cannot be involved directly in eradication, but allowed that some eradication-related aid may be possible (e.g., covering ancillary costs). ¶5. (C) More critically, Ambassador Bell noted, the EU lacks the capability to fill the law enforcement vacuum left by DEA's expulsion, but EU members states can and should be pressed to strengthen such cooperation, he said. The UK, Spanish and visiting Swedish ambassadors have all acknowledged privately that the EU's limited CN approach has proven insufficient and needs to be expanded to include direct support for law enforcement. Ambassador Baker reported that the UK is currently undergoing an internal review of its regional CN policy, to be completed by early December, that will include consideration of new efforts in this area. Additionally, the Europeans indicate that they intend to step up consultation with neighboring states such as Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina, which are strengthening their own cross-border counter-narcotics cooperation with the GOB. ¶6. (C) The EU's paper proposes a number of CN measures for the near term, including increased funding for technical assistance (e.g., on money laundering and judicial support), expansion of alternative development aid, and creation of mechanisms to aid the GOB in evaluating both its CN successes and shortcomings. The EU working group also identified as a priority better CN coordination, both internally and with other international partners. Ambassador Baker amplified that point, maintaining that a coordinated, united stance will be critical to overcoming Bolivian President Morales's apparent resistance to reversing the growth in coca cultivation. The Europeans also see the re-opening of the UNODC office in La Paz (closed for budgetary reasons) as key to strengthened coordination. Ambassador Bell reported that the EU has contributed 500,000 euros for UNODC projects and office funding and asked for U.S. help in pushing the UN to open the office as soon as possible. (Note: We understand from the UN that donor support will determine whether the UNODC can return.) ¶7. (C) Comment: We see a welcome evolution in the EU's approach toward counter-narcotics in Bolivia, as EU and EU member state officials evince recognition of the need to move beyond their relatively modest and narrowly-focused efforts to date. The Europeans may be convinced that Morales does not want Bolivia to be categorized as a narco-state, but they are also clear-eyed about GOB shortcomings (in terms of political will, capabilities and corruption), and understand that the EU has to shoulder a greater share of the burden in confronting these challenges. With policy limitations on what the EU can do collectively, however, translating this recognition into concrete action will take time, as well as leadership from individual member states. CREAMER

BOLIVIA'S REFERENDUM: MARGIN OF VICTORY MATTERS

2010-12-08T08:57:00.001-04:00

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09LAPAZ96	2009-01-23 13:01	2010-11-30 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz

VZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB  DE RUEHLP #0096/01 0231326 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 231326Z JAN 09 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9793 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 8742 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 6115 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0078 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 7298 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4344 RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0330 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 4679 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 6085 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 6963 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1731 RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 1617 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PHUM PINR ENVR BL SUBJECT: BOLIVIA'S REFERENDUM: MARGIN OF VICTORY MATTERS

REF: A. 08 LAPAZ 2606
¶B. LA PAZ 6
¶C. LA PAZ 11
¶D. LA PAZ 62
¶E. LA PAZ 90

Classified By: A/EcoPol Chief Joe Relk for reasons 1.4 (b, d)

¶1. (C) Summary: With the January 25 constitutional
referendum rapidly approaching, all signs point to victory
for President Morales and his ruling Movement Toward
Socialism (MAS) party. Although the opposition has made
inroads into the MAS lead, most national polls point to
between 54 and 60 percent support for the proposed
constitution (with one government poll showing 66 percent),
and the MAS appears set to leverage its considerable rural
base to victory. After a series of national news articles
raised questions about significant fraud in the August 2008
recall referendum, the National Electoral Court has taken
pains to advertise the electoral rolls as secure. However, a
recent poll shows less than half of the public shares the
court's confidence, and the opposition believes significant
electoral fraud is likely. While cheating seems unnecessary
to secure victory for the MAS, padding their lead would give
the party leverage in congressional negotiations regarding
legislation implementing hundreds of vague constitutional
clauses. Opposition leaders continue to fear the MAS will
use any stalemate in these negotiations to close congress and
institute rule by decree. At both the national and regional
levels, the margin of victory matters. A landslide for the
MAS nationally, or large victories for the opposition in the
eastern departments, could spark more conflict. End summary.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -
MAS Victory Seems Assured
- - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶2. (C) With the January 25 constitutional referendum rapidly
approaching, all signs point to victory for President Morales
and his ruling Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party.
Although the opposition has made inroads into their lead,
causing the MAS to tone down its rhetoric, national polls
point to between 54 and 60 percent support for the proposed
constitution. (One government poll shows the "yes" vote
winning by 66 percent.) However, many polls downplay or
ignore the MAS' rural base. Almost as importantly, the MAS
seems prepared to take at least five of the nine departments,
including La Paz, Potosi, Oruro, Cochabamba, and Pando, with
Beni a distinct possibility. If the MAS can win at levels
similar to their August 2008 referendum victory (i.e. 67
percent or more) and can make inroads into the "Media Luna"
or eastern half of the country, they will have much more
leverage in upcoming congressional negotiations over
implementing legislation.

- - - - - -
Polling Data
- - - - - -

¶3. (C) Polling data has varied widely over the past two
weeks, due to a combination of a tightening race and polling
methodologies (i.e. city vs. rural). Recent national polls
by Gallup and Apoyo within the last week show approval for
the constitution with a much slimmer lead than many expected,
ahead only 48 to 42 percent and 49 to 43 percent,
respectively. Ipsos and Mori both conducted polls of capital
cities and both found the "yes" vote ahead, with Ipsos
showing a 59 to 35 percent lead and Mori reporting 60 to 40
percent. However, our contacts tell us all these polls
partially or totally ignored the rural vote, where the MAS
has much of its base. A poll by Observatorio de Gestion
Publica, publicized by government-friendly Radio Patria
Nueva, marked the constitution's lead at 66 percent, versus
31 percent against. Some estimate a six percent "bump" when
the rural vote is included.

¶4. (U) Polls showing a breakdown
by city or region indicate
the constitution will easily win in at least four
departments: La Paz, Potosi, Oruro, and Cochabamba, likely
with at least 70 percent support in each. The MAS has a
distinct chance to capture both Pando and Beni as well. In
Pando, the Observatorio poll shows Pando department split
evenly, and the Ipsos poll shows the capital city of Cobija
supporting the constitution by a ratio of 64 to 36. Polling
data for Beni has been more scattershot, but although its
capital city of Trinidad is firmly against the constitution,
by as much as 88 percent, the larger city of Riberalta is
leaning for approval of the constitution. The Observatorio
poll shows Beni evenly split as a department.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -
Rural and Indigenous Role
- - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶5. (SBU) Although the opposition is making a mighty effort
across the country to rally against the constitution, the
forces of inertia seem to be conspiring against them,
particularly in the form of a largely uneducated rural base
in the Altiplano. Leading daily La Razon interviewed several
community leaders from the Altiplano, and their supporters,
and reported on January 18 that neither the leaders nor the
supporters had read the Constitution. Instead, the repeated
message was that rural communities would take their marching
orders from the MAS, and vote for the constitution. According
to the Ipso poll of capital cities, only four percent of
respondents said they had read much or all of the
constitution, 45 percent of respondents said they have read
some, and 50 percent said they had read none of the draft
text. In the countryside, the number of those reading the
constitution is much lower. Post suspects disinterest, blind
faith in Evo Morales' political project, and illiteracy,
despite the Cuban literacy program, all play a role. In
addition, the sheer volume of the 411-article constitution
probably scares some potential readership away.

¶6. (C) However, despite the overall level of MAS dominance
among campesinos and indigenous voters, some opposition does
exist, albeit for a variety of reasons. The xxxxxxxxxxxx, has tried to rally
support against the MAS and the proposed constitution (Reftel
A). In a meeting with PolOffs, they lamented the way the MAS
had "cheated" and "fooled" campesinos into believing Morales
was himself truly indigenous or cared about indigenous
issues. Although they held a national meeting on January 17
and tried to reach out to the press, they sounded defeated
when they acknowledged that the MAS, through a combination of
funding and pressure on local social and business leaders,
held a "vertical control" in the countryside that would be
difficult to break. They also noted rural communities tended
to vote in blocks, supporting one political party until they
discarded it to vote en masse for another.

¶7. (C) Going in a completely different direction, some rural
social groups and far-left leaders, such as Achacachi Mayor
Eugenio Rojas and El Alto City Councilor Roberto de La Cruz
also publicly recommended voting against it because it was
seen as not revolutionary enough. They criticized the
government for making too many concessions to the opposition
during the constitutional compromise reached on October 21,
including the agreement to not make land reform retroactive.
However, they have a relatively small following, and some,
like de La Cruz, eventually reversed course as the projected
MAS margin of victory shrunk in January. Edgar Patana,
leader of the regional workers union (COR), other El Alto
union leaders, and the majority of social groups have
recommended voting for the constitution.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Opposition Feisty, But Realistic
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶8. (C) The opposition has not given up, but seems to be
battling
more to limit the margin of defeat than to win. In
Santa Cruz,xxxxxxxxxxxx
told EmbOff that polls show an overwhelming victory for the
"No" vote in Santa Cruz, but that he is worried about the
opposition's goal of winning in five of Bolivia's nine
departments (Reftel E). Although a current
privately-commissioned opposition poll showed the
constitution ahead by a margin of only five points, 39 to 34
percent (with 20 percent undecided), opposition alternate
xxxxxxxxxxxx doubted the opposition would be able to
win the referendum outright even under the most optimistic
scenario. He predicted that Morales would succeed in
personalizing the constitution as "Evo's constitution" and
leverage his cult of personality. Ultimately xxxxxxxxxxxx was more
concerned with the margin of the opposition's defeat and
discrediting the results of "any election that uses this
voter roll" (Reftel C).

¶9. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx has been
criss-crossing the country with opposition xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx, campaigning against the proposed constitution, but
also building a foundation for a likely run for the
presidency. xxxxxxxxxxxx claimed opposition leaders put aside
jockeying to be the 2009 opposition unity presidential
candidate in the final days of the "no" campaign to "attack
the government from three sides:" the prefects (governors)
who been traveling around the Media Luna to show &they are
not afraid" of government threats to arrest them and
galvanize support in opposition departments, a group of three
presidential contenders to show opposition unity and
xxxxxxxxxxxx, who is used for more cerebral attacks on the CPE
and to &dismiss the governments mythology that they
exclusively represent the indigenous.8 xxxxxxxxxxxx noted that
opposition parties Podemos and MNR are playing a deliberately
muted role, recognizing that their unpopular association with
the &old regimes8 would play into MAS strategy. "Political
parties are bad words in Bolivia," xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx La
Paz-based group of mostly young professionals who focus on
issues and distance themselves from the party moniker. "We
need parties, but we need to start from scratch, without the
old leaders. This will take time."

¶10. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx told
PolOff the opposition is chipping away at the MAS referendum
lead despite the government's leviathan advantage in
resources by de-personalizing the constitution and
"convincing people on the street that is not in their best
interests." Although he conceded the "no" campaign would
ultimately be a losing effort, he cited the emerging feud
between Morales and Church, corruption charges against
government officials, and the increasingly precarious economy
as emerging factors in December and January that created an
opposition "surge" after "we were so depressed" in the fall.
xxxxxxxxxxxx said that the government's newfound mobilization of
congressmen and deputies to challenge the opposition view on
television and radio shows is proof of government panic.
"Before they just thought they could ignore us (and win),"
said xxxxxxxxxxxx. "They said there was no opposition." xxxxxxxxxxxx
agreed, and added that this is playing into the opposition's
hands, because they "are forced to defend a constitution they
often know little about." According to xxxxxxxxxxxx has
been challenging MAS supporters to debate him during his
speaking tours and embarrassed Vice Minister of Social Groups
Sacha Llorenti in a January 20 debate when he started talking
in fluent Aymara. He asked the dumbstruck Llorenti what he
planned to do if the constitution passed, since all public
officials will be required to speak one of Bolivia's
indigenous languages. Later he challenged President Morales
to debate him in Aymara, which the president allegedly speaks
poorly.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Fraud, Doubts, and Questions
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶11. (C) The National Electoral Court (CNE), which will
oversee and ratify the results of the referendum, has
undertaken a public relations campaign to assure the public
of the security of the election rolls, which came under
scrutiny after leading daily La Razon published a series of
articles questioning the validity of the August 10, 2008
recall referendum. Several contacts, including xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx, told us the MAS padded their
August referendum victory by five to seven points through
fraud at several levels (reftel C). While many international
observers groups are expected to view the January 25
constitutional referendum -- including the European Union,
the OAS, the Carter Center, the UN, the CAN, the
South-American and Andean parliaments, and UNASUR (septel) --
the depth of the earlier fraud has muted the opposition's
confidence in observers' ability to ensure the results are
fair. Members of the Santa Cruz civic committee told EmbOff
that they have no faith in international observers. The
committee has met with the OAS team already and "told our
side of the story", describing the discoveries of tens of
thousands of false voter cards and the statistical signs of
fraud in areas that managed to vote 100 percent for President
Morales in the August 2008 referendum. However, the civic
committee said that the fact that international observers
blessed the August referendum means they do not expect an
honest review of the constitutional referendum. Civic
committee members also noted that small numbers of observers,
generally based in the city, will not be able to stop
widespread fraud in the countryside, which is where they
believe most of the August 10 fraud took place.

¶12. (C) In a press conference designed to bolster confidence
in the security of the electoral rolls, National Electoral
Court (CNE) President Jose Luis Exeni presented a PowerPoint
describing the bill of clean health given by the OAS. As
part of the presentation, he showed the number of voters
dropped from the rolls for not participating in prior
elections and the number added during this cycle. While all
departments projected to vote against the constitution had a
net reduction in the voter rolls, including 85,000 Crucenos
and 17,000 Benianos, MAS strongholds including La Paz
(38,000) and Potosi (16,000) saw substantial gains -- a
curious reckoning, considering population and migration
trends to the contrary.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Pando At Center of Storm, Again
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶13. (C) While it is possible the constitution could pass in
Beni, most opposition leaders tell us the MAS has set its
sights on lightly-populated Pando department as its best
chance to win in five departments. By winning the popular
vote and a majority of the departments, the MAS could more
credibly claim to have support throughout the country. Pando
has also traditionally aligned with the opposition, so a
breakthrough win there would send a strong signal that the
strength of the MAS continues to rise. And with fewer than
32,000 registered voters, or less than one percent of the
country's voting population, Pando is the most vulnerable
department to even small amounts of fraud or voter
registration changes.

¶14. (C) In a conversation with PolOff, xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx alleged the MAS deliberately fomented unrest in Pando
in September to justify a military siege, depose Prefect
Leopoldo Fernandez, and arrest opposition-aligned leaders to
swing the balance of power to the MAS in the Senate. Besides
disabling the opposition's ability to campaign by arresting
many of its leaders,xxxxxxxxxxxx alleged the government crackdown
changed Pando's electoral map by causing hundreds of
opposition voters to flee to Brazil while importing 2,000 new
security forces, which xxxxxxxxxxxx claimed were likely MAS voters
from the Altiplano (Reftel B). xxxxxxxxxxxx added
that in the run-up to the August 2008 referendum, Government
Minister Alfredo Rada facilitated the establishment of fake
identities via the police role in issuing national identity
cards (which can then be used to vote). (Reftel C).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
January 26: What Happens Next?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶15. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx told PolOff December 31 that
a general election prompted by passage of the new
constitution requires a plethora of enabling legislation that
the opposition-controlled Senate will block, at least in the
forms likely to be proposed by the MAS (Reftel B). xxxxxxxxxxxx
said the new draft constitution is deliberately vague, which
grants MAS legislators wide discretion to "fill in the
blanks" with new implementing legislation. He also said the
Senate would clash with the government on assigning new
borders for electoral districts, needed for the general
election. xxxxxxxxxxxx added that Morales' MAS party is
already injecting "ridiculous" interpretations of the
constitution into a wide gamut of implementing legislation
that "the Senate cannot in good conscious agree to." He said
Senate rejection of MAS proposals provides a ready excuse for
Morales to dismiss congress for "rejecting the will of the
people" and then have President Morales rule by decree
(Reftel D).

¶16. (C) Despite the official government position that
President Morales will undergo treatment to correct a
deviated septum immediately following the referendum, several
contacts confirm that the problem is actually a tumor in the
pituitary near the sella turcica and that Morales will travel
to Spain for the operation. xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx told us Morales' first choice, Cuba, could not
perform the surgery. Article 238 is also of consequence to
the post-January 25 political landscape. It would establish
that all other government officials must stand down three
months before general elections expected in 2009, with the
notable exception of the president and vice president.
Besides providing the MAS the advantage of ruling during the
campaign, it also ensures leadership cannot pass to the
opposition-controlled Senate. It is unclear why the
opposition waited until the final week before the referendum
to complain about the article or why they accepted it during
marathon sessions in October to arrive at a "compromise
text," which, it should be noted, the opposition agreed to
under duress, with thousands of MAS-aligned protesters
surrounding the congress and threatening violence.

- - - -
Comment
- - - -

¶17. (C) It is likely there will be some amount of fraud in a
referendum the MAS seems likely to win legitimately anyway.
While it can be difficult to separate fact from fiction, the
Morales administration has a reputation of doing exactly what
they announce they will do. In this case, 66 percent seems
to be the target number, and the MAS is likely to pull out
all the stops to reach that level. With at least two-thirds
support across the country and a minimum of five of the nine
departments under his belt, President Morales would be able
to claim a political mandate to implement the constitution
quickly. Practically speaking, this will put great pressure
on the Congress, especially the opposition-controlled Senate,
to acquiesce in negotiations and accept MAS versions of
implementation legislation. If they do not, Morales and
others in the MAS have spoken of rule by decree. Using
similar logic, Morales could call for early elections to more
quickly advance the "democratic revolution" in Bolivia.
Early elections would also help the MAS avoid dealing with
the quickly-crumbling economy, which would likely be more of
an issue in December.

¶18. (C) Both sides seem to be angling over the margin of the
MAS victory, not the victory itself. While Morales continues
to predict a victory of up to 80 percent, Vice President
Garcia
Linera tried to manage expectations with a 66 percent
estimate on January 21. The margin matters. If the
constitution gets less than two-thirds support, many
observers feel this would represent a relative defeat,
especially when Morales himself has set such high
expectations. On the other hand, we are equally concerned
that large-margin victories in media luna departments could
lead opposition leaders to ignore the national results and
resume a course for autonomy on their own terms -- putting
them on a collision course with the national government. A
solid but not overwhelming MAS victory, perhaps around 56 to
60 percent, might be the best outcome to keep both sides from
claiming a strong mandate for extreme measures.
URS

MORALES BASHES GOLDBERG PINATA ONE MORE TIME

2010-12-08T08:56:00.001-04:00

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08LAPAZ2670	2008-12-31 16:04	2010-12-03 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz

VZCZCXYZ0008 PP RUEHWEB  DE RUEHLP #2670 3661641 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 311641Z DEC 08 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9617 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 8690 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 6050 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0013 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 7235 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4281 RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0293 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 4614 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 6043 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 6898 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1676 RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 1572 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 002670 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PINR OPDC OPRC BL SUBJECT: MORALES BASHES GOLDBERG PINATA ONE MORE TIME Classified By: Acting EcoPol Chief Brian Quigley for reasons 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Meeting with cabinet on December 30 to evaluate his third year in office, Bolivian President Evo Morales justified once again his decision to expel Ambassador Philip S. Goldberg. Morales noted that with the departure of Ambassador Goldberg, the political opposition had "bottomed out," and concluded that Goldberg was "clearly commanding the conspiracy against democracy" in Bolivia. Morales went on to praise Bolivia's efforts against narco-trafficking, calling Bolivia the "most outstanding country in Latin America" in the fight against drugs. Nevertheless, Morales restated his hope that bilateral relations would improve under President-elect Obama. Post questions Morales' logic, but understands that in the face of declining natural gas prices and corruption scandals within his administration, Morales needs to distract domestic attention by using the U.S. as his strawman once again. End summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Should Old Acquaintance Be Forgot - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (U) In a year-end meeting December 30 to evaluate his third year in office, President Evo Morales took time to validate and celebrate his decision on September 11 to expel Ambassador Philip Goldberg, whom he accused of leading a conspiracy to topple the Morales regime. "After suffering that attack of the (political) right, of the empire, I was not wrong in that moment when I decided the Ambassador had to leave. The Ambassador leaves, the opposition bottoms out -- clearly someone was commanding the conspiracy against democracy, even against the national government itself." ¶3. (U) Morales went on to accuse the Bush administration of violating its international commitments in the fight against narco-trafficking, saying Bolivia "is the most outstanding country in Latin America in the fight against drug trafficking." Local press reports and even the government's own media service noted that the precipitous fall in relations had been exacerbated by Morales' "personal decision" to suspend Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) activities in the country. The official media service went a step further, adding that Morales also suspended CIA activity, and that the U.S. brought the suspension on itself by "meddling in internal affairs." Despite his attacks on Ambassador Goldberg, the Bush administration, and the "empire of the north" generally, Morales was quick to state once again that bilateral relations would be re-evaluated once President-elect Obama was in office. - - - - Comment - - - - ¶4. (C) True to form, Morales' mention of declaring Ambassador Goldberg persona non grata grabbed media attention and distracted focus from more pressing matters, including the Quintana corruption scandal, the falling price of natural gas (and with it the possible reduction of Morales' popular Renta Dignidad program), and his recent admission that some cocaleros are selling their coca to be processed into cocaine. As illogical as Morales' diatribes arguments are, as long as he can get mileage out of such attacks, the administration will continue to spread its vitriol. LAMBERT

MORALES MANIPULATES MEDIA OWNERS

2010-12-08T08:55:00.000-04:00

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08LAPAZ2623	2008-12-22 15:03	2010-12-03 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz

VZCZCXYZ0009 PP RUEHWEB  DE RUEHLP #2623/01 3571502 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 221502Z DEC 08 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9558 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 8679 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 6039 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0002 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 7222 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4270 RUEHGE/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN 0917 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 4603 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 4336 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 6033 RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 0567 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 6884 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1664 RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 1564 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 002623 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL ODIP OIIP KPAO EAID BL SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: MORALES MANIPULATES MEDIA OWNERS REF: LA PAZ 2569 Classified By: PAS Couselor Denise Urs for reasons 1.4 b,d ¶1. (C) Summary: Bolivian President Evo Morales continues on the offensive against the media, part of a long-running campaign against the Bolivian media. Through verbal and financial assaults, the Bolivian Government is attempting to manipulate the way news is reported in this country. The GOB uses financial tactics, such as hitting media with tax bills or spending large sums of money on advertising, to influence editorial lines and to create a fog about truthfulness. It is also using its own media to expand and reinforce a cult following around Morales. End summary. GOB on the Attack ¶2. (SBU) The latest round of political attacks against the media (reftel) is part of an ongoing battle. President Evo Morales regularly calls the media his "principal opposition," and his "enemies." Notwithstanding his latest barbs, however, Morales usually adds that he is not against journalists, but against media owners. Rumors have been floating for months that in order to attempt to protect the President from his "enemies," Venezuelan investors are trying to purchase various outlets including La Paz's second-largest daily La Prensa, but so far there is no evidence that any sales have been concluded. ¶3. (C) Instead, the GOB is intimidating media outlets through legal proceedings and showing favoritism in the distribution of its significant ad budget to push the press toward a more favorable view of its policies. In one example, the GOB sent La Razon, the largest newspaper in La Paz, a tax bill for nearly $5 million for having "avoided taxes during 2006." High-level officials at La Razon speculated to Public Affairs Section officers that this tax bill may have been an attempt to intimidate the paper to move from its generally anti-GOB editorial stance. The tax liability would also lower the value of the paper so that it could be sold at a lower price. ¶4. (C) Nationalization of certain companies has also helped the GOB push its press agenda forward. On May 1, President Morales nationalized communications giant Entel, one of the largest advertisers in Bolivia. The GOB has been accused of using the enormous advertising budgets of the companies it has nationalized, including Entel, to reward media that publish pro-GOB articles and to punish those that do not. ¶5. (C) With only one exception, anti-GOB television network Unitel, all of the major media in Bolivia accept direct paid advertising from the Government, including spots that label the media as "liars" and suggest that Bolivians should not trust what they read, see, or hear from the press. Ironically, these same media often editorialize against the GOB during the same broadcasts or in the same newspapers that carry anti-media ads. PAS officers have asked media directors why they continue to carry the GOB ads, and all have stated that without the income it would be more difficult to survive in the very competitive market. Who owns the Media? ¶6. (SBU) Although the majority of media in Bolivia are privately owned, it is difficult to determine who the owners are. There are no public records that prove ownership, and companies or individuals who own majority stakes can sell without a public paper trail. There are regular rumors about the possible sale of outlets, but proof of such sales is nil and the rumors usually fade quickly. ¶7. (C) Another issue of concern is the influence of Venezuelan money in the media. PAS regularly hears that Venezuelan businessmen are negotiating the purchase of one of the television networks (usually cash-strapped ATB) as well as numerous newspapers that are in financial trouble. Others claim it is mere speculation. Nevertheless, Venezuelan money has built a technically stronger, pro-government, populist media network in the main Bolivian cities, called Radio y Television Popular. ¶8. (C) La Paz,s second largest daily La Prensa reported that Morales has reformed state-owned media outlets in an effort to expand the popularity and cult following of the President. The GOB created a network of community radio stations, an internet wire agency (ABI), and expanded the reach of the Government-owned TV Channel 7 using a $9 million donation from Venezuela to install 120 repeaters. There are also reports that the budget for Channel 7 operations has expanded by $3.8 million and that the normal procurement protocols have been dropped. The political opposition claims that the President is advised by a team of communications experts from Venezuela as well as other countries. ¶9. (C) Under the Morales administration, Channel 7, Empresa Nacional de Television, has become one of the government's primary media tools, often presenting biased and misleading information, openly propagandizing for the President and his policies, and discrediting the opposition. Channel 7 is intent on expanding its reach and influence throughout the country. The manager of Channel 7 announced that it is upgrading to digital technology, a costly investment by Bolivian standards. A year ago, Channel 7 announced the receipt of a donation of equipment from unknown sources to improve its reach in the departments of La Paz and Santa Cruz, and that it had purchased 50 new repeaters to be distributed to remote locations in the west and the Amazon region. After the Iranian President's visit to Bolivia early in 2007, some publications reported that Channel 7 would get a large donation (some reported the intended donation would be a multi-million dollar investment) to strengthen the state TV network, but there has been no indication that this is going to materialize. Iranian media are now reporting that the donation will be in the form of Spanish-language programming. Channel 7 also airs Venezuelan Government-owned Telesur programming as part of its regular daily schedule. Who Owns the Print Media? ¶10. (SBU) Two major media conglomerates appear to own most of the media in Bolivia. Spanish group Prisa (owners of the Spanish daily El Diario) owns La Razon; ATB, a private TV network; and &Extra8 a cheap sensationalist daily. The other media conglomerate, the Canelas and Rivero families, owns most of the national major dailies throughout the country. In La Paz, they own La Prensa; in Santa Cruz, leading daily El Deber; in Cochabamba leading daily Los Tiempos; they also own the only daily in El Alto, El Alteo; in Sucre, Correo del Sur; in Potosi, El Potosi; and in Tarija, El Nuevo Sur. The Canelas-Rivero Group papers are generally critical of the Government. Other smaller, independently owned newspapers fight for ever-shrinking private-sector advertising revenues and often accept GOB advertising to continue printing. Comment ¶11. (C) Bolivia's media environment is increasingly difficult. The GOB, aided by large Venezuelan investments, has used financial pressures in an attempt to change the editorial line of the media, and to hasten or provoke the sale of media outlets. The regular rumors about the impending sales of media may be a smoke screen to cover an actual sale, they may be a rouse to frighten the media, or they may simply be the imagination of media owners. It is always possible, however, that media will be sold without public knowledge, changing the opinion-leader landscape in the country. End comment. LAMBERT

BOLIVIA: BEFORE U.S. VISIT, EVO LASHES OUT

2010-12-08T08:54:00.000-04:00

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08LAPAZ2458	2008-11-18 13:01	2010-12-03 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz

VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB  DE RUEHLP #2458/01 3231343 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 181343Z NOV 08 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9263 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 8557 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 5916 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 9880 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 7100 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4148 RUEHGE/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN 0902 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 4476 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 4316 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 5960 RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 0558 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 6765 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1540 RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 1524 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 002458   SIPDIS   E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2018  TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR BL SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: BEFORE U.S. VISIT, EVO LASHES OUT   REF: LA PAZ 2370   Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 b,d   ¶1. (SBU) Summary: In the days before his November 16  departure for the United States, where he will speak at the  OAS and UN and meet with U.S. representatives (Dodd, Lugar,  Baukus and possibly others), President Evo Morales and his  closest cabinet advisors lashed out at a wide selection of  USG targets, claiming that the USG has a strategy of  supporting a united opposition front against Evo for the  December 2009 elections. Following the November 1 expulsion  of DEA, Government Minister Alfredo Rada described the DEA as  "insignificant" and said, "the world will not end with the  end of the presence of the DEA." Evo announced that he is  "after the CIA" last week, and in a November 14 interview the  state news agency ABI cited Presidency Minister Quintana as  saying that the "civic prefectural conspiracy" was "fed by  the empire (the United States), financed by organizations  that originate in USAID, the CIA, and the DEA." Speaking from  Venezuela, Quintana added MILGROUP to the mix, saying that  state security fired on civilians in 2003 (during the riots  that led to the fall of ex-President Gonzalo "Goni" Sanchez  de Lozada) because "no state security institution is not  taught, indoctrinated, and intervened by the DEA, the CIA,  and by MILGROUP." End summary.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  Evo Accuses USG of Trying to Unite the Opposition  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -   ¶2. (SBU) At a November 15 rally in Cochabamba, Morales  accused the USG of trying to help form an opposition "front"  to oppose his next presidential run: "I am almost sure,  sisters and brothers, that the next elections (December 2009  if the draft constitution passes in January), all the right  will unite on instructions from the Government of the United  States." At the same time, Evo reiterated his allegations  that USAID finances "the opposition".   ¶3. (SBU) Meanwhile, analysts are weighing in on the issue of  a combined front against Evo, whether comprised solely of the  "moderate left" (that is, the left without Evo's Movement  Toward Socialism party) or united with less- conservative  elements of what is now the conservative opposition party  Podemos. Former president Carlos Mesa (an oft-mentioned  contender for leader of the elusive non-Evo front) opined  recently that "a single front (combining left and right) is  not viable in the sense that there are very distinct  ideological positions between which, eventually, there would  be opposition, but this doesn't eliminate the possibility of  a front..."   ¶4. (C) Comment: Evo's pre-emptive strike against a potential  opposition front--aligning them without evidence with "the  empire"--appears to be an effort to set the stage for  discrediting anyone who runs against him as a U.S. stooge.  As of now the opposition is far from united, with as many as  seven potential presidential candidates: former president  Carlos Mesa, former prefect Manfred Reyes Villa, Tarija  Prefect Mario Cossio, Potosi Mayor Rene Joaquino, Unidad  Nacional party leader Samuel Doria Medina, former president  Tuto Quiroga and even indigenous guerrilla Felipe Quispe. It  is hard to envision how this disparate group would come  together, in fact, many of the strategists for potential  candidates complain to us that other groups and leaders will  not step aside for the good of the opposition as a whole. End  comment.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  Continued Accusations Against USG Agencies  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -   ¶5. (SBU) According to press reports, Minister of Presidency  Juan Ramon Quintana met in Venezuela on November 14 to  propose a multilateral "strategic alliance" of governments  and academics to defend the process of revolutionary change.  Quintana reminded his audience of Bolivia's recent "torturous  civic prefectural conspiracy" which he claimed had been "fed  by the empire (the United States), financed by organizations  that originate in USAID, the CIA, and the DEA." Back in  Bolivia, Minister of Government Alfredo Rada was also  leveling accusations at USG agencies, claiming that the  Bolivian government must deeply review the actions of  agencies such as USAID and DEA: "it is a process that demands  a more-global evaluation to take the decision to normalize  this relation, and that means new rules of pay, transparency  in relations and respect for sovereignty." Rada said that  DEA was welcome to share information in the counternarcotics  fight, but the DEA is mistaken if it thinks it can "continue  in the country or will return to the country to continue  diverting resources of the fight against drugs to work of  political destabilization or political investigation--that  can't continue."   ¶6. (SBU) Rada announced on November 16 that the Bolivian  National Police who worked with DEA will be reviewed and  those that might have worked "on the margin of the interests  of the country" will be fired. Rada warned that if "the  police acted as a foreign embassy in their own institution,  there will be a separation of these people." He added, "If  there are police who worked correctly, with good results, you  can be secure that...they will be able to continue their  work."   ¶7. (SBU) From Venezuela, Presidency Minister Quintana added  new accusations against U.S. agencies, claiming that US  agencies were behind the 2003 decision of the government of  then-president Gonzalo "Goni" Sanchez de Lozada to fire on  civilians. "They consummated the most repugnant genocide in  Bolivia, which was the genocide of the year 2003, when  Sanchez de Lozada was expelled from the country. In the face  of a lack of moderation, in the face of the doubts of the  high military command to massacre the comrades en El Alto,  the Military Group (MILGROUP) occupied the highest levels of  the armed forces and took the decision that the armed forces  had to massacre the people of El Alto to liberate a caravan  that had to supply the city of La Paz with fuel. Therefore,  this is not indirect intervention, this is not interference,  (it is) direct participation in the genocide of the year  2003." (Note: Over 60 people were killed in clashes between  followers of Evo Morales--who had blockaded the capital city  of La Paz--and government forces. The Morales government has  repeatedly accused Sanchez de Lozada of genocide and recently  began processing papers to request the former president's  extradition. End note.)   ¶8. (SBU) Following President Morales' November 11 statement  that he and the government "are after the CIA too," Vice  Minister of Social Movements Sacha Llorenti announced on  November 17 that the presence of CIA agents is "prohibited"  in Bolivia: "there exists no norm that would allow the  presence of those agents in the national territory and to  verify their presence in the country would be a grave action  against our sovereignty." According to Llorenti, the  government is investigating the possible presence of  "external agents or of Bolivians who serve external  agents....the government is decided, and in this there will  be no step backwards, on the dignification of our country and  of its institutions."   - - - -  Comment  - - - -   ¶8. (C) Morales is already campaigning hard for both the  constitution and his re-election, as can be seen by his  standard attacks on the USG. His rhetorical attacks have now  led to the expulsion of both the Ambassador and the DEA, and  cannot be ignored as mere campaign stumping. USAID could be  next, as there have been repeated high-level attacks and  social-movement calls for its expulsion. Morales' new focus  on Bolivian "co-conspirators" (either police working with the  DEA or any political enemy Evo decides to describe as a CIA  collaborator) will almost certainly instill fear among our  contacts, who may become more cautious about meeting with us.  His threat to expel the CIA from Bolivia means that any one  of us can be (mis)identified as a spy and kicked out should  we do--or be falsely accused of doing--anything that  displeases Evo. End comment.  URS

SHANNON MEETING WITH PRESIDENT EVO MORALES

2010-12-08T08:53:00.000-04:00

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08LAPAZ1667	2008-08-04 17:05	2010-12-03 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz

VZCZCXRO2966 PP RUEHLMC DE RUEHLP #1667/01 2171730 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 041730Z AUG 08 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8143 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 8206 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 5562 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 9501 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 6721 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3817 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 4101 RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 2289 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 5653 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 6436 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1166 RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 0856 RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 1011 RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 2286 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 1321 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LA PAZ 001667 SIPDIS PASS TO USAID/LAC DAVID JOHNSON, JOANN LAWRENCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2018 TAGS: ASEC EAID ECON PGOV PREL PTER SNAR BL SUBJECT: A/S SHANNON MEETING WITH PRESIDENT EVO MORALES REF: LA PAZ 1498 Classified By: Amb. Philip S. Goldberg for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: WHA A/S Shannon, accompanied by INL PDAS McGlynn, the Ambassador, DCM, and Emboff, met at 5 a.m. on July 23 with Bolivian President Evo Morales, who was accompanied by Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca, Minister of Government Alfredo Rada, Presidential Spokesman Ivan Canelas, and Bolivian Ambassador to the U.S. Mario Gustavo Guzman. Morales expressed his regret for the June 9 march on the Embassy and its aftermath and acknowledged that Bolivia "needs" the U.S. However, he also cited "proofs" of a USG conspiracy against him and his government. Assuring Morales that there was no USG conspiracy against him, A/S Shannon agreed that the two countries should work together to build a climate of confidence, using bilateral consultations as a mechanism to achieve this end. After the Morales meeting A/S Shannon and delegation held meetings with Bolivian Senate President Oscar Ortiz and President of the Congress Edmundo Novillo. End summary. EVO FEARS A CONSPIRACY ---------------------- ¶2. (C) President Morales opened the meeting by saying he viewed this as a chance to improve relations with the USG. Evo said he wanted to be "sincere" and to say up front "I do not believe in the capitalist system." He remarked that his government is one of dialogue and then went on to talk about his belief that the United States was conspiring against his government. Morales complained that "since the 90s the Department of State has described me as a narco-trafficker as a narco mafia, and I have been called the Andean Bin Laden" by former Ambassador Rocha. He then cited a litany of events that he argued proved the hostile intent of the United States. Morales also expressed concern about how USAID's resources are spent. Morales said he had been told that USAID offers money to Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) mayors for them to switch to opposition party Podemos. According to Morales, "Bolivian employees of USAID go door-to-door in northern Potosi telling people if they get rid of Evo the economy is going to get better." Evo said that one mayor told him that USAID offered him $15,000 to $25,000 dollars to oppose Evo. Evo closed his opening remarks by saying "currently there is a conspiracy led by the U.S. Embassy against my security, against my government. A/S SHANNON RESPONDS -------------------- ¶3. (C) A/S Shannon said that the United States was committed to the success of Bolivian democracy and the Bolivian people and had no interest that would justify a conspiracy against the Morales government. He noted that he had no interest in receiving Morales, list of supposed conspiratorial behavior, but rather would like to point out how the USG has been trying to work with the Morales administration. Shannon mentioned President Bush's congratulatory phone call after Morales' election and the meeting held with Secretary Rice. The A/S highlighted how the USG has modified its anti-narcotics tactics to work with the GOB, re-certified the GOB, and extended ATPDA benefits. He also noted that the USG had worked with multilateral development banks to forgive $1 billion in loans owed by Bolivia. Shannon told Morales that "we have no interest in creating conflicts or political chaos in Bolivia. Our Ambassador and officers will meet with various groups, but it is not to conspire against you." Shannon said that Bolivia LA PAZ 00001667 002 OF 003 and the United States are in a "critical moment in our relationship" and that he wanted security guarantees for USAID and the Peace Corps so as "to be able to continue with these programs." STOP THE CONSPIRACY AND GIVE US THE CASH ---------------------------------------- ¶4. (C) President Morales responded that "if the conspiracy stops then we can begin a new relationship based on our proposed agenda." Evo said that "only 20% to 30% of USAID money reaches the people, why don't you support the 'Bolivia Cambia, Evo Cumple' (Bolivia Changes, Evo Delivers) program instead?" Evo insisted that the Venezuelan-supported program is "sound and transparent" and that USAID should redirect its money there. The president brought up ATPDA and asked for a five year extension and an eventual "just and beneficial" long term trade deal. With regard to Millennium Challenge Account (MCC), Evo asked the A/S "to just tell me the truth" about the political decision to freeze the program. Morales said that Brazil and Hugo Chavez are allies that will help with the road projects but that he hasn't given up hope on MCC. DRUGS, USAID, AND THE CHAPARE ----------------------------- ¶5. (C) Morales complained that people are trying to link his government to the FARC and that his government is not being noticed for its respect for human rights. Evo told Shannon, "I recognize that in the Yungas there has been an increase in coca production. For political reasons there is not much we can do." Morales also said that he regrets the amount of drugs leaving the country. He criticized USAID's involvement in the Chapare, saying that USAID set up parallel organizations to the coca unions and that it works with local mayors against the coca federation. The president says that he receives letters "from all over the country asking me to remove USAID." AMERICAN JUSTICE ---------------- ¶6. (C) Evo said that people speak well of the American justice system so therefore he "cannot believe that you would have those two delinquents (Sanchez de Lozada and Sanchez Berzain) there. "People are upset, you should expel them. I tell you this, send back Goni and you will become the mayor of El Alto." CHOQUEHUANCA SPEAKS ------------------- ¶7. (C) Foreign Minister Choquehuanca said "we want to reestablish confidence. We want American cooperation to be strictly economic and to be part of the 'Bolivia Cambia, Evo Cumple' program." Choquehuanca said the GOB was finishing the Sanchez de Lozada (Goni) extradition request and that it should be ready by August. He asked that Bolivia be re-certified and that "our efforts be recognized, especially our respect for human rights." The Foreign Minister mentioned establishing exchange programs because the current USG programs "are not transparent and we are suspicious when scholarship students are asked to spy on us." LET'S START ANEW ---------------- ¶8. (C) A/S Shannon ended the meeting by saying that we LA PAZ 00001667 003 OF 003 would study the GOB's proposed agenda and add our own points. He suggested that subsequently dates for bilateral consultations could be established. Evo said that his friend President Lula gave him some good advice, "have lots of patience. If you tell me to separate out the conspiracies than that's what we will do. We will not break relations. We will continue to put up with and bear these things. I regret that my brothers and sisters from El Alto went down to the Embassy (to try and break into the compound on June 9) and I recognize that my country needs you." SENATE PRESIDENT OSCAR ORTIZ ---------------------------- ¶9. (C) Immediately following the Morales meeting A/S Shannon and delegation met with Senate President Oscar Ortiz (Podemos - Santa Cruz). Ortiz stressed the importance of the senate being "one of the only institutions not in the hands of the MAS." He told Shannon that "democracy is under heavy attack" and that time is passing by quickly. The August 10 revoking referendum "will only ratify the deep divisions in the country and Evo will lose in five departments." The senator expressed concern about "overt" Venezuelan influence and the possibility of voter registration fraud. He chastised the OAS for "coming here last week and making irresponsible declarations regarding voter registration records." Ortiz predicted that "eventually the economic crisis in the country will overtake any political crisis." When asked about dialogue to find a solution to the current political crisis Ortiz responded that the opposition wanted a solution through dialogue and that he had spoken to Vice President Garcia Linera about this. "However," Ortiz said, "it takes two to tango." He hopes the "friends of Bolivia" would be expanded to include the European Union and lamented the increase in drug trafficking and the fact that "the Brazilians and the European Union tolerate it." PRESIDENT OF THE CONGRESS EDMUNDO NOVILLO ----------------------------------------- ¶10. (C) A/S Shannon also met with the President of the Congress Edmundo Novillo (MAS - Cochabamba). Novillo said that the August 10 referendum "will not solve the political crisis" and that the people do not understand what it is because "a revoking referendum is something new for the country." He admitted that "this process of change has generated uncertainty." When asked what role the congress could play in resolving the crisis Novillo was pessimistic, saying that "the polarization is strong, too strong, within the congress." Regarding Bolivia - U.S. relations Novillo said he thought it is a good time to reevaluate all aspects of the relationship with an eye toward common interests. He said the U.S. should realize "there are suspicions within the government and within the population because the relationships with past governments." Novillo said that anti-narcotics cooperation "is a difficult topic" and that it is necessary to have a mutually agreed upon agenda. He recognized that USAID's alternative development programs have had "a certain amount of success" but that the money could and should be better invested. ¶11. (U) Assistant Secretary Shannon has cleared this cable. GOLDBERG

GOB RESPINS ANTI-U.S. ALLEGATIONS

2010-12-08T08:52:00.001-04:00

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08LAPAZ329	2008-02-19 23:11	2010-12-03 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz

VZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB  DE RUEHLP #0329/01 0502300 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 192300Z FEB 08 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6467 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7598 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4967 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 8872 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 6087 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3307 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 3522 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 5243 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 5936 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0553 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0912 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000329 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON BL SUBJECT: GOB RESPINS ANTI-U.S. ALLEGATIONS REF: A. LA PAZ 303 ¶B. LA PAZ 304 ¶C. LA PAZ 218 Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Bolivian government attempted to renew and, in some cases, repackage old allegations against the U.S. February 16-18. Bolivian President Evo Morales threatened to show USAID the door if it continues undermining his administration. As proof, Morales provided the example of a political organization that was allegedly turned down for USAID assistance due to its pro-Morales stance. He also cited unnamed groups that were asked to work against the government as a condition for assistance. Morales also argued against a free trade agreement with the U.S. and charged the U.S. of involvement in the disappearances of Bolivians during drug-related conflicts in the region of Chapare. Morales' assertion that pro-government groups were prepared to take up arms to defend his agenda were rebuffed by a wide-range of social and labor groups. Government Minister Alfredo Rada continues to accuse the U.S. of involvement in a police "spying" scandal to deflect from his role in the unauthorized surveillance of opposition politicians and reporters. The Bolivian government's refusal to sign a cooperation agreement concerning U.S. military aid and the impact of that refusal on disaster assistance was made public February 18. Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca explained the government did not want to sign an agreement "with its eyes closed" and was only reviewing the agreement. Despite public assurances that they want better relations with the U.S., the relentless public spinning of the Bolivian government's complaints against the U.S. at the expense of diplomatic channels suggest the BOG has another agenda: discredit the U.S. and distract the Bolivian public. End Summary. Lights, Camera, Allegations --------------------------- ¶2. (U) Bolivian President Evo Morales made several references to ongoing "political problems" with the U.S. February 15, although he clarified diplomatic and commercial relations would be maintained. Morales rehashed the argument that USAID is supporting opposition groups and that the U.S. Embassy is "making politics" at the expense of diplomatic work, such as advancing commercial ties. Morales asserted during recent months USAID has been convoking groups through implementing NGOs and offering them money with the stipulation that they work "against the Bolivian government." Morales claimed leaders from the Federation of Ayllus (indigenous local government units) of Potosi told him an USAID-supported NGO denied their group's request for $20,000 because the organization "supports Evo Morales." Morales urged citizens to report NGOs that are "bought by USAID to distribute funds to make politics against the government." He added, "The government will not allow NGOs to work against the executive power. Faced with these provocations from USAID, we will ask them to go home." Morales saluted U.S. citizens that are denouncing both USAID and the Embassy for practicing "politics," but offered no details on who he was referring to. ¶3. (U) Although most of his criticisms were respun from old charges, Morales added a new spin on some existing allegations. Morales asserted Embassy Bolivian police guards act "like embassy workers ... at the side of the U.S. government." Morales claimed he learned of this "strange" police arrangement through Fulbrighter van Schaick, who accused Assistant Regional Security Officer Vincent Cooper of asking him to "spy" on Cubans and Venezuelans in Bolivia last week (Reftels a and b). Though not directly associated with recent charges the U.S. is behind Bolivian police "spying" on politicians and reporters, this mischaracterization of our Bolivian guard force feeds into the Morales administration's allegations of undue U.S. influence on Bolivian police units. Evo on FTA, Drugs, and Cooper "Expulsion" ----------------------------------------- ¶4. (C) Morales rejected a free trade agreement with the U.S. as a return to the days of former-president Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, when Morales alleges the government made deals with U.S. businesses at the expense of Bolivians. Morales characterized the Embassy's decision that ARSO Vincent Cooper would not return to Bolivia as the "expulsion" of a "man who conducted North American espionage." Morales repeated his opinion that the war on drugs has been a failure because it targeted coca leaf instead of cocaine. He alleged the DEA, U.S. military, and Bolivian national police headed Bolivian anti-narcotics efforts "from a U.S. military base" in Cochabamba Department when there were "demonstrations and disappearances," implying U.S. involvement. (Note: The U.S. supports Bolivian anti-narcotics efforts at the Chimore Airport and has offices there, but there are no U.S. military bases per se in Bolivia. Despite Morales' intermittent calls to dismantle such non-existent bases, this issue is a misunderstanding or a straw man. End Note.) Call to Arms Disconnected ------------------------- ¶5. (U) While railing against "oligarchic groups," and particularly efforts to convoke an autonomy referendum in the opposition-led Department (state) of Santa Cruz, Morales claimed pro-government groups would defend his administration "with arms." Morales said February 14 that sympathizers in Santa Cruz had told him they would take up arms to ensure the opposition showed Morales the proper "respect." However, leaders from MAS-aligned social and union groups rejected any attempt to resort to arms February 16, calling instead for an electoral solution to settle Bolivian differences. Spin Doctor Rada's Dizzying "Spy" Accusations --------------------------------------------- ¶6. (U) On February 15, the Ambassador met with Government Minister Alfredo Rada to discuss the USG's support to the Police's Special Operations Command (COPES) police unit, a unit that Rada has stated was likely behind a growing domestic surveillance scandal. Following their meeting, the Ambassador issued a public statement which re-iterated that the USG was never involved in domestic spying and explained that USG would no longer fund COPES because the unit had been disbanded on January 29. ¶7. (U) In an interview with the La Paz newspaper La Prensa following the February 15 meeting Rada continued to insinuate )- as he has done publicly on various occasions -- that COPES was responsible for internal surveillance against political officials and journalists. Rada once again called COPES a parallel intelligence organization that conducted "political intelligence," argued it reported directly to the USG and not to the National Intelligence Directorate (DNI), and that it exceeded the scope of its mandate. Rada explained that since September 11, 2001 the U.S. government had directed COPES to gather intelligence on terrorist organizations which violated COPES' mission to conduct surveillance only on narco-trafficking organizations. Rada stated, that "terrorism is a fundamentally political phenomenon . . . therefore COPES . . . conducted political intelligence . . . All of this a function of the State Department's priorities." (Note: According to the COPES' memorandum of understanding between the Bolivian and U.S. governments, conducting surveillance on both illegal narcotics and terrorist targets is part of its mission. End Note.) ¶8. (U) Throughout the interview Minister Rada engaged in double speak, at times strongly insinuating the USG was behind the domestic spying scandal, at other times acknowledging there was little information tying the USG to the case. "It would be irresponsible to affirm they (the Embassy) were behind these (domestic spying) operations," Rada stated. He followed with, "The fact that intelligence personnel from the Embassy received reports from ODEP (COPES' official name since 2001) makes us believe that they were aware of these things (domestic spying). Despite earlier statements in the interview that COPES responded to the USG, Rada closed the interview with the statement, "That ODEP-COPES followed direct orders from the Embassy, we cannot yet demonstrate, but we are investigating. But there was a direct economic link, and it has been demonstrated that they worked on priorities designed by Washington." Rada also tried to link Fulbrighter Van Schaick case to the domestic spy scandal. Arguing his Van Schaick's sworn statement is the first piece of concrete evidence that links the USG to espionage within Bolivia. Eyes Wide Shut on MILGP Assistance ---------------------------------- ¶9. (C) The Bolivian press reported February 19 that the Bolivian government had frozen military humanitarian assistance, by not renewing our humanitarian assistance diplomatic note (which acts as a SOFA, or status of forces agreement, for U.S. military personnel in Bolivia). The article stressed that non-military aid (USD) 600,000 to flood victims is not affected. However, it highlighted that our MILGRP has provided humanitarian assistance (include medical, dental and eye treatment) since 1996 and has already prevented aid from arriving for flooding victims. Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca responded that the government had not canceled any agreement, but was simply reviewing it. Choquehuanca stated, "We now do not sign agreements with the United States with our eyes closed, like what happened in the past, especially with anti-drug assistance." (Note: The humanitarian assistance agreement has nothing to do with our counter-narcotics aid. A Bolivian diplomatic note suspended renewal of the assistance agreement January 29, citing the need for a dialogue to bridge a "gap of understanding." ((Reftel C)) End Note). Comment ------- ¶10. (C) Although charges that USAID is undermining the Bolivian government are nothing new (Minister of the Presidency Juan Quintana originally laid out the charges in August and officials have drummed them up periodically since), Morales' call for Bolivians to help the government "identify these NGOs" ostensibly working to undermine his administration is a troubling development. Using Morales' example of the Potosi group that was "denied" $20,000, any person or organization that asks for USAID funding and does not receive it could allege a political motive. We will continue to counter misunderstandings about USAID's transparency and apolitical nature with reality. However, the Bolivian government is unlikely to back off from its USAID assault any time soon, as it enjoys the propaganda value of creating an external enemy to distract from domestic problems. Likewise, although government officials have privately admitted to us they do not believe the U.S. was involved in the police "spying" scandal, they are not disengaging from insinuations of U.S. involvement. Rada's accusations are designed not to lead to a formal process that would prove or disprove them, but rather to create the appearance of U.S. impropriety to distract the Bolivian public from very real and potentially damaging charges against him. As such, they are a success. The incongruity of the government accusing us of being in cahoots with the opposition and, at the same time, spying on them seems largely overlooked in the public discourse. Unfortunately, the Bolivian press does not consistently apply critical analysis to these incoherent, vague, and sometimes contradictory charges before distributing them to the Bolivian and international public. ¶11. (C) Comment Continued. Although they may not always believe in the merits of some of their specific accusations, government leaders from Evo down appear to genuinely believe the Embassy is working to undermine the Morales administration. Given his proclivity to view the Embassy as separate from the U.S. government and people, we expect Morales to bring the GOB's vague litany of accusations against the Embassy to both the visiting Congressional delegation and to the U.S. public during his planned February 25-27 speaking tour in the U.S. End Comment. GOLDBERG

GOB RESPINS ANTI-U.S. ALLEGATIONS

2010-12-08T08:52:00.000-04:00

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08LAPAZ329	2008-02-19 23:11	2010-12-03 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz

VZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB  DE RUEHLP #0329/01 0502300 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 192300Z FEB 08 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6467 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7598 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4967 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 8872 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 6087 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3307 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 3522 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 5243 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 5936 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0553 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0912 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

VENEZUELA-BOLIVIA: HOW MUCH FIRE BEHIND THE SMOKE?

2010-12-08T08:51:00.000-04:00

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
07LAPAZ3153	2007-11-30 23:11	2010-12-03 21:09	SECRET	Embassy La Paz

VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB  DE RUEHLP #3153/01 3342314 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 302314Z NOV 07 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5844 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7362 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4730 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 8637 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 5864 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3082 RUEHGE/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN 0486 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 3284 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 3718 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 5067 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 5719 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0326 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0749 RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T LA PAZ 003153 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR VE CU BL SUBJECT: VENEZUELA-BOLIVIA: HOW MUCH FIRE BEHIND THE SMOKE? REF: A. LA PAZ 3013 ¶B. LA PAZ 3119 Classified By: Ecopol Counselor Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary. A common cry among opposition circles is that Hugo Chavez is pulling Evo's strings, particularly as Morales forcefully pushes forward to adopt a new constitution that would provide for indefinite reelection. Evo for his part does nothing to hide his admiration for Chavez; on the contrary he acts like a smitten school girl when he is with Chavez and constantly touts their personal/ideological bond. But, how much influence does Chavez have? Is Venezuelan money buying loyalty within the Bolivian armed forces? Are there sizable numbers of Venezuelan troops in country? Is Venezuela smuggling arms into Bolivia? While it is difficult to separate fact from fiction, there is little doubt here that Evo listens to Chavez, and that the Venezuelan and Cuban Ambassadors here play a central advisory role. We have heard enough to indicate that Venezuela is impatient with the pace of change in Bolivia and is pushing Morales hard to consolidate his hold on power. The results of Venezuelan December 2 constitutional referendum may impact Evo's thinking on how he should proceed with a similar referendum in Bolivia. End summary Alleged Venezuelan Coaching on Constituent Assembly - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) While the opposition sometimes exaggerates Chavez' influence over Morales, Brazilian and Peruvian diplomats based in La Paz assert that it is becoming increasingly evident that Chavez is pushing Evo to follow Venezuela's script. These diplomats recounted a GRULAC dinner hosted by the Cuban Ambassador on November 26, attended by President Morales (who arrived with the Venezuelan Ambassador), during which Evo told the group that "there is no going back." Morales expressed displeasure with how his MAS party handled the Constituent Assembly process in Sucre but was vehement that a new constitution must go forward. To the astonishment of the Latin American diplomats present, the Venezuelan Ambassador then launched into a 30-minute ramble about the common history Bolivia and Venezuela share and how their futures are linked. ¶3. (S) According to the Brazilian political counselor, an "extremely reliable" source had reported that the Venezuelan Ambassador was at an Evo cabinet meeting November 29 as the MAS-led Constituent Assembly was proceeding in Sucre. Apparently, when a couple of ministers expressed concern about moving forward unilaterally with the Constituent Assembly, the Venezuelan Ambassador urged that the government go ahead. Comment: While we are quite skeptical that the Venezuelan Ambassador would actually attend a cabinet meeting, ROAL sources independently place the Venezuelan at the Palace that day. Whether or not the Venezuelan Ambassador actually attended the cabinet meeting, Evo meets regularly with him and undoubtedly seeks his advice. End Comment.) Venezuelan Military Presence in Beni Department - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) In a discussion with Peruvian, German, Argentine and Brazilian diplomats here, all expressed concern about a known Venezuelan military presence in the northeastern Beni department (bordering Brazil). It is quite public and in fact touted that a Venezuelan engineer company is building levies around the Beni capital of Trinidad. Beni local authorities are, however, convinced that the Venezuelans are also training Bolivian military in special operations and have sizable arms caches for a possible further deployment. The German reported that without a doubt there is a Venezuelan base in San Borja, but the other diplomats were dismissive of this information and argued that the Beni authorities tend to greatly exaggerate. We cannot confirm that there is a "secret" Venezuelan base at that location and suspect that the opposition is exaggerating and/or is simply expressing concern about the Venezuelan military presence. Our Defense Attach was told by the Mayor of Trinidad on November 26 that there are 200 to 300 Venezuelans in Trinidad. The group of diplomats affirmed that the number of Venezuelans is about 300, but no one is completely certain. We understand that the Venezuelans have exclusive control over Venezuelan flights and cargo, and exercise an inordinate amount of control over the military portion of the Trinidad airport. Beni on Venezuelan Mystery Flights: We're Not Gonna Take It, Anymore - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (S) Defense Attach also met with Trinidad Mayor Moises Shiriqui following a meeting between Beni Department Prefect Ernesto Suarez and Beni Mayors. The Mayor brought up the 0100 arrival of a Venezuela C-130 cargo plane at the Beni airport November 24, which local authorities suspected was shuttling arms. After unloading seven large wooden crates, the plane immediately departed. Authorities told the media, which were forced to leave shortly after the landing, that the boxes contained medical supplies. (Note: We have not been able to determine what is in the crates. End note.) ¶6. (C) Prefect Suarez announced publicly November 29 that Venezuelan planes would not be allowed to land at Trinidad. If provided advance landing notice from the government, local authorities plan to block the runway with vehicles in order to prevent any Venezuelan plane from landing or taking off. (Note: Official Airport hours are between 0800 and 2200. There is a history of opposition accusations the Venezuelans are shipping in arms, perhaps destined for nefarious pro-government groups. The opposition also complained about an early morning Beni stopover by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez as an affront to Bolivian sovereignty. Ref A. End Note.) Will Evo Turn To Comandante Chavez? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) The Peruvian political counselor was extremely concerned that Venezuela, at Evo's invitation, would intervene militarily in Bolivia to back Morales should he be unable to exercise control over the opposition departments of Beni, Pando, Tarija and Santa Cruz. The Peruvian believes, and the Brazilian agreed, that the rank-and-file military will not/not use lethal force against fellow Bolivians. We too share this assessment (Ref B). The Peruvian and Brazilian both commented that funds coming in from Venezuela to the Bolivian military do not flow down from the senior ranks, and therefore, there is much resentment. The top military commanders, however, are opportunists that will follow Evo's orders out of self-interest. In fact, Generals Vargas, Bersatti and Trigo are reportedly fighting to stay in their jobs, causing further disgruntlement among those who would like to move into their positions. So, there are strong indications that the military is split and could be quite reticent to follow orders. Hence, with no Bolivian military to enforce Evo's will, Peru fears he will turn to Chavez. Chavez Stirs the Pot - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (SBU) Chavez's November 27 statement that the U.S. "empire" is "promoting violence" in order to overthrow the Morales administration builds on a constant barrage of inflammatory statements indicating a willingness, or perhaps an eagerness, to send Venezuelan troops to Bolivia to bolster his erstwhile ally. Chavez's October 14 threat to turn Bolivia into Vietnam should "oligarchs" attack Morales provided the opposition with traction for long-standing complaints of Venezuelan "imperialist" designs. Morales defended the remarks in November 4 magazine article. Both leaders reiterated and expanded upon the Vietnam remarks during their November 10 addresses at the Ibero-American Conference in Chile, where Chavez warned Bolivian supporters of the United States ("pitiyanquies") that any attempt to remove Morales would be met with "a thunder of rifles and machine guns." Questions over possible Venezuelan involvement in the October 18 Bolivian military takeover of Santa Cruz's Viru Viru Airport further ignited criticism of the Bolivian-Venezuelan relationship. Venezuelan "imperialism" has stayed in the headlines since, fed by heated exchanges between opposition and government officials, an alleged attack on the Venezuelan consulate in Santa Cruz, and a scandal involving $11 million in missing Venezuelan micro-credit loans. Comment - - - - ¶9. (C) The opposition's cries of Chavez the big bad wolf are over the top, but they are right when they express concern that Evo is getting advice from the Venezuelans and Cubans. With checks and doctors, the Venezuelan and Cuban ambassadors are doing what they can to bolster Evo and push his change program. For example, it is estimated that Evo has distributed around $60-80 million in Venezuelan checks to municipalities since he came to office. That said, beyond the financial support and advisory role, we find little hard evidence to support the prospect of actual Venezuelan military intervention in Bolivia. The opposition will continue to point to Chavez to discredit Evo and are hoping that a victory for the "no" vote in Venezuela's referendum will give Evo pause about proceeding with his. Likewise, the opposition fears that if Chavez wins, he will embolden Evo to push ahead GOLDBERG

OPPOSITION, OTHERS DEFEND US AID

2010-12-08T08:50:00.000-04:00

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07LAPAZ2400 2007-08-30 21:09 2010-12-03 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy La Paz

VZCZCXRO4952
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHLP #2400/01 2422118
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 302118Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4852
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7042
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4410
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 8303
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 5534
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 2761
RUEHGE/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN 0399
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 2942
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 4823
RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 0097
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 5395
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0003
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0326
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0509
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LA PAZ 002400

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2017
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL PHUM EAID BL
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION, OTHERS DEFEND US AID

REF: A. LA PAZ 2387
¶B. LA PAZ 2386

Classified By: A/DCM Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

- - - -
Summary
- - - -

¶1. (U) Following Minister of the Presidency Quintana's August
29 attacks on USAID in which he accused the USG of supporting
the opposition and told USAID to get in line with government
policies or leave the country, the opposition, NGOs and
pundits are defending USAID and criticizing the government
for the unwarranted attack. The official State Department
response to the Bolivian government's accusations has
received wide coverage, and many editorials are suggesting
that the MAS attack on USAID is a smokescreen to cover recent
domestic problems including civic strikes, rising inflation
and Venezuelan cash assistance.

- - - - - - -
Blowing Smoke
- - - - - - -

¶2. (U) Many political commentators and opposition
politicians have drawn attention to the timing of Minister
Quintana's diatribe, coming as it did only a day after six of
Bolivia's nine departments shut down in strikes against the
ruling MAS government. The head of the opposition party
National Unity (UN) Samuel Doria Medina said, "It's an old
method of (Hugo) Chavez. Every time he has a domestic
problem, he insults the U.S. government and fights with them.
It's no coincidence that on Tuesday there was a massive
strike against the government of Evo Morales, and that now
Quintana comes out to tell lies and hoaxes." In the words of
Carlos Hugo Molina, one of the former government officials
(under Goni Sanchez de Lozada) listed by Quintana as evidence
that USAID is financing the "old way" and the opposition:
"They are trying to scare us...this should be denounced at
international levels." Another USAID contractor, Juan Carlos
Urenda (a Santa Cruz civic leader) described the MAS
accusations as an attempt to cast a smokescreen over the
"serious problems in this country," and opined that this was
"another mistake of the government that will do no less than
deepen the differences and confrontations in the country."

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Pay No Attention to the Venezuelan Behind the Curtain
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶3. (C) On August 29, as Minister Quintana criticized USAID's
"flagrant interference in Bolivian politics", President
Morales was handing out Venezuelan checks to mayors in the
department of La Paz. In the past, President Morales has
publicly called for European, Japanese and U.S. aid to be
more like Venezuelan aid, which in practice would mean almost
no accountability or transparency. In his attack on USAID,
Minister Quintana praised European aid for being transparent
and for following Bolivian laws. Although Quintana did not
directly mention Venezuelan aid, the MAS is clearly
responding to criticism of the increasing Venezuelan
influence in the country. The official government news
source ABI on August 30 ran an article describing how
President Morales has been handing out "cooperation checks"
from Venezuela and Europe. This attempted conflation of
Venezuelan and European aid seems to be a MAS attempt to both
isolate the United States and justify its acceptance of
increasing Venezuelan involvement in the country. Following
Quintana's presentation, Vice President Garcia Linera
announced that the Bolivian government will push for a new
law to control the destination of international aid and will

LA PAZ 00002400 002 OF 003

investigate the programs of all international aid in Bolivia.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Biting the Hand that Continues to Feed You
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶4. (U) Many Bolivians are concerned about the more immediate
and concrete impact that could result from poking a stick at
the United States. The Bolivian External Trade Institute
(IBCE) is concerned for the future of ATPDEA, pointing out
that Bolivia is even now preparing a proposal for the
extension of ATPDEA trade preferences. IBCE head Gary
Rodriguez stated, "We understand that the (Bolivian)
Government doesn't need trade preferences, but the workers do
need them, as do entrepreneurs who seek to consolidate and
not lose free access for their exports."

¶5. (C) More directly, many observers are pointing out that
Bolivia cannot afford to risk USD120 million in assistance
from USAID. Few are suggesting that all USAID assistance
could be lost, but concerns are rife that funding could be
reduced in the future. While Morales and the MAS may be
willing to wave goodbye to our assistance, other officials
either doubt that Venezuela will step up to completely fill
the gap or, pragmatically, see a benefit in receiving as much
aid as possible from various sources. (Comment: At a time
when Vice President Linera is heading to Washington to, among
other issues, push for Millennium Challenge aid to Bolivia
and a continuation of ATPDEA trade benefits, the timing of
the attacks against the USG seems self-defeating. End
comment.)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Next Target: NAS Assistance
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶6. (C) Minister Quintana also announced his "suspicions of
U.S. double morality" in the fight against drugs, questioning
the U.S. focus on cocaine in Bolivia while claiming that
marijuana is not part of counternarcotics programs here.
Quintana said that the Bolivian government is investigating
NAS assistance and will publish their findings in the
following weeks. (Comment: It is understandable that a
government whose president is also the head of the
coca-growers union would turn its sights on NAS's programs.
Considering the egregious accusations that the Bolivian
government has just leveled at USAID, we expect that their
'investigation' of NAS will be equally rigorous. End
comment.)

- - - -
Comment
- - - -

¶7. (C) In the wake of Quintana's press conference, USAID has
received an outpouring of support. Many partner NGOs are
publicly challenging the government's accusations, and some
have requested more information from USAID in order to
repudiate the MAS stance. Morale in USAID could take a hit,
particularly among the Bolivian locally-engaged staff, some
of whom fear that after Quintana's threats and insinuations
about 'traitors' who 'sell out their country', they may be
targeted by the MAS in the future. Their fears are not
unfounded, considering that Quintana named USAID contractors,
listed their posts in previous governments, and accused them
of working against the MAS program of change. To address
initial concerns and assure employees of USG support, USAID
held an all-hands staff meeting right after Quintana's press
briefing. The Ambassador will hold a mission wide townhall
meeting immediately upon his return to La Paz.

LA PAZ 00002400 003 OF 003

URS

DEPSEC'S UPCOMING MEETING WITH BOLIVIAN VP

2010-12-08T08:49:00.000-04:00

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
07LAPAZ2385	2007-08-29 21:09	2010-12-03 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz

VZCZCXYZ0007 PP RUEHWEB  DE RUEHLP #2385/01 2412109 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 292109Z AUG 07 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4835 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7034 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4400 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 8295 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 5524 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 2751 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 2932 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 4815 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 5384 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 9992 RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0501 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 002385 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR D E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON EINV EMIN SNAR BL SUBJECT: DEPSEC'S UPCOMING MEETING WITH BOLIVIAN VP REF: A. LA PAZ 2357 ¶B. LA PAZ 2312 Classified By: A/DCM Mike Hammer, reasons 1.4 b and d. - - - - Summary - - - - ¶1. (C) Although the Morales government states it wants good relations with the United States, officials often use anti-U.S. rhetoric to distract from domestic problems, as when the Bolivian government recently groundlessly accused the United States of financing opposition groups. The key areas of concern in Bolivia currently are democracy, narcotics, and protection for U.S. investments. While Garcia Linera is generally seen as one of the more reasonable members of the Bolivian government, and often acts as moderator for radical elements of the ruling Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party, he has been aggressive in questioning the role and purpose of U.S. aid and U.S. anti-narcotics policies. The VP will likely push for ATPDEA extension and seek Millennium Challenge Account funding. End summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Politically-Motivated Anti-American Accusations - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) It has become the norm for the Morales government to launch verbal attacks against "American imperialism" in times of domestic difficulties in order to deflect public attention. On multiple occasions, President Morales has also accused the U.S. government of attempted "terrorism", suggesting that an Amcit who bombed a Bolivian hostel in 2006 was acting on USG orders. President Morales cited this supposed act of terrorism as an excuse for proposing visa requirements for U.S. visitors, expected to enter into force in December. Concerned about a recent increase in vitriolic rhetoric, Ambassador Goldberg reviewed the U.S.- Bolivia bilateral relationship with Vice President Garcia Linera August 20 and noted recent pronouncements and actions on the part of the Bolivian government that strain bilateral ties. The Vice President promised to look into the issues of concern and asked that the Ambassador not allow the forces that seek to distance Bolivia from the U.S. to prevail, emphasizing that the Bolivian government is committed to improving relations (ref b). However, not even a week later, Garcia Linera came out publicly accusing the U.S. government of funding opposition groups in Bolivia. We called on Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Hugo Fernandez on August 28 to protest these baseless accusations. Despite our protest, the Bolivian government a day later (August 29) stepped up their anti-U.S. aid rhetoric. ¶3. (C) With no warning, Minister of the Presidency Quintana gave a lengthy presentation on state-run television accusing USAID of supporting the opposition and providing what he described as evidence in support of Morales's and Garcia Linera's previous accusations. Using USAID's democracy program as an example, Quintana claimed that only 30 percent of the funding could be accounted for and said that the other 70 percent is programmed unilaterally. Quintana listed grants and subcontracts which have been given to Bolivian organizations, highlighting organization managers who worked in previous governments as an example of the USG funding supporters of the "old way" and those against the MAS program of change. Quintana praised foreign aid from other countries, stating that other countries follow Bolivian laws. In a particularly ugly insinuation, Quintana called on USAID's Bolivian employees to "remain loyal" and "not be traitors." We would find it useful if the Deputy Secretary could repeat to Garcia Linera our concerns about the potential damage to the bilateral relationship if such baseless anti-U.S. attacks persist. - - - - - - - - - - Democracy in Danger - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) Strengthening and supporting democracy in Bolivia is our mission's primary concern. Although the ruling MAS party and President Evo Morales were elected with a clear majority in fair and open elections, their actions since assuming power have often displayed anti-democratic tendencies. President Morales is currently attempting to discredit and weaken the judicial branch of government. Specifically, the MAS-controlled lower house of Congress has sent an impeachment case against four of the five judges of the Constitutional Tribunal (the court which considers questions of constitutionality, separate from the Supreme Court, which is the court of final appeal.) The vote on the impeachment case was a striking example of how the MAS has begun to manipulate regulations in order to push the MAS agenda: after fighting broke out in the Congress, the MAS head of the lower house convened only the MAS congressmen in the offices of the Vice President, where they voted by "majority of those present" (that is, only the MAS) to impeach the four judges. The MAS's aggressive actions in the Constituent Assembly, which is currently attempting to draft Bolivia's new constitution, also provide an example of the MAS's growing disregard for the democratic process. ¶5. (C) During a recent visit by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, President Evo Morales went so far as to declare his intention to rule by decree if laws got in his way. In a number of areas, Evo seems to be following in Chavez's footsteps (for example, the recently-published draft constitution, written by the MAS and Evo's Spanish and Venezuelan advisors, would allow indefinite reelection for the President and Vice President.) Venezuelan funding is pouring into the country with no transparency or accountability, further damaging the democratic process. In fact, La Razon (Bolivia's paper-of-record), recently called into question Venezuelan assistance. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Narcotics: Room for Further Cooperation? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) Counter-narcotics programs represent a chance for the Bolivian and U.S. governments to work together, but again Bolivian government rhetoric has made the task more difficult. President Evo Morales, who is the head of Bolivia's 'cocalero' coca-growing union, is a staunch supporter of coca leaf cultivation, and he publicly emphasizes a distinction between coca leaf and cocaine. In reality, the line between the two is far from clear: interdiction has increased under Evo's tenure, but so have coca production and cocaine exports. The Bolivian government's policies regarding coca are often incoherent, with one ministry challenging or annulling the actions of another ministry. Ambassador Goldberg was called to a meeting with Vice Foreign Minister Hugo Fernandez on August 22 to discuss his public comments voicing U.S. concerns over the rise of coca cultivation and drug trafficking. The Ambassador explained that his comments reflected concerns shared by Bolivian and U.S. drug enforcement authorities, supported by the latest United Nations figures. Evo's administration's reaction to the Ambassador's statements suggests that the comments struck a raw nerve. Evo is having difficulties making the case that coca cultivation is separate from cocaine production and does not want to be seen as tolerating an increase in drug trafficking. ¶7. (C) The Bolivian government, however, may be starting to realize that drugs represent a growing problem domestically and therefore may become more open to greater counternarcotics cooperation with the United States. Following a persistent effort by the Ambassador to push for a net reduction in coca cultivation, the Bolivian government announced August 28 that it is working on an "Action Plan" to implement the government's strategy to reduce coca cultivation to 20,000 hectares, down from the estimated 27,500 hectares currently being cultivated (according to UNODC's 2006 estimate). The government has plans to go even further and bring down coca cultivation to 16,000 hectares (by an unspecified date). While we reject the government's ongoing effort to bring "legal' cultivation to 20,000 hectares and would clearly want the government to produce a more substantial net reduction, 20,000 hectares would represent the average of what has been grown annually in Bolivia over the past decade, including during the past administrations. There may be an opportunity here for us to start a process which will achieve net reduction. The Vice President has discussed with the Ambassador the possibility of working out a bilateral agreement to achieve net coca reduction; it would be useful if the Deputy Secretary could refer to this idea and urge Garcia Linera to follow-up. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - U.S. Investments Threatened - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) The MAS's draft constitution made public on August 14 includes an article that specifies that international investors would only enjoy the benefits of Bolivian law and could not invoke external agreements or, by implication, international arbitration. A number of Evo's recent actions and statements have been seen as anti-investment by the industries affected: to give only a few examples, the forced renegotiation of petroleum contracts, the nationalization of Glencore's Vinto smelter, Evo's stated intention to create a state energy and electricity company, the Bolivian government's desire to repatriate a controlling share in Entel the Italian-owned telephone company, and Morales's claims that the Bolivian government now controls twenty percent of Bolivia's economy and should be involved in more. ¶9. (C) One U.S. investment which is vulnerable is San Cristobal mine, which is 65 percent owned by Apex Silver. San Cristobal would be particularly hard-hit by a bill currently in Congress, which would increase mining taxes. Although the Bolivian government claims to want a fifty-fifty split of profits, the proposed tax increases actually result in, on average, a 60 percent government take of profits. Because Apex hedged on metal prices in order to obtain financing, in aggregate proposed tax increases pose a serious threat to San Cristobal mine. When hedge costs are factored in to the overall cost structure, Apex estimates that the proposed tax regime will yield the GOB a 93 percent effective tax rate. If refunds on import taxes are eliminated for mines that produce concentrate instead of metal, as has been proposed by the Ministry of Finance, the government's take would be more than 100 percent of San Cristobal's profits. In his August 20 meeting with Vice President Garcia Linera, the Ambassador noted that given the USD 900 million investment in San Cristobal mine, he hoped that the Vice President would grant Apex Silver the opportunity to present its concerns about the government's planned tax increase directly to him. Vice President Garcia Linera agreed to look into the matter and promised to hear out Apex Silver's concerns once he had a potential way forward. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Still Interested in ATPDEA and MCA - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (C) Vice President Linera will likely push for extension of ATPDEA during your meeting. ATPDEA is crucial to a certain segment of the Bolivian economy, particularly specialty textile goods (note: USAID has provided support to a number of small companies which, without ATPDEA, would likely go bankrupt.) President Morales has made numerous statements that ATPDEA should not be extended by increments but should be formalized to give Bolivia permanent beneficial trade access to the United States. Morales has also stated that ATPDEA is not a U.S. "handout" but instead is Bolivia's due for its help in counternarcotics efforts. ¶11. (C) Vice President Garcia Linera is likely to push for extension of ATPDEA or mention a potential long-term bilateral "trade agreement" that Bolivian officials have yet to define. We also understand that Garcia Linera will visit with the Millennium Challenge Corporation to try to accelerate efforts to negotiate a compact. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Being Firm while Keeping the Relationship on Track - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶12. (C) Ambassador Goldberg has made clear our desire for good relations with Bolivia. In return, Vice President Garcia Linera has stressed that the Bolivian government also wants better relations with the United States and has pleaded with us not to "surrender to the forces that want to distance our countries" and to continue to work to try to find areas of cooperation but has done little to tone down his president's or even his own anti-U.S. rhetoric. ¶13. (C) Garcia Linera needs to hear our concerns about Bolivian democracy, the eroding investment climate, as well as our desire to continue and even expand counter-drug efforts. We also have to continue to urge the Morales government to temper its rhetoric if it is indeed interested in improved bilateral ties. That said, we are not optimistic that the United States will be able to improve its relationship with Bolivia in the short term, given Morales's paranoia and Chavez's continuing influence here. URS

MORALES TO TOBIAS: THANKS FOR THE ASSISTANCE

2010-12-08T08:47:00.001-04:00

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
07LAPAZ597	2007-03-02 20:08	2010-12-03 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz

VZCZCXYZ0001 PP RUEHWEB  DE RUEHLP #0597/01 0612038 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 022038Z MAR 07 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2707 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 6602 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3923 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7811 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 5057 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 2292 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 2390 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 3355 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 4458 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4933 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 9521 RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0191 RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000597 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2017 TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL SNAR BL SUBJECT: MORALES TO TOBIAS: THANKS FOR THE ASSISTANCE Classified By: DCM Kris Urs for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------- SUMMARY -------- ¶1. (C) As part of Director of Foreign Assistance and USAID Administrator Randall Tobias' visit to Bolivia, President Morales met with Tobias, WHA PDAS Charles Shapiro, and Ambassador Goldberg early March 2. Morales thanked Ambassador Tobias for U.S. natural disaster assistance, saying that this year's flooding is the worst Bolivia has seen in 60 years. On the bilateral relationship in general, Morales said Bolivia wants an "excellent relationship" with the United States. Ambassadors Tobias and Shapiro offered support for Bolivia's goal of a more inclusive society, but Tobias noted that the goal should be placed in the context of a democracy that includes all Bolivians. Morales asked for aid in creating jobs and improving infrastructure and said he has "great interest" in the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) and in an additional ATPDEA extension. Morales described Bolivia's many marches and blockades as largely local problems and accused opposition party Podemos of organizing them and plotting against his government. Morales thanked Ambassador Tobias for USAID assistance, highlighting alternative development and infrastructure programs in particular. Ambassador Tobias noted both countries' interest in close counternarcotics cooperation and acknowledged the GOB's interdiction efforts; Morales responded by saying his government is serious about fighting narcotics trafficking. Morales spoke in terms of a net reduction of coca and said his government plans to work harder in the Yungas; he also stressed the GOB's desire for closer counternarcotics cooperation with the United States. In an unprecedented move, Morales joined Tobias for a joint press conference following the meeting and publicly thanked the USG for disaster assistance and general cooperation. In perhaps the Embassy's most positive meeting with Morales to date, the president repeatedly thanked Tobias (both privately and publicly) for U.S. assistance and seemed to appreciate the finer points of USAID operations in Bolivia. End summary. ------------------- DISASTER ASSISTANCE ------------------- ¶2. (C) As part of Director of Foreign Assistance and USAID Administrator Randall Tobias' visit to Bolivia, President Morales (along with Amcit MFA trade advisor Tom Kruse) met with Tobias, WHA PDAS Charles Shapiro, and Ambassador Goldberg early March 2. Morales thanked Ambassador Tobias for U.S. natural disaster assistance, saying that this year's flooding is the worst Bolivia has seen in 60 years. Morales said he is "very grateful" for the international cooperation Bolivia has received. Ambassador Tobias conveyed the sympathy of the American people for Bolivia's flooding victims and informed Morales that two relief planes will arrive March 5 to provide additional assistance. Tobias said the USG is glad to have the opportunity to help Bolivia in its time of need. Morales thanked Tobias for two additional plane loads of assistance and said food rations and donations will be needed for approximately six months in some areas, until Bolivians can begin to recover from the disasters. ------------------------- BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP ------------------------- ¶3. (C) On the bilateral relationship in general, Morales said he wants an "excellent relationship" with the United States. He explained that Bolivia has a culture of dialogue and that debate is welcome. Morales said that while sometimes the press wants to generate conflict between us, he wants the "maximum level of cooperation with the USG." He acknowledged that the United States is the most developed country in the world, but noted that the United States faces environmental challenges, implying that the United States could learn from the Bolivians about how to live at peace with nature. Ambassadors Tobias and Shapiro offered support for Bolivia's goal of a more inclusive society, but Tobias noted that the goal should be placed in the context of a democracy that includes all Bolivians. Ambassador Tobias emphasized the long relationship between Bolivia and the United States, which he said the United States values and wants to continue. Tobias told Morales that the United States and Bolivia have many things in common, and that they should continue to work to find common interests. ¶4. (C) Morales asked for aid in creating jobs and improving infrastructure and said he has "great interest" in the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) (particularly for a highway from La Paz to Pando via Beni) and in an additional ATPDEA extension. Morales thanked Tobias for Congress' extension of ATPDEA benefits and said Bolivia wants commerce with the United States so it can export goods to the U.S. market. He noted that as developed and developing countries, the United States and Bolivia complement each other well. Morales also acknowledged the United States' prominent role in international institutions including the World Bank and the IDB, and said he was grateful for that assistance. Morales said Bolivia's macroeconomic stability has improved overall, largely due to increased hydrocarbons revenues, but not enough to create sufficient jobs. He also pointed out that his government's hydrocarbons' nationalization did not include expropriation of property or assets. Ambassador Tobias responded by saying that the USG is working hard to improve lives, create jobs and increase investment in Bolivia. We recognize that a stable economy is key to those goals, he said. Tobias also encouraged Morales to aggressively pursue a MCC proprosal. He emphasized that his visit should be read as a strong signal that the United States wants to work with Bolivia toward these goals. ------------- SOCIAL UNREST ------------- ¶5. (C) Morales described Bolivia's many marches and blockades as largely local problems and accused opposition party Podemos of organizing them and plotting against his government. He said that in contrast to protests over the past year, the marches he led prior to becoming president were "apolitical"-- in support of human rights, coca, and other causes. He said the Bolivian people received his marches warmly by supporting the marchers and providing them with food. Morales lamented the most violent conflict in his administration to date-- the October 2006 conflict between miners in Huanuni. Before the conflict, Morales said he personally met with miners more than 15 times. He said he told both sides that he would work to help them but that they would have to work together. Morales regretted that they couldn't, calling the violence the "worst moment" in his administration. -------------- USAID SUPPORT -------------- ¶6. (C) Morales thanked Ambassador Tobias for USAID assistance, highlighting alternative development programs in particular. He noted the current high prices for Chapare-produced palm hearts, as well as the GOB's desire to export more bananas. Morales said Bolivia wants to export alternative development products, as successes in alternative development reduce coca cultivation. He mentioned the importance of a good infrastructure for alternative development projects, and thanked Tobias for USAID assistance in constructing a road in the Chapare. While stating that the GOB "wants to maximize U.S. cooperation," Morales suggested that USAID assistance could be more efficient. He said that for the cost of one USAID-constructed soccer field, the GOB could have built three. (NOTE: Morales made this argument previously and Ambassador Goldberg responded via letter to explain that our numbers indicated otherwise). Morales also mentioned health and education as critical areas for international cooperation in Bolivia. ¶7. (C) After expressing gratitude for USAID assistance, Morales indicated that he would prefer that international assistance be donated to the central government, not Bolivia's prefects or mayors. He said he would like to establish a type of open registry to monitor aid, not for purposes of controlling it but for the benefit of Bolivia's development process. He said it would be useful to know the amount of USAID assistance in Bolivia and what the money is spent on. -------------------- COCA: MORE IS LESS? -------------------- ¶8. (C) Ambassador Tobias highlighted both countries' interest in close counternarcotics cooperation and acknowledged the GOB's interdiction efforts. He said that while the United States remains concerned that any increase in coca cultivation will go to the illegal drug trade, he looked forward to continuing to work through those issues with the GOB. Morales responded by saying his government is serious about fighting narcotics trafficking. He said that although he has been accused of being a narcotrafficker, the GOB policy is "zero cocaine, zero drugs." He said in Bolivia, "one can't talk about zero coca." At the same time, he said, his government's respect for the traditional use of coca does not imply unrestricted growth. Morales also explained that cocaine is not part of Bolivia's indigenous culture. ¶9. (C) In giving Ambassador Tobias some of his personal history, Morales said he was not born a cocalero but moved to Chapare in 1979-80 after completing his mandatory military service. His family, he said, focused on rice production but also grew a few catos of coca on the side. Because of globalization and increased international trade in the 1980's, Brazilian rice became cheaper than Bolivian rice, thus damaging his family's business. He recounted that in those years of hyperinflation, people had to sell large bundles of bananas to buy a coke or a beer. Morales said eradication with government compensation failed because people became accustomed to being paid large sums of money, "like by a bank." In Morales' opinion, militarization also failed, as it led to permanent confrontation without results. These failures, Morales said, led him to suggest one cato of coca per affiliate to limit production of coca and to prevent conflict. He said that when he speaks to the Six Federations (the main coca labor organization in the Chapare), he tells them if they fail to respect the cato of coca, the GOB will have to return to militarization. He said this serves as a strong deterrent. ¶10. (C) Regarding the GOB's future plans, Morales spoke in terms of a net reduction of coca and said his government plans to work harder in the Yungas (particularly in La Asunta and in Caranavi). He also stressed the GOB's desire for closer counternarcotics cooperation with the United States. Morales lamented a lack of progress in the Yungas but said he hoped the situation would improve. He thanked the USG for its help eradicating in Bolivia's national parks, calling counternarcotics a "shared responsibility." Morales, however, also defended the GOB's proposal to raise the legal limits of coca production to 20,000 hectares, saying it is "impossible to guarantee 10,000- 12,000 hectares of coca" but that 20,000 hectares is a more realistic goal. Likewise, he defended the GOB's human rights-conscious policy of "rationalization," or voluntary eradication, stating that statistics show that the process is more effective if it is voluntary. While Morales admitted increased coca cultivation in some areas, he maintained those cases are the exception and not the rule. Morales said he knows if he fails, the United Nations and United States will be watching. In response to Ambassador Tobias' inquiry about how much coca should be approved for traditional uses under ideal circumstances, Morales replied "less than 20,000 hectares." He admitted, however, that the European Union's legal demand study was "stuck." Overall, Morales said, he is optimistic about the GOB's ability to fight narcotics trafficking, having met its obligations in 2006. --------------------------------------------- A FIRST JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE WITH MORALES --------------------------------------------- ¶10. (SBU) In an unprecedented move, Morales joined Tobias for a joint press conference following the meeting. Morales stated publicly that he was "very happy" with the meeting, and publicly thanked the USG for disaster assistance (noting that more would arrive next week) and general cooperation. Morales said the GOB's dialogue with the United States was important to Bolivia and that it would continue. Morales emphasized the GOB's "culture of dialogue" and its respect for differences with other countries. Additionally, in response to questions about the release of the INCSR report March 1, Morales said that he respected the report as an internal evaluation of our government, but that GOB statistics on counternarcotics progress were very different. --------- COMMENT --------- ¶11. (C) In perhaps the Embassy's most positive meeting with Morales to date, the president repeatedly thanked Tobias privately and publicly for U.S. assistance. Morales seemed to appreciate the finer points of USAID operations in Bolivia and to have a superficial understanding of U.S. concerns on counternarcotics (as reflected by his discussion of a net reduction of coca). On trade, Morales clearly wants an ATPDEA extension, as further evidenced by Foreign Minister Choquehuanca's late February trip to Washington, but again made no mention of a concrete free trade proposal. While it seems that Morales may be warming to the benefits of a good bilateral relationship, his willingness to cooperate on the more difficult issues and to deliver solid political, economic, and counternarcotics policies may still be another matter. End comment. This cable has been cleared by Ambassadors Tobias and Shapiro. GOLDBERG

BOLIVIA: BACKGROUND NOTES

2010-12-08T08:46:00.002-04:00

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
07LAPAZ383	2007-02-13 10:10	2010-12-03 21:09	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	Embassy La Paz

VZCZCXYZ0003 PP RUEHWEB  DE RUEHLP #0383/01 0441051 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 131051Z FEB 07 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2445 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 6523 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3847 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7732 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4977 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 2216 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 2312 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 4397 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4859 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 9447 RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0137 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC RHMFIUU/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL

UNCLAS LA PAZ 000383 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON BL SUBJECT: CODEL NELSON SCENESETTER ----------- SUMMARY ----------- ¶1. (SBU) Embassy La Paz warmly welcomes CODEL Nelson to Bolivia February 21. Shortly after indigenous coca leader Evo Morales' one-year anniversary as president, Bolivians find themselves again facing the social unrest that has plagued their country since 2003, but which had subsided after Morales took office. The fourth president in as many years, Morales rose to power promising a "revolution" that would deliver a more inclusive society, a new constitution, nationalization of natural resources, and land reform. Morales has delivered on some of his promises, but is facing increasing difficulties governing Bolivia, which he himself has exacerbated this year by condoning and even encouraging street protests against those who oppose him. While we support Morales' stated goal of social inclusion, serious questions exist about his commitment to democracy and to the rule of law--our top priorities here-- particularly given his demonstrated impatience with compromise. Cuban and Venezuelan advice, interference, and assistance are an additional area of concern. ¶2. (SBU) Summary continued: Although Bolivia's macro-economic outlook remains strong in the short term, Morales' nationalization of hydrocarbons and the February 9 move against non-U.S. interests in the mining sector will threaten new investment. Trade should be key to Bolivia's future, and Congress' extension of ATPDEA benefits was well-received here. The GOB has shown little real interest in a long-term trade agreement. On counter-narcotics, the Morales government's mixed results on counter-narcotics reflect its confused strategy -- encouragement of coca cultivation (and thus, more cocaine) coupled with increased interdiction efforts. Your visit provides an opportunity to encourage Morales to follow a democratic path and to respect U.S. mining interests; to take counter-narcotics issues more seriously and to become a true partner in fighting the flow of illegal drugs; and to take advantage of free trade and other opportunities, including the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). End summary. ---------------------------- BOLIVIA: BACKGROUND NOTES ---------------------------- ¶3. (SBU) Landlocked Bolivia is the highest and most isolated of the Latin American republics. Once over 780,000 square miles, Bolivia lost large chunks of its land to Chile and Paraguay, leaving it with some 424,000 square miles, roughly three times the size of Nevada. Aymara indigenous groups dominate La Paz and the highlands; the Quechuas populate the cities of Sucre and Cochabamba and surrounding areas. The rich lowlands, known as the "half-moon" states, tend to be less influenced by indigenous cultures. The government recognizes 38 different indigenous groups and over 60 percent of Bolivians identify themselves as indigenous, making Bolivia the most indigenous country in Latin America. Bolivia is a country of contrast, with a small prosperous minority of its population immersed in modern business and technology and the overwhelming poor majority still mired in poverty and living relatively unchanged by progress. ¶4. (SBU) Rapidly urbanizing Bolivia is the second poorest country in Latin America, with poverty afflicting two-thirds of its population. In 2005, its GDP was approximately USD 8.5 billion. Agriculture accounts for roughly 14.5 percent of Bolivia's GDP, and soybeans grown in eastern Bolivia are the major cash crop. Extraction of minerals and hydrocarbons make up an estimated 10 percent of GDP, with manufacturing accounting for another 12 percent. Lack of economic opportunities has fueled mass migration to Argentina, Brazil, Spain, and the United States, as well as rural-to-urban and western-to-eastern migration within the country. -------------- SOCIAL UNREST -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Shortly after indigenous coca leader Evo Morales' one-year anniversary as president, Bolivians find themselves again facing the social unrest that has plagued their country since 2003, but which had subsided after Morales took office. The fourth president in as many years, Morales rose to power promising a "revolution" that would deliver a more inclusive society, a new constitution, nationalization of natural resources, and land reform. A sharp political strategist, Morales has delivered on some of his promises, and has maintained high popularity rates. However, his first year in office has brought Morales to terms with the difficulties of governing Bolivia. He has exacerbated the challenge by condoning street protests against those who opposed him. A cocalero ambush of Bolivian anti-drug forces in the Chapare, a mining clash in Huanuni, a 500,000-person strong demonstration in favor of regional autonomy in eastern Bolivia, January riots in Cochabamba, and a February 7 protest by miners in La Paz have presented Morales with serious challenges. ----------------------- DEFENDING DEMOCRACY ----------------------- ¶6. (SBU) While we support Morales' stated goal of social inclusion, serious questions exist about his commitment to democracy and to the rule of law--our top priorities here-- particularly given his demonstrated impatience with democratic rules and compromise. Bolivia convened a constitutional convention in August 2006, which to date has failed to make any progress, largely due to executive branch interference and Morales' opposition to Bolivian constitutional norms and traditions. Before the convention may begin its work, it must decide what vote will be required to approve constitutional changes. The GOB has taken a hard-line approach, repeatedly refusing to compromise with the opposition. Morales has packed the Supreme Court using recess appointments, instructed his party to pass a questionable land reform law and a military treaty with Venezuela in a late-night senate session November 28, and permitted violence against opposition hunger strikers, as well as the kidnapping of an opposition prefect. Most recently, the GOB is widely thought to have instigated the January protests in Cochabamba aimed at sacking an opposition prefect. (Despite GOB denials, evidence exists that the administration paid, transported and fed armed cocaleros who were bussed to Cochabamba to riot against an opposition-led local government). In addition to frequent public attacks on the opposition, Morales also has targeted Bolivia's prefects (governors), eastern Bolivia (because it seeks regional autonomy), the judiciary, and the press. ---------------------------------------- ONE PLACE WHERE WE'RE NOT BIG BROTHER ---------------------------------------- ¶7. (SBU) In addition to internal pressures, Cuban and Venezuelan advice, interference, and assistance continue to be a serious concern. Cuban doctors and newly-inaugurated hospitals bring medical care to isolated communities. Venezuela has agreed to purchase Bolivian soy, has provided micro credit financing to small businesses, has donated tractors to Bolivian farmers, and has funded community radio stations to broadcast the GOB's messages. Most recently, the Venezuelan government has agreed to buy essentially all of Bolivia's tainted beef, otherwise quarantined by an outbreak of hoof-and-mouth disease, as well as its industrialized coca. These Venezuelan programs receive frequent public acclaim from Bolivia's poor. On the other hand, middle class Bolivians resent Venezuela's growing presence and influence, and have balked at the Bolivian military singing the Venezuelan national anthem and depending on Venezuelan-donated helicopters to transport their president. Regionally, Bolivia has strengthened ties with Chile, but has alienated Brazil and Argentina at various points over the past year, largely because of its nationalistic but incoherent hydrocarbons policy. ----------------------------------------- NATIONALIZATION OF RESOURCES AND TRADE ----------------------------------------- ¶8. (SBU) Although Bolivia's macro-economic outlook remains strong in the short term, Morales' nationalization of hydrocarbons and moves against non-U.S. interests in the mining sector (where the bulk of U.S. investments lie) threaten new investment. On May 1, 2006, Morales announced GOB nationalization of the hydrocarbons sector. Despite the presence of Bolivian troops in hydrocarbons fields, the reality was less dramatic. Instead of a traditional nationalization, the GOB required companies to sign new contracts under duress and gave Bolivia's state oil company YPFB control over the entire hydrocarbons chain. The main impact has been to halt new investment in the sector, which Bolivia needs to meet domestic demand and fulfill contractual obligations to Brazil and Argentina. As a political measure, however, the "nationalization" remains wildly popular. ¶9. (SBU) With respect to the mining sector, high-level GOB officials have given repeated assurances that the Morales administration will respect existing U.S. mining interests. However, the GOB has reiterated threats to nationalize the mining industry, and on February 9 took over a smelter owned by Swiss company Glencore (which had been sold by ex-President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada). We continue to urge the GOB to respect existing mining concessions and to limit tax and royalty hikes. ¶10. (SBU) Trade is the key to Bolivia's future. Congress' extension of Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) benefits was well-received here, ensuring the continuity of thousands of jobs. However, high-level GOB officials refuse to take serious steps toward a free trade agreement, instead advocating the extension of the unilateral trade preferences. We have explained that "fast track" trade promotion authority expires in June, and that the new U.S. Congress is not likely to extend it. The Morales administration, however, continues to want something for nothing. --------------------- COCA CASTS SHADOW --------------------- ¶11. (SBU) The Morales government's mixed results on counter-narcotics reflect its confused strategy-encouragement of coca cultivation coupled with increased interdiction efforts. Despite the Embassy's attempts to focus the relationship elsewhere, counter-narcotics is often the negative focal point of the bilateral relationship. Given President Morales' leadership of the Chapare-based coca federations, this is not surprising. Morales repeatedly called for "zero cocaine, not zero coca," drawing a distinction between illegal drugs and legal use of coca leaf, which is also chewed or brewed as tea. It should be noted that Bolivian coca production vastly exceeds licit demand, as the GOB tacitly accepts, having refused to proceed with a market study funded by the EU which would show just that. ¶12. (SBU) Per capita rates of illegal drug use in urban Bolivia approach U.S. levels, confirming that Bolivia is a consumer country and not merely a producer. Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS)-supported demand reduction efforts focus on local and regional partners due to central government indifference. NAS- and DEA-supported interdiction programs have been successful under the Morales government. Comparing 2006 to 2005, cocaine seizures were up 23 percent. Destruction of base labs and maceration pits were up 55 and 54 percent respectively. While Bolivian CN forces have improved coordination and efficiency, the increased seizures are due in part to increased supply. ¶13. (SBU) Anecdotal evidence suggests that coca plantings have grown dramatically since Morales' election, edging out other licit and less-profitable crops. And just as coca planting has increased, eradication is down. The GOB achieved its goal of eradicating 5,000 hectares in 2006, but has gotten off to a slow start in 2007. The Morales government has been unwilling to enforce Bolivian law (or informal agreements limiting coca cultivation), has stalled the launch of the licit demand study required by Bolivian law, and now is considering raising legal limits from 12,000 to 20,000 hectares nationwide (to include the Chapare). This increase would place Bolivia in violation of its own law and treaty obligations. In an attempt to justify increased coca growth, the GOB has announced plans to legalize and industrialize coca for use in products such as toothpaste, demand for which is notional, at best. ---------- COMMENT ---------- ¶14. (SBU) Your visit presents an opportunity to further our strategy of engagement with the GOB. We have expressed serious concerns about the Morales government's commitment to a democracy that includes separation of powers, checks and balances, an active political opposition and a free press. We continue to emphasize that what Morales says matters as much as what he does in terms of his attacks on the United States. On counter-narcotics, we have continued to support interdiction and eradication efforts, demand reduction programs, and capacity building, while engaging in frank discussions about the GOB's shortcomings and redirecting our support where it has greatest impact, i.e., to interdiction. Via USAID, we're spending about $90 million annually to further social and economic inclusion of Bolivia's historically marginalized indigenous groups and to support democratic institutions and processes, including decentralized governance. In addition, USAID encourages economic growth for the poor through exports and trade, and also provides assistance in the areas of health, alternative development, and environmental protection. Your visit provides an additional opportunity to encourage Morales to follow a democratic path and to respect U.S. mining interests; to take counter-narcotics issues seriously and to become a true partner in fighting the flow of illegal drugs; and to take advantage of free trade and other opportunities, including the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). End comment.

REACTIONS TO BOLIVIA'S NEW COCA STRATEGY

2010-12-08T08:46:00.001-04:00

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06LAPAZ3449	2006-12-21 19:07	2010-12-03 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz

VZCZCXYZ0001 PP RUEHWEB  DE RUEHLP #3449/01 3551928 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 211928Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1876 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 6409 RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 0032 RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0105 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3733 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7607 RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA 0025 RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0704 RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 0017 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4855 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 2105 RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0199 RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 0015 RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0080 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 2179 RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0086 RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA 0003 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0101 RUEHLE/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 0105 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 3236 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 4301 RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 0226 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0106 RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 0058 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4742 RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 0007 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0276 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 9329 RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0153 RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 0010 RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 0732 RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0007 RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0227 RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 0007 RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0066 RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0017 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUEHLP/DEA LA PAZ DEC USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 003449 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2016 TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL SNAR BL SUBJECT: REACTIONS TO BOLIVIA'S NEW COCA STRATEGY Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Krishna Urs for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ------- Summary ------- ¶1. (C) On December 20, the DCM met with European Union chief of mission Ambassador Andrew Standley and United Nations representative Jose Manuel Martinez Morales to discuss reactions to the GOB's new coca strategy which was announced at a December 18 ceremony in the Chapare. Poloff also attended as notetaker. The GOB's plan includes an increase of 8,000 hectares of coca cultivation above the 12,000 currently allowed under Bolivian law. The United Nations and European Union representatives admitted that their respective organizations lacked a clearly defined response to the GOB's announced plan. Ambassador Standley said that EU member countries were all concerned with the GOB's plan and that they preferred a discreet response rather than a public rebuke. The DCM explained that Bolivian anti-narcotics review in March rested on a number of factors but that the GOB's 2007 strategy, if implemented, could complicate the review. The DCM repeatedly stressed the need for the international community to have a united and clear response to the GOB's new plan; his peers concurred and discussed convening a mini-Dublin group meeting in early January 2007. End Summary. ---------- Background ---------- ¶2. (C) At a December 18 ceremony in the Chapare President Morales unveiled the GOB's 2007 counter narcotics strategy. The cornerstone of the strategy is the GOB's "commitment to containing" coca cultivation at 20,000 hectares, an increase from the 12,000 allowed under Bolivian law. Morales also committed to improving drug consumption prevention programs, strengthening interdiction, promoting the industrialization of coca products, and changing international conventions to decriminalize coca leaf. ---------------------------------------- United Nations & European Union Position ---------------------------------------- ¶3. (C) The United Nations and European Union representatives admitted that their respective organ- izations lacked a clearly defined response to the GOB's announced plan. Mr. Martinez opened with the point, and all parties agreed, that the GOB's plan was a violation of both international conventions (1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs) and Bolivia's own narcotics law (known as law 1008). Ambassador Standley said that EU member countries were all concerned with the GOB's plan and that they preferred a discreet response rather than a public rebuke. Standley stated his personal opinion that the GOB will never find widespread legal (industrial) uses for Bolivia's excess coca. Mr. Standley noted that the GOB continues to stall EU efforts to perform a study on the size of Bolivia's licit coca market. He mentioned that he recently met with Pablo Solon, Bolivia's Ambassador at large for integration and trade issues, who assured him the GOB was still interested in the study and that it would move forward on it in January. Standley was most interested in hearing how the United States was planning to respond to the GOB's plan and how it would impact Bolivia's narcotics certification in March 2007. ---------------- DCM Urs' Remarks ---------------- ¶4. (C) The DCM explained that Embassy La Paz had been warned that the GOB was planning a change in licit coca growing targets and that the Ambassador had expressed the USG's concern over the GOB's plan prior to its announcement. The DCM concurred that strong public denunciations of the GOB's plan would be counter- productive. The DCM explained that the USG was prepared to sign its annual letter of agreement with the GOB on counter narcotics that same day and would not abandon its anti-drug efforts at this time. However, he emphasized that USG officials will state both privately and publicly that that the GOB's new strategy is a step backwards and seems to violate international commitments. ¶5. (C) The DCM explained that White House review of Bolivian counter-narcotic efforts in March rested on a number of factors but that the GOB's 2007 strategy if implemented would seriously complicate the review. He explained that the USG position would push for Bolivia to move forward on the EU's proposed coca study. In response to this potential requirement, Mr. Martinez observed, with a hint of sarcasm, that the GOB was likely to announce its plan to begin the study on February 28, ¶2007. ¶6. (C) The DCM repeatedly stressed the need for the international community to have a united and clear response to the GOB's new plan. The DCM suggested that a mini- Dublin group meeting be convened to develop a common position. Ambassador Standley and Mr. Martinez concurred with the DCM's suggestions, and the three agreed that January 8 or 9 would be a suitable date for the meeting. GOLDBERG

WILL THE REAL OPPOSITION LEADER PLEASE STAND UP?

2010-12-08T08:44:00.000-04:00

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06LAPAZ3400	2006-12-18 21:09	2010-12-03 21:09	SECRET//NOFORN	Embassy La Paz

VZCZCXRO8185 PP RUEHLMC DE RUEHLP #3400/01 3522107 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 182107Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1676 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 6399 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3723 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7593 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4843 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 2095 RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 0611 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 2168 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 3228 RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 1985 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 4290 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4732 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 9317 RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 LA PAZ 003400 SIPDIS S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 LA PAZ 003400 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2036 TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL BL SUBJECT: WILL THE REAL OPPOSITION LEADER PLEASE STAND UP? REF: LA PAZ 03178 Classified By: ECOPOL Counselor Andrew Erickson for reason 1.4 (d). ------- SUMMARY ------- ¶1. (C) Evo Morales' election in December 2005 was a political earthquake in Bolivia, sweeping aside political expectations that have defined Bolivian politics for generations and at the same time breaking open fissures and offering up new possibilities. While President Morales' popularity has risen and fallen since his election, his popularity has surged since the hydrocarbons nationalization and his successful use of political hardball tactics to overcome an opposition-imposed blockade of the senate. For now, the traditional opposition appears to be crumbling under the GOB's pressure. While it is too early to discern the final shifts of Bolivia's political tectonic plates this cable is an effort to explore the new political geography of current and potentially future leaders of the country. End Summary. ----------------------------- INDIGENOUS & REGIONAL LEADERS ----------------------------- ¶2. (C) RENE JOAQUINO CABRERA: A mason by trade, Potosi Mayor Rene Joaquino Cabrera is an emerging politician known for competent management, reported honesty, and efforts to govern transparently. Despite a low public profile, Joaquino has been involved in politics since 1993 and has twice been elected mayor of Potosi. His political group, the Social Alliance of the People, has earned a reputation of acting independently and moderately to build consensus within Bolivia's Constituent Assembly (CA). However, Joaquino does not have the name recognition or funding necessary for a national campaign. Given the number of potential candidates for the next presidential race, there may not be enough political space for Joaquino to make a convincing bid for national office. Despite these challenges to Joaquino's emergence nationally, his indigenous background and personal biography as a former child laborer in the country's mines could galvanize popular support. ¶3. (C) OSCAR GERARDO MONTES: A member of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) party, Tarija Mayor Oscar Montes is an intelligent strategist who understands the realities that the political opposition faces in Bolivia's current political climate. With a wealth of political experience that includes positions within national and local government, Montes has regional name recognition within Tarija and enjoys a good reputation. Understanding the political chasm that separates the country's eastern and western regions, Montes has expressed interest in creating a politically viable alternative to the MAS that includes an alliance among Bolivia's southern-most departments (Chuquisaca, Potosi, Ouro, and Tarija). He is politically aligned with Joaquino (see above). Poloffs believe a national ticket featuring Joaquino as the presidential candidate and Montes as the candidate for vice-president could empower Bolivia's southern departments and garner wide national support. ¶4. (C) PEDRO TICANA: Former minister of indigenous affairs under the Mesa and Rodriguez governments, Pedro Ticana is unaffiliated with a particular political party and is an effective political operator with a diverse political background. A former adviser to Movement Towards Socialism (MAS), Ticana is now closely aligned with Potosi Mayor Joaquino and eastern Bolivia. Helping Joaquino organize a new political party, Ticana could help establish a political block comprising the country's southern and eastern departments. Ticana's political experience with three LA PAZ 00003400 002 OF 005 different governments demonstrates his ability to work beyond party lines to establish effective political connections and build consensus. As a Quechua, Ticana has the ability to take advantage of the political prominence indigenous groups now enjoy. Political analysts, however, note Ticana prefers to remain behind the scenes rather than seek a national leadership position. At a November 2006 indigenous roundtable with Ambassadors Goldberg and Shapiro, Ticana presented himself as a moderate political thinker who seeks to establish a political environment that values inclusion and dialogue. ¶5. (C) MARIO COSSIO CEJAS: Touting a wide range of experience in academia and politics, Tarija Prefect Mario Cossio's potential as a rising opposition leader is aided by his hydrocarbons-rich prefecture. Given Tarija's hydrocarbons revenues, Cossio is well-equipped to advance the agenda of the media luna (Pando, Beni, Tarija, and Santa Cruz departments), especially on regional autonomy. A member of Camino al Cambio, a civic political group, Cossio enjoys broad public support and is viewed positively by the Bolivian national media. His ability to rise as a national opposition leader may also be aided by his discreet role in the highly publicized divide between the media luna and the GOB, which could help Cossio attract more wide-ranging political support. Physically mestizo, Cossio can tap into the support President Morales now enjoys by Bolivians who identify with him and his background. ¶6. (C) RUBEN COSTAS: The public face of the media luna and a member of Autonomia Por Bolivia, Ruben Costas' position as prefect of the economic powerhouse Santa Cruz department gives him a natural edge in establishing himself as a regional opposition leader. Costas' willingness to work with the United States would make him a solid democratic partner. His politically savvy use of the media to advance the interests of the media luna have helped establish Costas as one of the primary political opposition leaders. His public confrontations with the Morales administration, the latest bringing a public retraction by Morales of his accusations that Costas was involved in a plot against him, have helped Costas score public victories against the GOB. Given his close relationship with other prefects in eastern Bolivia and his leadership on regional autonomy, Costas is well-known and respected in the east. However, his close association with eastern Bolivia may limit him to a regional leadership position, as the Altiplano has historically opposed candidates hailing from the east, especially the Santa Cruz department. ------------- THE DINOSAURS ------------- ¶7. (C) JOSE LUIS PAREDES MUNOZ: A member of PODEMOS who values U.S. assistance in Bolivia, La Paz prefect Jose Luis Paredes stands out as a potential national opposition leader. In an October 11 meeting with ECOPOL, Paredes privately expressed his interest in obtaining U.S. support to run for the presidency (poloff explained that we do not intervene in Bolivia's internal affairs). As the former mayor of El Alto, Paredes has a strong base of support in the Altiplano, despite the efforts of several MAS-controlled social sector groups to drive him from office. With a history of demonstrating an ability to govern, Paredes has responded well to the enormous pressure he is under from his constituency and from the central government. With an eye towards his political future, Paredes is attempting to shore up support through a public relations campaign highlighting his accomplishments as prefect. However, Paredes remains very vulnerable to allegations of corruption in regard to charges filed against him on October 16 for actions allegedly committed while he was mayor of El Alto. LA PAZ 00003400 003 OF 005 ¶8. (C) MANFRED REYES VILLA: A former presidential candidate, Cochabamba Prefect and Agrupacion Unidad por Cochabamba (AUC) leader Manfred Reyes Villa has a wealth of political experience and broad name recognition although whispers of corruption haunt him. Known for delivering on his promises, Reyes is popular among his constituents, which is particularly challenging given his position in an otherwise MAS-dominated prefecture. Despite his political experience, Reyes' political potential may have peaked during his 2002 presidential campaign, when he garnered approximately 22 percent of the national vote. Lacking a politically relevant party, Reyes ties to Bolivia's old guard politicians will likely keep him from regaining a national position. Although Reyes may be unable to assume a national role, he will likely remain an important player regionally. ¶9. (C) SAMUEL DORIA MEDINA: A wealthy prominent businessman and national political figure (since his third place finish in Bolivia's December 2005 national elections) Samuel Doria Medina is the head of the National Unity (UN) party and a delegate in the CA. An entrepreneur and former minister under ex-President Jaime Paz Zamora, Medina's financial resources and position within the CA enable him to coordinate a national opposition movement. Known for having political ambitions, Medina may try to thrust himself into the next presidential race without regard for his realistic chances of winning it. Medina's chances to run for the presidency, however, have been reportedly neutralized by his willingness to broker deals with the MAS in the CA and threats by the GOB to nationalize his businesses. While the impact of these reports are unknown, Medina would still have to find support outside his party and overcome the leftist, indigenous trend in Bolivian politics if he were to attempt a presidential campaign. In the meantime, Medina will likely continue to play a key role building consensus in the CA. ---------- IRRELEVANT ---------- ¶10. (C) JORGE "TUTO" QUIROGA RAMIREZ: The recognized leader of PODEMOS, Jorge "Tuto" Quiroga is considered the glue that binds his party in the CA and in Bolivia's congress. Unfortunately, he seems tone-deaf to Bolivia's radically changed political environment, and has been unable to strike a chord with the population. As the leader of the largest opposition group in the CA and a former president, Quiroga remains Bolivia's primary opposition leader. Like Ortiz, Quiroga's leadership of PODEMOS may undermine his ability to win national office. Beginning late-November 2006, Quiroga has started to take a more public stance on divisive issues between his party and the GOB to build pressure and support for a two-thirds vote in the CA. While effective as a party leader, most political analysts concede Quiroga would not fare well in a future presidential race. In a recent meeting with the Ambassador, Quiroga appeared less interested in Bolivian politics than discussing foreign policy -- that of Bolivia as well as the U.S. ¶11. (C) OSCAR ORTIZ: An influential and well-known opposition senator from Santa Cruz, Oscar Ortiz has made a name for himself by using his political position to publicly criticize the GOB. A member of PODEMOS, with a background in business, Ortiz understands the intricacies of economics and can use his experience to communicate policies that would resonate with a Bolivian electorate that is increasingly focused on employment. Like Costas, his ties to eastern Bolivia and his pro-business outlook may diminish his ability to rise through the political ranks, particularly in light of GOB rhetoric against free market economics. Ortiz's affiliation with the PODEMOS party may also prevent his LA PAZ 00003400 004 OF 005 emergence as an opposition leader that can gain broad political appeal. ------------- LEFT FIELDERS ------------- ¶12. (S/NF) SANTOS RAMIREZ: The president of Bolivia's senate, Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) senator Santos Ramirez is considered the political confidant of President Morales. A lawyer by education and a teacher by training, Ramirez has an extensive history in politics as a member of congress before being elected to the senate in 2006. Born in the Potosi department, Ramirez is well-known in Potosi and serves as the head of the MAS party there. With a political career closely aligned to President Morales' legislative agenda, Ramirez' political future is considered heavily dependent on the political successes of the GOB. Rumored to be a major player in the MAS' political playbook, Ramirez is in a position to assume a leadership position in the event President Morales stumbles (reftel A). Ramirez' role in railroading controversial legislative measures supported by President Morales confirms the opinions of many political analysts who consider him a radical. Emboldened by the newfound wave of popularity President Morales is enjoying, Ramirez may shed his politically adept style for a more radical approach. With his strong alliances with the GOB, Ramirez may ride out the wave of President Morales' strong popularity before revealing his personal aspirations to emerge on Bolivia's national stage. Sensitive reporting indicates that Ramirez may be very vulnerable on corruption and human smuggling charges. ¶13. (C) FERNANDO HUANACUNI: A relative unknown in Bolivia's political sphere, professor, lawyer, and Aymara writer Fernando Huanacuni has raised the eyebrows of political analysts convinced President Morales' successor will hail from the country's indigenous community. Relatively young in political terms at thirty-nine years old, Huanacuni may present a fresh perspective that would be welcomed by a growing population of young Bolivians frustrated with a government they view as unresponsive. A resident of El Alto and born in the La Paz department, Huanacuni's ability to galvanize support for a national run would directly challenge President Morales' base of support. Despite his lack of name recognition, Huanacuni's television show on social pressures is helping him gain wider recognition if he uses it as a method to raise his political profile. Similar to the assessments made for other indigenous politicians, Huanacuni's indigenous background could help him galvanize greater support. ¶14. (C) JUAN DEL GRANADO: Known as the "the Gardener" for his passionate support for environmentally-friendly public works, La Paz Mayor Juan del Granado is popular among his constituency for his efforts to reform La Paz and fight corruption. He stands as a likely candidate to emerge nationally from the MAS' rank-and-file if the opportunity presented itself. A former member of the MIR and the Movimiento Bolivia Libre (MBL), Granado is the founder and current leader of the Movimiento Sin Miedo (MSM), a political party he started when he ran for mayor that is now allied with the MAS. In addition to the publicity Granado enjoys from his position, his skillful use of radio and television for constituent outreach help him raise his profile among the electorate while highlighting his accomplishments in office. Despite his alliances with MAS, however, Granado political viability remains murky at best. Considered a member of the middle class, Granado would likely have to counter negative perceptions of the middle class among the indigenous community and traditionally marginalized groups to court their vote. A former minister in the Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada administration, Granado would be an easy target for LA PAZ 00003400 005 OF 005 this past association and this would present a high hurdle for Granado to clear in a national run for office. ------- COMMENT ------- ¶12. (C) The December 2005 and July 2006 national elections exposed what turned out to be a hollow center of leadership in Bolivia's political traditional political classes. It was in this vacuum that Evo Morales took the presidency; Bolivia's traditional leaders are still reacting to the earthquake his victory represented. The rough-and-tumble politics favored by Morales have further exposed the many weaknesses of the traditional opposition. Most recently, the emergence of divisive issues within the CA has spurred some political leaders to action, and offered tentative clues to possible alternative opposition leadership. While a resurgence of the old opposition is possible, it is unlikely that Bolivia's future leader will be one of the political dinosaurs and irrelevant leaders of the past. Bolivia remains an overwhelmingly poor country. Given the leftward shift of rhetoric among many voters, a post-Morales environment would likely offer serious electoral advantages to a leader emerging from Evo's indigenous supporters. If Morales were to exit unexpectedly, an indigenous or strong regional leader would be the most likely candidate to fill his position. This year, President Morales has had a lucky run, with high hydrocarbons and other commodity revenues leaving him abundant room to maneuver. That situation will change dramatically, however, when his economic luck runs out. End Comment. GOLDBERG SELECT * FROM `cable` WHERE `id` = '90016' ORDER BY `date` ASC

AMBASSADOR DISCUSS WAYS TO IMPROVE BILATERAL TIES

2010-12-08T08:43:00.000-04:00

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06LAPAZ2910	2006-10-27 13:01	2010-12-03 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz

VZCZCXRO2364 PP RUEHLMC DE RUEHLP #2910/01 3001308 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 271308Z OCT 06 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1098 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 6220 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3540 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7402 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4662 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1913 RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 0577 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 1964 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 3157 RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 1841 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 4113 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4551 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 9125 RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 LA PAZ 002910 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2016 TAGS: PARM ECON SNAR PREL PGOV BL SUBJECT: VP, AMBASSADOR DISCUSS WAYS TO IMPROVE BILATERAL TIES Classified By: Ambassador Philip S. Goldberg for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). ¶1. (C) Summary: In their first meeting since the Ambassador presented his credentials October 13, the Ambassador and Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera engaged in a cordial exchange October 26 on U.S. assistance, extension of ATPDEA benefits, Morales' anti-American discourse, military relations and counternarcotics. The vice president opened the meeting warmly, saying that his recent visit to a USAID fair had provided him with a valuable education about U.S. assistance in Bolivia. With respect to President Bush's announcement in support of an ATPDEA extension for the region, the vice president said the GOB is "very happy and grateful" for this "friendly sign" from the United States. The Ambassador told Garcia Linera that the best way forward for the GOB would be to not only lower, but to improve, its public discourse toward the United States. The Ambassador also cautioned Garcia Linera that Bolivia's relationships with other countries have consequences. The vice president said he hoped the Ambassador would rely on him as an "instant messenger" for any communications with the GOB in order to avoid missteps in the relationship. On mil-mil relations, Garcia Linera said he hoped to remove the F-10 counterterrorism matter and the MANPADS issue from the bilateral agenda, although he said the missiles transfer would continue to be an internal issue. On counternarcotics, the Ambassador said that voluntary eradication is ideal, but said that the GOB would have to show quick results. Following the meeting, the Ambassador and the vice president held a joint press conference, the first of its kind since Morales took office in January. Despite the recent ups and downs in the bilateral relationship, Garcia Linera appeared to be putting on his best face for the Ambassador. End summary. ------------------------------------- U.S. ASSISTANCE: A PLEASANT SURPRISE ------------------------------------- ¶2. (C) The vice president opened the meeting warmly, saying that while he had been familiar with the amount of U.S. assistance, his visit to a recent USAID fair had provided him with a valuable education about its "characteristics." Garcia Linera was particularly impressed with USAID's microenterprise and agricultural assistance, which he said directly help many poor Bolivians. Garcia Linera also noted the Ambassador's October 25 book and equipment donations in the Altiplano. The Ambassador said he hopes to continue traveling in order to demonstrate our desire to assist Bolivians with their development efforts, as well as to improve Bolivians' understanding of the United States. He expressed concern that many Bolivians' image of the United States is outdated, and that we are in fact a very dynamic country that understands well the struggle to overcome social, political and economic exclusion. --------------------------------------------- ------ U.S. EXECUTIVE BRANCH SUPPORT FOR ATPDEA EXTENSION --------------------------------------------- ------ ¶3. (C) With respect to President Bush's announcement in support of an ATPDEA extension for the region, the vice president said the GOB is "very happy and grateful" for this "friendly sign" from the United States. The Ambassador complimented the vice president's October 25 comments on ATPDEA, saying that he was prudent to caution the Bolivian people that the matter will be decided by the U.S. Congress. The Ambassador told the vice president that President Bush's support is an example of our desire to improve relations with Bolivia. Garcia Linera stressed that in the absence of free trade negotiations, ATPDEA is of critical importance to Bolivia. The vice president acknowledged former Ambassador LA PAZ 00002910 002 OF 005 Greenlee's advice to the GOB on ATPDEA, saying that he hoped that the Ambassador would continue in the same vein. --------------------------------------------- REINFORCING THE MESSAGE: PLEASE LOWER THE TONE --------------------------------------------- ¶4. (C) The Ambassador told Garcia Linera that the best way forward for the GOB would be to not only lower, but to improve, its public discourse toward the United States. He cautioned that President Morales' anti-American remarks may damage Bolivia's chances for an ATPDEA extension. The Ambassador explained that before his arrival at post, he participated in counternarcotics certification conversations, in which he said there were serious questions about recertifying Bolivia. If we hadn't certified, the Ambassador said, we wouldn't be talking about an ATPDEA extension now. The Ambassador told the vice president that he offered the president, the minister of the presidency and the foreign minister the same counsel-- that the GOB needs to lower its tone. He said the USG cannot compartmentalize its foreign policy, but looks at the overall relationship. The Ambassador said that by accusing the USG and the Embassy of conspiracy and assassination attempts, the GOB had fallen well below the accepted norms of diplomatic and political discourse. ¶5. (C) Garcia Linera attempted to defend Morales' anti-American rhetoric, saying that the president's history with the United States was one of "distance and conflict." He said the GOB wants to turn the page but that "the history is still there," although "each time less." The vice president said the GOB wants to close the era of mistrust definitively, saying that Morales' trip to the United States for the United Nations General Assembly was a big step forward in this regard. He said the trip enabled Morales to see the "human" side of our country, and that it was important for Morales to see the United States as an open, pluralistic society. He said the president was "excited" when he returned, energized by the personal contact with Americans he had had in the United States. The vice president said he "celebrated" Morales' trip and described the bilateral relationship following it as "closer, friendlier." Garcia Linera said he hopes that Morales will visit the United States again soon. The visit aside, Garcia Linera said he could not "guarantee" that Morales would not suffer a rhetorical relapse, but promised to try. He said that he had asked Ambassador Greenlee for a "good dose of patience" and asked Ambassador Goldberg for the same as a "very personal request." Garcia Linera said the GOB is "not looking for confrontation or tension." He said that once in a while, "fissures will open, things surface, but we want to expand and improve relations." ------------------------------ CHOOSE YOUR FRIENDS CAREFULLY ------------------------------ ¶6. (C) Along the same lines, the Ambassador cautioned Garcia Linera that Bolivia's relationship with other countries may have consequences. He said Bolivia's relations are Bolivia's business, but that the GOB should be aware that they can impact its relations with other countries, including the United States. The Ambassador offered the example of a recent anti-American speech by the Venezuelan ambassador, with Morales at his side. The Ambassador added that no one in the diplomatic corps seems to have met the Venezuelan ambassador, a signal that raises questions about the Venezuelan's activities here. Garcia Linera said he understood and said "we don't need" those consequences. Likewise, the Ambassador suggested that the GOB be careful not to interfere in the democratic processes of neighboring countries, citing a press report that Morales and Ecuador's LA PAZ 00002910 003 OF 005 "legitimate president" Rafael Correa would speak at an October 26 event supporting Bolivia's "revolution" (septel). The Ambassador said respect for Ecuador's democratic process could only help Bolivia's international image. Garcia Linera appeared to take the Ambassador's comment on board, responding that the GOB was not funding the conference. ------------------- YOU CAN TALK TO ME ------------------- ¶7. (C) The vice president said he hoped the Ambassador would rely on him as an "instant messenger" for any communications with the GOB in order to avoid missteps in the relationship. Garcia Linera said, "Don't doubt me as a channel for anything." He encouraged the Ambassador to pass him criticisms and observations, and to call him at any hour or to ask for a meeting with him or the president on short notice. Garcia Linera referred to a recent GOB experience with bad intelligence (presumably on the subject of U.S. students in Bolivia whom the GOB alleged were undercover U.S. military operatives), saying that if a similar situation presents itself, the president would like to call the Ambassador to confirm the information. Garcia Linera lamented that at the time of that incident, the GOB "didn't have a bridge" to the Embassy, leading the president to keep the information to himself and then to speak about it publicly. Garcia Linera admitted that was "their mistake" and that they have to work against susceptibility to certain types of information. ¶8. (C) The Ambassador thanked the vice president for his offer and agreed to contact him with any questions or concerns. He also encouraged Garcia Linera to call him, particularly before publicly accusing the USG of any wrongdoing. The Ambassador stressed that the USG has not reacted publicly to Morales' accusations because of our desire to improve relations. In turn, Garcia Linera said he would welcome the Ambassador's counsel on how the GOB could improve the bilateral relationship. The vice president admitted the GOB had been skeptical about former Ambassador Greenlee's advice in this regard--and had even debated about whether Greenlee's advice was good. Garcia Linera said in the end, they had accepted the Embassy's advice in good faith and had been pleasantly surprised. ------------------------------------------- MILITARY RELATIONS: VP WANTS TO STRENGTHEN ------------------------------------------- ¶9. (C) In response to the Ambassador's stated desire to improve mil-mil relations (despite Article 98 restrictions), Garcia Linera said he hoped to remove the F-10 counterterrorism matter and the MANPADS issue from the bilateral agenda, although he said the missiles transfer would continue to be an internal issue. Garcia Linera said Bolivian forces are no longer using the F-10 arms and that plans are underway to transfer them to permit U.S access. The Ambassador said he was optimistic about resolving that issue and hoped that we could do the same with the missiles transfer, despite the political complexities of that issue. Garcia Linera said that while he understands the U.S. position, the pending "internal investigation" of President Rodriguez and other GOB officials would not be resolved quickly. ¶10. (C) The Ambassador also said that we would like to do more in the area of military education and exchanges. Garcia Linera welcomed the overture, adding that he would like to take up the full range of military cooperation prohibited by Article 98 later. The Ambassador gently reminded Garcia Linera that the GOB should ratify the agreement so they could give him access. Finally, Garcia Linera expressed great LA PAZ 00002910 004 OF 005 interest in the milgroup's New Horizons exercise planned for 2007, as well as other civil works. The Ambassador explained that we are asking the GOB to sign a new Status of Forces Agreement to make such projects possible, and that we have already raised the subject with the ministries of defense, presidency and foreign relations. ------------------------------------------- COUNTERNARCOTICS: AN INITIAL CONVERSATION ------------------------------------------- ¶11. (C) On counternarcotics, the Ambassador said of course the USG would like to see the GOB's voluntary eradication program work, but said the GOB would have to show quick results. The Ambassador said that while he realized coca is a sensitive topic domestically, it is in both countries' interest to work together to fight drug trafficking. He told Garcia Linera that it would be impossible for the USG to support the GOB's coca ideology (e.g. industrialization and legalization), suggesting instead that the two governments focus on their common interest in stopping the flow of drugs. He also told the vice president that President Morales' ill-informed statements on U.S. drug use were not helpful. The Ambassador told Garcia Linera that the United States has worked hard to lower drug consumption, but that consumption is up in Europe and is a growing problem in Brazil and Bolivia. Garcia Linera described eradication as "complicated," but noted that the Morales government is eradicating in many new areas. Garcia Linera made a subtle pitch for increased U.S. counternarcotics assistance, saying the GOB needs additional eradicators. If not, he said, we will see an increase in narcotrafficking. The Ambassador suggested they discuss counternarcotics strategies in depth soon, and noted that the October 28 arrival of INL Deputy Assistant Secretary Christy McCampbell would present an immediate opportunity for further dialogue. ----------------------- A UNITED PUBLIC FRONT ----------------------- ¶12. (C) Following the meeting, the Ambassador and the vice president held a joint press conference at the Ambassador's urging, the first of its kind since Morales took office in January. Like the meeting, the tone of the press conference was warm. The vice president publicly thanked the Ambassador for his visit, describing it as "cordial." Garcia Linera said he and the Ambassador had discussed "steps forward" on many issues of mutual interest, and cited the GOB's will and his own personal commitment to "expand and improve" relations with the United States, particularly in order to promote democracy and fight poverty and drug trafficking. -------------------------------- COMMENT: STARTING A NEW CHAPTER -------------------------------- ¶13. (C) Despite the recent ups and downs in the bilateral relationship, Garcia Linera appeared to be putting on his best face for the Ambassador. During the hour-long meeting, the two talked about the president's birthday (October 26), which a crowd of supporters commemorated with fireworks (causing an occasional noisy interruption to the otherwise smooth conversation) and a toy donation ceremony for Bolivian children. (Note: Garcia Linera said the president was delighted to give the children toys because he had played with sheep bones as a child in eocnomically-depressed Oruro. End note). Garcia Linera seemed relaxed and pleased to start anew with the USG, even responding to the Ambassador's invitation to use first names by telling the Ambassador to "call me Alvaro." Garcia Linera said he had been very attentive to Ambassador Goldberg's words and gestures since he arrived, implying his approval of his new interlocutor. LA PAZ 00002910 005 OF 005 End comment. GOLDBERG

MORALES: WALKING A FINE LINE ON DRUGS

2010-12-08T08:42:00.000-04:00

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06LAPAZ2657	2006-10-02 20:08	2010-12-03 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz

VZCZCXRO7200 PP RUEHLMC DE RUEHLP #2657/01 2752018 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 022018Z OCT 06 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0756 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 6148 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3464 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7322 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4584 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1841 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 1881 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 4051 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4477 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 9051 RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LA PAZ 002657 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2016 TAGS: SNAR PGOV PREL BL SUBJECT: MORALES: WALKING A FINE LINE ON DRUGS REF: A. LA PAZ 2637 ¶B. LA PAZ 2647 Classified By: Amb. Philip S. Goldberg for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Following the September 29 death of two civilians who ambushed a GOB eradication operation in Carrasco National Park in Cochabamba, the Embassy's NAS section will begin supporting GOB eradication efforts in the park at the GOB's request. President Morales started spinning the conflict October 2, publicly declaring that the two civilians killed "are not cocaleros but narcotraffickers" in an effort to maintain the loyalty of his cocalero base. Regardless of how the GOB moves forward, this is likely a lose-lose situation for it, given Bolivians' predisposition toward blaming their government for civilian deaths. While Morales attempts to walk the political highwire, our role is to provide assistance to achieve US goals while keeping the GOB out in front. This event demonstrates that enforcing anti-drug laws can require tough decisions that go beyond Morales' simplistic rhetoric about coca being harmless. End summary. ¶2. (C) Following the September 29 death of two civilians who ambushed a GOB eradication operation in Carrasco National Park in Cochabamba, the Embassy's NAS section will begin supporting GOB eradication efforts in the park at the GOB's request. Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera expressed gratitude for the Embassy's September 29 offer to assist, stating that President Morales had decided to begin a serious eradication campaign in the park and would need U.S. backing. At Garcia Linera's suggestion, the DCM met September 30 with Defense Minister Walker San Miguel to coordinate Embassy logistical support for the GOB campaign. Based on that meeting, NAS-owned C-130s and helicopters will begin transporting Bolivian eradicators and troops October 2. San Miguel told the DCM that this crisis has created an opportunity for improved mil-mil relations. We are taking careful measures to provide only logistical support, and to encourage the GOB to respect human rights throughout the planned operations. ¶3. (C) President Morales started spinning the conflict October 2, publicly declaring that the two civilians killed "are not cocaleros but narcotraffickers" in an effort to maintain the loyalty of his cocalero base. (Note: In fact, the civilians did not belong to the Six Federations of Cocaleros of the Chapare, and therefore were not part of Morales' core political support. End note). Cocaleros in Carrasco National Park have defiantly challenged the GOB, saying that they will defend their coca "with blood." While Morales manages the public side of the conflict, the GOB is investigating the deaths to confirm that GOB forces did not commit human rights abuses. (Ironically, forensic experts have determined that at least one of the injured was a victim of cocaleros' friendly fire). ¶4. (C) Comment: Regardless of how the GOB moves forward, this is likely a lose-lose situation for it given Bolivians' predisposition toward blaming their government for civilian deaths, as in October 2003. If the GOB takes a hard line and begins eradicating Carrasco National Park in earnest, the backlash from Morales' core political base could be strong. Morales went to the Chapare October 2 to meet with his base, and we will provide a read-out of that meeting septel. If the GOB instead attempts to finesse this conflict and fails, it will become vulnerable to further conflicts which it will also likely lose. The final option -- negotiating a deal which neither comes down too hard nor caves to cocalero demands -- is a fine line that may be impossible to walk, particularly since keeping the Constituent Assembly on track requires the GOB's full attention. ¶5. (C) Comment continued: While Morales attempts to walk the political highwire, our role is to provide assistance to achieve US goals while keeping the GOB out in front. In a rare move, the GOB has asked for Embassy logistical LA PAZ 00002657 002 OF 002 assistance to move military units to begin the forceful eradication of coca. We'll try to use opportunities that present themselves to help the GOB get back onto the right track on counternarcotics, including in signing a new LOA on future cooperation, and will hold out hope that the goodwill stemming from our assistance may create an opening for increased dialogue on broader issues, including democracy and mil-mil relations. In any case, this event demonstrates that enforcing anti-drug laws can require tough decisions that go beyond Morales' simplistic rhetoric about coca being harmless. End comment. GOLDBERG

EVO'S POLITICAL ADVISERS

2010-12-08T08:41:00.000-04:00

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06LAPAZ908	2006-03-31 14:02	2010-12-03 21:09	SECRET	Embassy La Paz

VZCZCXRO8932 PP RUEHLMC DE RUEHLP #0908/01 0901407 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 311407Z MAR 06 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8691 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 5750 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3028 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6900 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4137 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1450 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 1393 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 3704 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4090 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 8626 RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LA PAZ 000908 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2016 TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL BL PINR SUBJECT: EVO'S POLITICAL ADVISERS (PART 3 OF 3) REF: LA PAZ 00831 Classified By: Amb. David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: President Evo Morales keeps several close advisers who facilitate and carry out his personal agenda but have limited influence on the President's decisionmaking. They are split between those who work behind the scenes to facilitate Morales' vision and those who are charged with intimidating the opposition, especially in Congress. This cable is part three of a three-part series examining how Morales has structured his advisory circle. End summary. ----------------- Behind the Scenes ----------------- ¶2. (S//NF) Morales has several behind-the-scenes operators whose names rarely show up in open sources, but which sensitive reporting indicates are key Morales advisers. They appear to be loyal to Morales' political vision and work closely with the Cubans and Venezuelans in a complementary rather than competitive way, unlike Morales' primary intellectual advisers (SEPTEL). (Comment: The fact that these advisers work behind the scenes suggests that they are not seeking public recognition, and Morales is more likely to keep them around because of it. End comment.) -------------------- Ivan Iporre Salguero -------------------- ¶3. (S//NF) Ivan Iporre is Morales' personal assistant, and sensitive reporting indicates that he also has been responsible for Morales' personal finances. Iporre controls Morales' agenda and access to him. He was one of three advisers who accompanied Morales on his world tour in January. Two Embassy contacts have said that Iporre is the "go-to-guy" for seeking political favors from the President. ------------------- Hugo Moldiz Mercado ------------------- ¶4. (S//NF) Hugo Moldiz, a journalist by trade and a well-known FARC and ELN-B contact, appears to hold an unofficial advisory position in the Ministry of Government. Sensitive reporting indicates that he has been an important operator for Morales with the Cubans in Bolivia, particularly coordinating the Constituent Assembly agenda and security and intelligence issues. Press reports have also highlighted Moldiz's role in allegedly organizing local self-defense groups, a pet project Morales takes from his years as a cocalero leader and may now be inspired by Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez. -------------------- Hector Arce Zaconeta -------------------- ¶5. (C) Hector Arce is Morales' personal attorney, a position he has held for six years. Arce appears to be responsible for designing the legal means for Morales to bypass laws the President deems inconvenient or for devising legal arguments for harassing or attacking Morales' political adversaries, such as the lawsuit against former President's Eduardo Rodriguez, Carlos Mesa, Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, and Jorge Quiroga. ---------------- Public Operators ---------------- ¶6. (C) Morales relies on several Congressmen, particularly Senate President Santos Ramirez Valverde, Chamber of Deputies President Edmundo Novillo Aguilar, and Chamber of Deputies member Gustavo Torrico Landa, to intimidate opposition LA PAZ 00000908 002 OF 002 Congressional leaders. Ramirez, Novillo, and Torrico owe their career to Morales and may be abusing power much like their predecessors. In particular, Ramirez, a blatant opportunist who one Embassy contact says would sell his mother to get what he wants, has already fallen prey to allegations of graft, according to PODEMOS Congressmen (REF A). ¶7. (C) These advisers operate more as the President's back alley thugs than as independent legislators. For example, PODEMOS Congressmen have told poloff that their MAS counterparts have been digging up dirt from the past and blackmailing opposition Congressmen to back the MAS or face exposure through the press. (Comment: One Embassy contact has referred to the Congressmen as part of the "Cochabamba boys"--a reference to the group of associates that Morales led over the years in the Chapare that regularly intimidated and harassed cocaleros--although only Novillo technically represents Cochabamba. End comment.) Further blurring the line between the executive and legislative branches, the press reported in January that both Ramirez and Novillo moved into the presidential palace at Morales' request, although Ramirez publicly denies that he lives there. GREENLEE

THE ROLE EVO'S "INTELLECTUALS" PLAY

2010-12-08T08:39:00.000-04:00

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06LAPAZ906	2006-03-31 13:01	2010-12-03 21:09	SECRET	Embassy La Paz

VZCZCXRO8861 PP RUEHLMC DE RUEHLP #0906/01 0901326 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 311326Z MAR 06 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8688 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 5747 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3025 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6897 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4134 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1447 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 1390 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 3701 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4087 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 8623 RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 LA PAZ 000906 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2016 TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL BL PINR SUBJECT: THE ROLE EVO'S "INTELLECTUALS" PLAY (PART 2 OF 3) REF: A. LA PAZ 00691 ¶B. LA PAZ 00600 ¶C. LA PAZ 00406 Classified By: Amb. David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: President Evo Morales' circle of Bolivian intellectual advisers occupies half of the President's Cabinet, including the top three positions: the Vice President, the Minister of the Presidency, and the Minister of Sustainable Development and Planning. While the intellectuals have more influence over the President than his domestic political advisers, they also compete with Cuban and Venezuelan advisers for Morales' confidence. The second tier of intellectual advisers is critical for implementing the government's policies, including the Cuban-sponsored education program, negotiating new contracts with international hydrocarbons companies, and carrying out land reform. This cable is part two in a three-part series on how Morales has structured his advisory system. End summary. -------------------------------------------- First Tier of Bolivian Intellectual Advisers -------------------------------------------- ¶2. (C) The first tier of President Evo Morales' domestic intellectual advisers is headed by Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera, followed by Minister of the Presidency Juan Ramon Quintana and Minister of Planning Carlos Villegas. All three were professors at the Greater University of San Andres (UMSA) before joining the Morales administration. Morales' intellectual advisers have more sway with the President than do his domestic political advisers (SEPTEL), but they also compete with Cuban and Venezuelan consultants for Morales' confidence. They have pursued their own agenda at times, which has angered the President in the past and could push him to rely more on his foreign advisers if these practices continue. -------------------- Alvaro Garcia Linera -------------------- ¶3. (C) Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera is the gatekeeper for Bolivian advisers and moderates and adds intellectual spin to the President's vision. Nonetheless, Garcia Linera is a committed, even devout ideologue and in the past has criticized Morales' lack of discipline to leftist ideals (NFI). At odds with Morales on several occasions, including disagreeing over Cabinet picks, the Vice President has struggled to find his niche in the Morales administration and may have found it as the MAS go-to-person for the Constituent Assembly. ¶4. (C) Garcia Linera, ambitious in his own right, was the puivotal political orchestrator of the Constituent Assembly (CA) process. Garcia Linera, who views the CA as the ultimate forum for reforming the state, is working to build his reputation as the expert on the issue. He was a gifted negotiator during the congressional debate over the convoking CA legislation. Embassy contacts say that he was key in talking down radical proposals offered by the MAS and opposition members, and in forging the final consensus. They also note that he had impressive patience and focus during the highly charged negotiations. (Comment: Some observers say that Garcia Linera has presisdential aspirations; if so, recent precedents suggest that the vice presidency is a good place to be. It also suggests that he may be competing with Morales for public support. End comment.) ¶5. (C) A sharp intellectual steeped in largely discredited political, philosophical, and economic theory, Garcia Linera appears to see Bolivia through the prism of the French revolution. In a recent press interview, he said that he sees himself as the last Jacobin and Evo as Robbespierre. (Comment: The Jacobins and Robbespierre were notorious for their reign of terror. They arrested and executed political LA PAZ 00000906 002 OF 003 adversaries and allies alike and ultimately met their demise from the same instrument used to execute the opposition: the guillotine. To extend the analogy, many pundits have argued that Morales may meet his own demise at the hands of protestors, just as he was a force during protests to oust Presidents Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada and Carlos Mesa. End comment.) ------------------- Juan Ramon Quintana ------------------- ¶6. (C) Embassy contacts have said that Minister of the Presidency Juan Ramon Quintana is responsible for intelligence and military issues, and for coordinating Venezuelan and Cuban support. Garcia Linera brought Quintana into his position. ¶7. (S//NF) Quintana is a disgruntled former military officer who was fired from his position in the Ministry of Defense in 2000 during the Banzer regime. He long suspected that the US was behind his firing, a suspicion that has some merit, and became stridently anti-U.S. as a result. Quintana, upon assuming his current duties, was responsible for the recent removal of 29 flag-rank members of the armed forces, most of whom were cooperating with the United States. The Minister also has been seeking out other officers who have had contact with U.S. officials, probably with the intent to fire them. ¶8. (S//NF) Quintana's disdain for the United States is so deep that he withheld from Morales sensitive information passed to him by U.S. intelligence agencies to prevent the President from knowing that the Americans were helping him. The already suspicious Morales is aware that Quintana withheld information, and sensitive reporting indicates that he is monitoring the Minister. Morales may choose to sideline the Minister if the behavior continues. Sensitive reporting also indicates that Quintana has had other problems with Morales for paying more attention to getting jobs for his friends than focusing on his substantive duties, something that could further aggravate the relationship. --------------- Carlos Villegas --------------- ¶9. (C) Minister of Planning Carlos Villegas oversees all economic coordination and decisionmaking. The Minister of Finance reports to Villegas, and not to Morales. Villegas, an economics professor from UMSA, is steeped in out-dated socialist economic theories and has yet to accept the practical realities of a globalized economy. (REF C) ¶10. (C) While Villegas may be beginning to understand the real impact of free trade on job creation, he appears to believe that markets in Venezuela and China serve as alternatives to U.S. markets. He has told Bolivian exporters to seek markets outside the United States, unconvinced that the U.S. is crucial to their trade (REF B). He recently returned from Venezuela after negotiating an agreement for Venezuela to buy Bolivian soy. Additionally, he has regularly antagonized other businesses, telling them that the President's Dignity Tariff, a new lower price mean to provide cheap electricity to Bolivians is a done deal, remarking that the private sector should either get on board or suffer. (REF A). --------------------------------------------- ------------ Second Tier of Bolivian Intellectuals Implementing Policy --------------------------------------------- ------------ ¶11. (C) The second tier of intellectual advisers includes Minister of Hydrocarbons Andres Soliz Rada, Minister of Agriculture Hugo Salvatierra, Minister of Education Feliz Patzi, Minister of Finance Luis Arce Catacora, and the palace spokesman Alex Contreras. They appear to take instructions from the top tier and from Morales himself. At times they LA PAZ 00000906 003 OF 003 appear more like political "operators" (SEPTEL) doing the President's bidding. In contrast to the political operators, however, the second tier of intellectuals does not tend to engage in strong-arming or undermining the opposition. They appear to focus almost exclusively on implementing policy--including coordinating the Cuban doctors program and pursuing land reform. (Comment: Soliz, Salvatierra, and Patzi are all associated with UMSA.) -------------------------------- And then there's FM Choquehuanca -------------------------------- ¶12. (C) While Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca Cespedes is considered one of Morales' most prominent intellectuals after Garcia Linera and Villegas, he is more of a figurehead who represents the indigenous face of Bolivia. He appears to be mostly hot air with no real substantive advisory role in traditional foreign policy issues, except for possibly maintaining contacts with European NGOs. An overly eccentric official, who an Embassy adviser says has a sulfuric relationship with most people, Choquehuanca's curious statements about his ancestors living for over 200 years and replacing milk with coca in a school nutrition program have drawn criticisms. Morales' largely discredited arch-nemesis Felipe Quispe Huanca has been a vocal supporter of the Minister, which only adds to Choquehuanca's trivial role. Indeed, Choquehuanca appears to have been only marginally involved in Bolivia's key foreign policy issues to date. GREENLEE

Evo: The Cuban and Venezuelan conspirator

2010-12-08T08:38:00.000-04:00

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06LAPAZ886	2006-03-30 16:04	2010-12-03 21:09	SECRET	Embassy La Paz

VZCZCXRO7448 PP RUEHLMC DE RUEHLP #0886/01 0891647 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 301647Z MAR 06 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8662 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 5737 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3015 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6887 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4124 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1437 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 1377 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 3691 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4079 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 8611 RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LA PAZ 000886 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2016 TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL BL PINR SUBJECT: EVO AND HIS ADVISORY CIRCLE (PART 1 OF 3) Classified By: Amb. David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: President Morales is an astute domestic political operator but lacks confidence in his economic and international relations abilities. As a result, Morales has surrounded himself with three compartmented groups of advisers. The first are domestic political operators who implement his political vision and serve as the attack dogs for the President. The second group are Bolivian intellectuals that help shore up his decisionmaking in economics, intelligence and security, and international relations, and implement policies on the ground, including the Cuban doctors program, Venezuelan identification program, and Bolivian land reform. The third group is his Cuban and Venezuelan advisers, who seem to have growing influence with the President, trumping even his intellectual advisers. This cable is part one of three cables that looks at the President, who is in his circle of domestic advisers, and how he uses them, and their competition with the Cubans and Venezuelans for the President's confidence. End summary. -------------------------------------- Evo: The seasoned Bolivian politician -------------------------------------- ¶2. (C) Radical cocalero union leader turned President Evo Morales Ayma is a pragmatic leader whose domestic political instincts are extraordinarily acute. Morales is an expert at spinning stories in his favor, co-opting the platforms of his adversaries, dividing his opposition, and appealing to his bases. A leader with strong anti-democratic tendencies, over the years he has been known to bribe, threaten, and even physically intimidate anyone who has stood in his way, including government officials, politicians, and cocalero colleagues. He has shown great tactical flexibility and an ability to out maneuver even his most formidable political opponents to consolidate his own political power. Morales has developed a reputation for consulting advisers and social groups on domestic political issues, but is confident that he is the expert, the advisor and the final decision maker for those issues. (Comment: This is particularly true on the coca issue.) His cadre of domestic political advisers (SEPTEL), which include Senate President Santos Ramirez, lower chamber President Edmundo Novillo, his personal assistant Ivan Iporre, and Vice Minister of Government Coordination and personal attorney Hector Arce, tends to operate more as "yes men" who carry out the President's orders than as advisers with real influence on the President,s decisions. ---------------------------- Evo: The struggling student ---------------------------- ¶3. (C) While Morales excels at domestic political machinations, he is more like a struggling student in the areas of economics and international relations decisionmaking. A man who likes to be in control, Morales has shown an eagerness for learning what he needs to make his own decisions in these areas. He has sought out intellectual "experts," primarily from Bolivia,s public universities, to provide him tutoring in the areas he lacks. Morales often tunes out detailed economic discussions with foreign officials and will at times defer to his "experts" when speaking to the press, large groups, and even US officials on issues he is uncertain about. His domestic intellectual advisers (SEPTEL), who include Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera, Minister of the Presidency Juan Ramon Quintana, and Minister of Planning Carlos Villegas, are largely leftist ideologues and have tended to have more influence with the President compared to his domestic political advisers because of his difficulty grasping complex economic theories and lack of experience in the international arena. Unfortunately, some of this advice borrows from a storehouse of discredited ideas and fantasyland assumptions. ------------------------------------------ LA PAZ 00000886 002 OF 002 Evo: The Cuban and Venezuelan conspirator ------------------------------------------ ¶4. (S//NF) The third group is a pandora's box of Cuban and Venezuelan advisers, who may have growing influence with the President. While we do not know the extent of their presence, sensitive reporting indicates that Morales meets privately with his foreign advisers multiple times a week without any domestic advisers present. The same reporting also indicates that he receives both political and economic advice from the Cubans. Morales is implementing several programs initiated by the Cubans and Venezuelans in the areas of education, health, and citizen registration. Several of the President's domestic advisers are working hand in hand with the Cubans and Venezuelans, seeking to replace US markets with Venezuelan trade deals, and sensitive reporting says that they are regularly traveling to Cuba for political training. ¶5. (C) Comment: Morales has had a roller-coaster relationship with several of his key domestic advisers, especially Vice President Garcia Linera. He is highly suspicious by nature and is unlikely to tolerate advisers with their own agenda for power and recognition. Morales likely sees the Cuban and Venezuelan advisers as non-threatening to his domestic power. In addition, as an admirer of Cuban President Fidel Castro and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, Morales probably is drawn by the longevity of their time in power and seeks to emulate their "success." If Morales grows wary of his domestic advisers he is likely to rely more heavily on his foreign advisers to carry out his vision. End comment. GREENLEE

MINISTER OF PRESIDENCY ON COCA, ERADICATION, AND BILATERAL RELATIONS

2010-12-08T08:32:00.000-04:00

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06LAPAZ417	2006-02-16 23:11	2010-12-03 21:09	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy La Paz

VZCZCXRO0302 PP RUEHLMC DE RUEHLP #0417/01 0472310 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 162310Z FEB 06 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8110 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 5607 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2872 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6744 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 3968 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1316 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 1215 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 3568 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 3953 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 8470 RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LA PAZ 000417 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA A/S T.SHANNON AND PDAS C.SHAPIRO STATE FOR WHA/AND P.FRENCH AND L.PETRONI NSC FOR D.FISK USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON SNAR PINR PHUM EAID BL SUBJECT: MINISTER OF PRESIDENCY ON COCA, ERADICATION, AND BILATERAL RELATIONS REF: LA PAZ 0406 Classified By: Ambassador David Greenlee for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Minister of the Presidency Juan Ramos de la Quintana told the Ambassador February 15 that the GOB wanted USG agencies to continue their programs in the Chapare, though implementation methods may need to be modified. He acknowledged that the GOB's counternarcotics policies were still being formulated, but assured that the GOB's commitment to combat the illicit drug trade would be met and that the cocalero federations did not speak on the GOB's behalf. Quintana said the depenalization and industrialization of coca was a priority for President Evo Morales. The Minister said cocaleros would be paid to eradicate coca in the national parks while other negotiated alternatives would be pursued with the cocalero federations. On interdiction, Quintana asked for greater information sharing from the DEA on organized criminal networks. When the Ambassador raised objections about anti-U.S. rhetoric creeping into GOB statements, the Minister blamed the Bolivian press for distorting reality. Quintana was forthright, somewhat confused, and suspicious of USG programs. The new GOB may or may not be disposed ideologically to work with us; but it certainly does not yet have the internal cohesion or coherence to cooperate effectively. End Summary. --------------------------------------------- --------- FIRST MEETING WITH MINISTER OF THE PRESIDENCY QUINTANA --------------------------------------------- --------- ¶2. (C) At our request, the Ambassador, DCM, and Econ/Pol Chief met the evening of February 15 with Minister of the Presidency Juan Ramos de la Quintana to seek clarification of GOB policy regarding USG programs in the Chapare. Newspaper headlines that morning carried the cocalero federations' decision to throw out USG agencies operating in the region, a position supported by GOB spokesman Alex Contreras (see reftel). The Ambassador told Quintana that the federations' statements--Evo Morales remains their titular head--and the apparent presidential endorsement had sparked considerable confusion about the GOB's intent. The Ambassador suggested that if eradication is to be stopped and USG involvement in the Chapare ended, the new policy should be communicated officially and we could begin shutting off our multi-million dollar assistance programs now. ¶3. (C) Quintana responded that he appreciated open, frank exchanges free of entangling rhetoric and underscored the GOB's continuing need for U.S. help on the counternarcotics front. But, he added, that message is not being clearly communicated because "...we do not yet have an agreement between the GOB and all the relevant actors on this issue." At the same time, he said the cocalero federations did not speak on behalf of the GOB, which has a stronger commitment than previous administrations and wants to "...break the stigma that Bolivia protects narcotraffickers." ¶4. (C) In that vein, Quintana claimed the GOB had a sound strategy to combat the illegal drug trade: compartmentalizing the problem into "clear chapters" for greater enforcement efficiency on the one hand, and depenalizing coca for industrialization and commercialization on the other. "Depenalization is a complex but necessary task because we want coca to have commercial and industrial purposes. This is an explicit priority for the President," he said, adding that the GOB would meet next week with EU representatives to discuss the terms of the demand study required for domestic purposes. (Note: While not stated, the implication was that the EU study should include consideration of Bolivian domestic demand to include coca necessary for these yet-only-imagined industrial purposes. End Note). --------------------------------------------- - LA PAZ 00000417 002 OF 003 A NEW APPROACH TO ERADICATION AND INTERDICTION --------------------------------------------- - ¶5. (C) Quintana said the GOB would preserve the best of previous GOB policies, including eradication, but implement them differently. The first priority, he offered, is to limit additional cultivation, although he added curiously that the GOB would not strictly interpret the 3200 hectare limit for Chapare cultivation set aside by the October 2004 agreement. He assured that eradication would continue in the two problem areas of the Carrasco National Park and the Yungas de Vandiola, saying that he would travel to the region himself this weekend to meet with cocaleros, but noted that existing military eradicators would work only in the areas where they can proceed peacefully, with negotiation--an open-ended concept--the rule in more conflictive zones. ¶6. (C) Quintana saw no change in the GOB's willingness to cooperate with the USG on interdiction and noted that the DEA was welcome to stay in the Chapare. The GOB's non-political approach to interdiction was exemplified, he said, by the non-partisan appointment of a new chief for the counternarcotics police. The Minister asserted that these units had committed human rights violations in the past, a situation this GOB would not tolerate. The Ambassador retorted that any such incidents did not involve DEA agents and that we shared Quintana's concern about human rights. Quintana went on to say that he was not critical of the results obtained by interdiction efforts, but of the methods used to obtain them. "In the past, because of the weakness of Bolivian institutions, USG involvement appeared more like intervention than cooperation. We ask that your cooperation be transparent, conducted with consideration and respect." While expressing a desire to be autonomous in their interdiction operations, he acknowledged the need for the USG's offer of helicopters and other equipment "in the spirit of shared responsibility," and said the GOB had no plans to alter the DEA's role in the drug enforcement arena. ¶7. (C) When the Ambassador asked what immediate changes in the interdiction efforts were contemplated, Quintana observed that the GOB had little understanding of how criminal organizations operated in Bolivia. "All we get," he complained, "are statistics on drugs intercepted and labs destroyed, but nothing on Bolivian criminal organizations and their links to other countries. This makes us suspicious that the counter-narcotics efforts are not sufficiently explained to the GOB or the Bolivian people." He also lamented that the Bolivian anti-drug unit (FELCN) did not have an institute to study criminal organizations. The Ambassador replied that maintaining the integrity of international criminal investigations was crucial but that he would raise the issue with the DEA. ------------------- INTELLIGENCE ISSUES ------------------- ¶8. (C) The Minister noted that the GOB wanted its intelligence services to respond better to the needs of the GOB and was suspicious of their relationship with the DEA. (Note: Quintana associated intelligence cooperation only with the DEA and the counternarcotics effort. End Note.) The Minister said that he wanted "a more democratic intelligence service" in the future. The Ambassador noted USG interest in promoting intelligence cooperation on counter-terrorism issues as well, given regional threats in the Tri-Border region and elsewhere, and suggested a subsequent meeting to discuss these issues in greater depth. ----------------------------------------- MUTUAL DESIRE FOR CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT ----------------------------------------- LA PAZ 00000417 003 OF 003 ¶9. (C) The Ambassador expressed concern about anti-U.S. rhetoric creeping into GOB statements and policies and warned that gratuitous insults did not encourage strong bilateral ties. Talking about imaginary U.S. military bases in Paraguay "as you have done publicly, Mr. Minister," does little to build confidence. Noting the billions of U.S. dollars of assistance in the past few decades, including the nearly one million in disaster assistance for Bolivian flood victims, the Ambassador observed that the USG would sometimes appreciate a good word or thank you, something President Morales notably forgot to offer in his conversation with President Bush. ¶10. (C) While acknowledging that the GOB probably had no intention of ratifying an Article 98 agreement, the Ambassador asked that the GOB respect the U.S. position without intentionally mischaracterizing it and claiming that the U.S. sought to shield its soldiers from justice. The issue is one of jurisdiction, not immunity, he said, and noted that over 100 countries had signed Article 98 agreements with the U.S. --------------------------------------------- ------ ATTACKING THE PRESS AND RE-ORIENTING USG ASSISTANCE --------------------------------------------- ------ ¶11. (C) Quintana, perhaps a little disingenuously, said he shared the Ambassador's concerns about poisonous rhetoric, but blamed the press for distorting the GOB's comments about the U.S. He described the Bolivian press as unprofessional and perverse because it was too closely associated with political parties. At the same time, Quintana said the U.S. was counterproductively omnipresent in Bolivian institutions--an ironic exageration in view of reportedly increasing Venezuelan and Cuban presence--and suggested that our assistance was too dispersed to be strategically effective. He lamented the uneven economic development throughout the country, noting that Potosi remained in abject poverty while Santa Cruz was developing fast "with its radical federalist ideas," and suggested a U.S. Corps of Engineers road project uniting the country would be a smart, focussed investment. The Ambassador reminded Quintana that the GOB nixed expanded military help by attacking us on Article 98. ¶12. (C) Comment: Quintana seemed forthright, a little confused, and abidingly suspicious of USG intentions. He exposed inaccurate views about existing USG programs, a strong ideological bent on coca, and a disturbing disaffection with the media--particularly disturbing since the MAS is considering laws to limit freedom of press. His most revealing comment was that the GOB is still struggling to clarify its policies, including on counternarcotics. Whether the new GOB wants to work with us is an open question; whether it can work with us is equally perplexing. End Comment. GREENLEE

Depesches de Embajada EUA en La Paz

2010-12-08T08:15:00.002-04:00

Wikileaks.ch

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06LAPAZ417.

Reference ID - Subject - Created - Released - Classification

06LAPAZ417 MINISTER OF PRESIDENCY ON COCA, ERADICATION, AND 2006-02-16 2010-12-03 CONFIDENTIAL

06LAPAZ886 EVO AND HIS ADVISORY CIRCLE (PART 1 OF 3) 2006-03-30 2010-12-03 SECRET

06LAPAZ906 THE ROLE EVO'S "INTELLECTUALS" PLAY (PART 2 OF 3) 2006-03-31 2010-12-03 SECRET

06LAPAZ908 EVO'S POLITICAL ADVISERS (PART 3 OF 3) 2006-03-31 2010-12-03 SECRET

06LAPAZ2657 MORALES: WALKING A FINE LINE ON DRUGS 2006-10-02 2010-12-03 CONFIDENTIAL

06LAPAZ2910 VP, AMBASSADOR DISCUSS WAYS TO IMPROVE BILATERAL 2006-10-27 2010-12-03 CONFIDENTIAL

06LAPAZ3400 WILL THE REAL OPPOSITION LEADER PLEASE STAND UP? 2006-12-18 2010-12-03 SECRET//NOFORN

06LAPAZ3449 REACTIONS TO BOLIVIA'S NEW COCA STRATEGY 2006-12-21 2010-12-03 CONFIDENTIAL

07LAPAZ383 CODEL NELSON SCENESETTER 2007-02-13 2010-12-03 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

07LAPAZ597 MORALES TO TOBIAS: THANKS FOR THE ASSISTANCE 2007-03-02 2010-12-03 CONFIDENTIAL

07LAPAZ2385 DEPSEC'S UPCOMING MEETING WITH BOLIVIAN VP 2007-08-29 2010-12-03 CONFIDENTIAL

07LAPAZ2400 OPPOSITION, OTHERS DEFEND US AID 2007-08-30 2010-12-03 CONFIDENTIAL

07LAPAZ3153 VENEZUELA-BOLIVIA: HOW MUCH FIRE BEHIND THE SMOKE? 2007-11-30 2010-12-03 SECRET

08LAPAZ329 GOB RESPINS ANTI-U.S. ALLEGATIONS 2008-02-19 2010-12-03 CONFIDENTIAL

08LAPAZ1667 A/S SHANNON MEETING WITH PRESIDENT EVO MORALES 2008-08-04 2010-12-03 CONFIDENTIAL

08LAPAZ2458 BOLIVIA: BEFORE U.S. VISIT, EVO LASHES OUT 2008-11-18 2010-12-03 CONFIDENTIAL

08LAPAZ2623 BOLIVIA: MORALES MANIPULATES MEDIA OWNERS 2008-12-22 2010-12-03 CONFIDENTIAL

08LAPAZ2670 MORALES BASHES GOLDBERG PINATA ONE MORE TIME 2008-12-31 2010-12-03 CONFIDENTIAL

09LAPAZ1541 EU WEIGHS ITS COUNTER-NARCOTICS EFFORTS IN BOLIVIA 2009-11-10 2010-12-03 CONFIDENTIAL

09LAPAZ1784 BOLIVIA: COUNTER-NARCOTICS NEWS AND TRENDS 2009-12-17 2010-12-03 UNCLASSIFIED

09LAPAZ96 BOLIVIA'S REFERENDUM: MARGIN OF VICTORY MATTERS 2009-01-23 2010-11-30 CONFIDENTIAL

Llamar o insultar?

2010-09-02T16:04:00.002-04:00

Morales llama traidores a algunos de sus partidarios

El presidente Evo Morales llamó traidores a políticos oficialistas que secundaron una reciente protesta regional en contra del gobierno y aseguró que los oficialistas no deben apartarse de la línea gubernamental.

"No van a faltar los traidores, no a Evo sino al proceso de cambio, pero siempre hubo traidores porque algunos quieren quedar bien con su región, pero primero está la patria" --JEMA

Un senador y varios diputados del partido de gobierno respaldaron con una huelga de hambre 19 días de protestas que paralizaron y aislaron con cortes de ruta a la provincia sureña de Potosí por varias demandas planteadas al Ejecutivo.

La protesta finalizó el fin de semana y afectó la imagen del gobierno que dilató la negociación. Morales nunca fue a negociar a Potosí como reclamaron los líderes de la protesta.

El jueves Morales dijo que esas movilizaciones tuvieron móviles políticos con el supuesto propósito de "desgastar a su gobierno". Potosí es una de las plazas electorales más importantes del mandatario.

Nota bene:

Traición al proceso de cambio??

Típico estilo zurdo, luego atacarás y harás encerrar a cualquiera que acompañe tu nombre con indio o llama, por considerarlo desacato a la suprema autoridad.

O crees que no es insulto llamar traidor a quien no comparte tu servil condición al castrismo y chavismo?

NO es entonces el Gran Indígena el verdadero traidor a la patria?

Viva el che, chavez y fidel!!!!

Bolivia (Uncyclopedia)

2010-08-10T02:18:00.005-04:00

Fuente

Bolivian Flag

Introduction

Bolivia is a country in the middle of South America. Often called "the heart of South America", Bolivia is landlocked between Brazil, Peru, Chile, Argentina, and Paraguay. Unlike many other countries, Bolivia still has many of it's indigenous traditions and still practice many of it's customs early ancestors used to practice. Praise by many "tree huggers", Bolivia is considered one of the few "lungs" of the world, considering the fact that they have part of the rainforest, the Chapare.

Evo Morales

For those who have no idea who the president of Bolivia is, let me explain. Evo Morales is the current President of Bolivia. No, he did not even graduate high school and he is now the leader of this country. Like any normal person, one would expect a man of such great status in world politics, such as, uhhhh, a PRESIDENT to carry himself in a way of elegance and power, right? No.

Evo Morales is a man who lived in the farms of Bolivia as a young little boy and did not complete high school as a young teenager. You ask yourself, do we really want a president like that? NO. The greatest question of all is not, "Who came first? The chicken or the egg?.", but, "Why in the world is this sweater-wearing, coca-eating, thieft our president?". I'll tell you why, he buys his farm working supporters with money, "benefits", coca leaves, and lies. Out of all of the important lawyers and CEO's and doctors, HE is the president of Bolivia.

Oh, and the SWEATERS. Gosh, don't get me started on the sweaters. Evo Morales says he gets his trademark sweaters done exclusively for him. Yeah. Sure. I am sorry, but if you want people, at least one person to take you seriously, you have to dress like a professional, not as if you were about to go feed your baby goat in the family's farm. I hope he realizes that wearing sweaters, that im pretty sure my grandma could knit better, is unprofessional and that if he says he has power and prestige, he should get an appointment with Versace ASAP.

Yeah, I just went there.

Críticas de observadores 'kjaras'

2009-12-10T12:51:00.002-04:00

Fuente
El mandatario -un indígena de tendencia izquierdista- subrayó por otra parte que su gobierno

"no tiene canales privados a su servicio, como
sucedió con algunos frentes de oposición".

Un indígena?
Los tontos útiles siempre son mayoría, o sea: uno del MAS!
Indígena?
Mana! Es mestizo puro! O es Indígena Cuarterón?
Tendencia?
Si eso es tendencia... me paso al partido del MENOS!
Izquierdista?
Si quiere transformar su República Cocalera en una Cuba indígena!

El mestizo morales

2009-12-02T09:30:00.003-04:00

... afirmó este martes que con el presidente Barack Obama en la Casa Blanca Estados Unidos "cambió de color" pero "no de contenido", tras la decisión del gobierno en Washington de reconocer los resultados electorales en Honduras.

Un indígena de apellido y color inequívoco reconoce en otro mesztizo sólo el color negro?

Me parece una expresión demasiado racista de alguien que dice haber vivido 500 años de discriminación.

En tu ideología te permites todo, presidente de los masistas!

"Lamento mucho decir que con el señor Obama si algo cambió es sólo de color y no cambió de contenido ideológico y programático en Estados Unidos"

Gran Indígena, lamenta lo que quieras decir, pero a lo largo de tres años de chambonear en todo ámbito, no puedes hacer otra cosa.

Sobre todo tu manejo de la política internacional demuestra que te importa un bledo el país, tan sólo repetir lo que el castrismo repite medio siglo.Tu gobierno -excepto prometer abundancia alpina y mentir hasta que se desportille la Puerta del Sol-, no logra ni mandar matar profesionalmente, sea en Pando o en "Las Américas".

Además reconoces, de un modo vergonzoso para el resto de los que te eligieron, que recién te consideras capaz de ser mandatario de una "plurinación". Algunos de los que no te eligieron lo sabíamos.

Tres años de chambonear? En una empresa tienes a lo sumo 3 meses y si eres incapaz e ineficiente, te botan para siempre.

Espero que el pueblo que te eligió, te vote algún día para el basurero histórico de los gobernantes incapaces; al lado de tus mentores castro y chávez, que bien se han ganado su puesto allí.

Morales, si ya reconoces que manejar un país "plurinacional" (para colmo: con directivas castristas) no es como el manejo de una cooperativa de cocaleros para producir cocaína, sólo puedo añadir:

Tu percepción de tus capacidades aún no es cercana a la triste realidad de tus logros.

Qué harías sin los 3000 millones de dólares que te regaló el chavismo para fomentar tu incapacidad gobernativa?

Héroes de la revolución: la versión final

2009-09-26T15:08:00.007-04:00

Para JEMA, el Gran Indígena" y AGL (y el resto de sus esbirros, tontos e idiotas útiles), en su mundo izquierdoso de lucha por el idiota perfecto procastrismo sólo hay dos actores opuestos, nadie puede ser neutral, o eres parte del proceso o eres un gusano contrarevolucionario:

revolucionarios origin-ario-heroicos y
traidores media-lunáticos

'Bulletje en Boonestaak' [Bolita y Larguirucho] [Fil de Fer et Boule de Gomme], escrito por A.M. de Jon y dibujado por George van Raemdonck para la revista o pasquín socialista holandés "Voorwaarts" [Adelante], en 1922.

Bulletje en Boonestaak on war-heroes:

"Don't you think it's wonderful to see a hero?"

"It's terrible," Boonestaak said. "And why is that man begging? He did so many heroic feats!"

"Yes," said Kalkhoofd, "That's because the dear home country likes it when you let your arms and legs get shot off, but it lets you figure out for yourself how to crawl around the world after that!"
Sobre los héroes de guerra:
Kalkhoofd: Piensas que es admirable ver un héroe?
Boonestaak: Terrible! Y por qué están pidiendo limosna? Con tantas hazañas heroicas que hicieron!
Kalkhoofd: Sí! La querida patria gusta que te amputen a balazos brazos y piernas por defenderla. Pero después de eso, trata por tu cuenta de arrastrarte por el mundo con lo que te queda.

CV de líderes: El amo y el peón.

2009-09-02T18:14:00.015-04:00

Dos curriculums históricos:

Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías (nacido el 1954 en Sabaneta,Barinas)

En 1966 culminó la educación primaria en el Grupo Escolar Julián Pino e ingresó al bachillerato en el Liceo Daniel Florencio O'Leary de Barinas. Desde joven se volvió un aficionado al béisbol, fue monaguillo y poseía inclinaciones por la pintura, la escritura creativa y el teatro. En 1971 se graduó de Bachiller en Ciencias.

Ingresó a la Academia Militar de Venezuela del Ejército Nacional de Venezuela, donde se graduó, en 1975 en Ciencias y Artes Militares, en la especialidad de Ingeniería y el grado de subteniente.

Enlace matrimonial con Nancy Colmenares, con quien tuvo tres hijos: Rosa Virginia, María Gabriela y Hugo Rafael.

En 1982 fue ascendido a capitán. En 1986 fue ascendido a Mayor y en 1988 fue designado Ayudante del Secretario del Consejo Nacional de Seguridad y Defensa, ubicado en el Palacio de Miraflores.

En 1990 fue ascendido a teniente coronel e inició una maestría en ciencias políticas en la Universidad Simón Bolívar,estudios que no concluyó.
Chávez, junto con otros militares del MBR200, toma parte en el Golpe de Estado de febrero de 1992 contra el entonces presidente Carlos Andrés Pérez.
La intentona golpista fracasó y Chávez junto con los principales líderes de la intentona, fue encarcelado por dos años.
Esperando el juicio, allí co-escribió Cómo salir del laberinto hasta ser indultado por el presidente Rafael Caldera. Chávez fue liberado el 27 de marzo de 1994
El 6 de diciembre, Chávez obtiene con los votos lo que no pudo con las armas:
Es electo Presidente de Venezuela con el 56,5% de los votos.
Ese año Chávez contrae matrimonio con Marisabel Rodríguez, madre de su última hija, Rosinés.
Chávez ganó las elecciones con promesas de cambiar la constitución de 1961. por medio de un proceso Constituyente.
El peor alumno en el colegio, militar golpista, ex-administrador de una cantina, con ínfulas de libertador de los pueblos socialistas, autoconsiderado hijo de Bolívar, mestizo que llama negro a otro mestizo (Obama)

Presidente de República Bolivariana de Venezuela
(1999 - hasta su muerte, si el pueblo demócrata se lo permite)

Juan Evo Morales Ayma (nacido en 1959 en Orinoca, Oruro, Bolivia), de origen uru -aymara A sus seis años se fue a trabajar, junto a su padre y hermana, en la zafra de la caña de azúcar de Tucumán, Argentina.

A los 12 años salió, junto a su padre y un rebaño de llamas, en una caminata de un mes desde Oruro hasta la provincia Independencia de Cochabamba.

Comenzó a trabajar desde muy joven, e igual iba a la escuela y tuvo además tiempo para dedicarse al fútbol. Trabajando durante toda su niñez, Morales se le ingeniaba (sic!) para dedicarse a su deporte favorito, el fútbol.

Desde esta época se comienza a notar su peculiar sentido de humor y sus dotes de líder.

Para continuar sus estudios Morales viajó a la ciudad de Oruro donde trabajó de ladrillero, de panadero y de trompetero. Llegó a tocar en la Banda Real Imperial, actividad que le permitió viajar y conocer diversas realidades.
Estudió hasta el Tercero Medio. Después se marchó para cumplir el servicio militar obligatorio.Al salir del cuartel volvió a su comunidad para trabajar la tierra.

En 1980 el fenómeno El Niño acabó con más del 70 por ciento de la producción agrícola de la región y se llevó más del 50 por ciento de los animales.

"Una tarde acabamos el aporque (remover la tierra) de la papa con muchos peones, luego vino un viento por la noche y llegó la helada. Al día siguiente estaba el papal quemado, negro, con un olor feo. Mi mama lloraba todo el día, mi papa estaba con mis tíos y allí decidieron: 'aquí jamás vamos a progresar, jamás vamos a ser campesinos prósperos, hay que ir a buscar tierra al oriente boliviano'."

La familia Morales emprendió viaje al Tropico de Cochabamba para comenzar una nueva vida de colonos en un lugar llamado San Francisco.

La exactitud de la información de este artículo o sección está discutida.
En la página de discusión puedes consultar el debate al respecto.

Existen desacuerdos sobre la neutralidad en el punto de vista de la versión actual de este artículo o sección.
En la página de discusión puedes consultar el debate al respecto.

En 1981 es nombrado Secretario de Deportes de su sindicato cocalero Lauca Ñ., San Francisco.

Fue el máximo dirigente de una federación de campesinos cocaleros que se resistía a los planes gubernamentales para la erradicación del cultivo de la hoja de coca.

En 1985 fue nombrado Secretario General de su sindicato.En 1988, precisamente cuando el Gobierno conservador del MNR consiguió que el Congreso aprobara, el 19 de julio, la Ley del Régimen de la Coca y Sustancias Controladas (Ley 1.008), que contempla la reducción y sustitución graduales de las cosechas calificadas de "excedentarias", mediante la siembra de cultivos alternativos o bien el desarraigo forzoso de cocales sin derecho a indemnización, sus compañeros le eligieron secretario ejecutivo de la Federación del Trópico en un Ampliado en el Chapare.A lo largo de su trayectoria sindical Morales conoce la cárcel y el confinamiento.En 1989, al rendir homenaje a los compañeros caídos en defensa de la coca, efectivos de UMOPAR le golpearon y le arrojaron al monte, pensando que estaba muerto. [Nadie hace el trabajo correcto en este país!]
Por ser el líder del movimiento no-violento??? contra la Guerra a las Drogas???!!!, una coalición internacional de políticos y académicos de extrema izquierda en contra de la guerra antinarcóticos nominó Morales como 'Pacifista de las Drogas' para el Premio Nóbel de la Paz de 1995 y 1996El domingo 22 de enero de 2006 Morales recibió la transferencia de mando y tomó posesión del cargo de Presidente Constitucional de la República.En las elecciones de 2005 (18 de diciembre), Evo Morales obtuvo casi el 54% de los votos.Su MAStitución (Constitución del MAS) fue redactada por un comité masista en un cuartel y luego en una oficina del edificio de la Lotería NacionalSi bien no tiene estudios superiores, recibió el título de Doctor Honoris Causa!!! por la Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo en República Dominicana, por la Universidad de Panamá y por la Universidad Nacional de La Plata en Argentina. Hmmm???
Padre soltero de tres hijos en tres mujeres distintas
Se le conoce como el "Cholerillo furtivo con paternidad irresponsable"
Mestizo que se considera de raza originaria, ex-conscripto, trompetista de banda militar y folklórica (aprendió al oído, no necesita leer música)
Secretario de Deportes del Sindicato de Lauca Ñ.
Secretario Ejecutivo de la Federación de Trabajadores Campesinos del Trópico de Cochabamba, Diputado Nacional, activista bloqueador de carreteras troncales y dirigente sindical cocalero, hoy

Presidente de la República Bolivariana Cocalera de Bolivia

(2006 - hasta su muerte, si el pueblo enajenado [castrista-chavista] se lo exige)

Los hermanos iraníes del evismo

2009-08-24T01:40:00.002-04:00

Fuente
Ahmad Vahidi, designado el miércoles por Ahmadineyad como Ministro de Defensa, aparece en una lista de buscados de la Interpol por el bombardeo de un centro judío en Argentina, en el que murieron 85 personas y 300 resultaron heridas.

El atentado se produjo en 1994 contra Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) en Buenos Aires, y dejó 85 muertos y 300 heridos, el peor atentado contra un objetivo judío desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Ahmad Vahidi lideraba entonces la unidad de la Guardia revolucionaria iraní, y está acusado de "ser un autor clave en el planeamiento y en la decisión de seguir adelante con el ataque".

Su nombramiento como ministro de Defensa iraní ha provocado la indignación de Argentina, cuya cancillería ha emitido un comunicado calificando la designación como "una afrenta a la justicia y a las víctimas" del atentado terrorista. "Su nominación merece la más enérgica condena del Gobierno de nuestro país", indicó la nota oficial.

Remarcó que Vahidi está reclamado por la justicia argentina por haber tenido y que "sobre él pesa una orden de captura internacional" de Interpol.

Por tal motivo, el Gobierno argentino instó a Irán "a cooperar de manera plena con la justicia" del país suramericano, "permitiendo que las personas que han sido acusadas de participar del atentado contra la AMIA sean juzgadas por los tribunales competentes".

El repudio del Gobierno argentino se suma al rechazo de la comunidad judía de Argentina. La Delegación de Asociaciones Israelitas Argentinas (DAIA) sostuvo que la decisión del presidente iraní, Mahmud Ahmadineyad, "quien niega sistemáticamente el Holocausto judío y llama a la destrucción de Israel, constituye un incalificable agravio a las víctimas de la masacre, a la comunidad judía, a Argentina y a su sistema judicial".

En declaraciones a la Agencia Judía de Noticias, con sede en Buenos Aires, el presidente de la AMIA, Guillermo Borger, consideró "vergonzosa e insultante" la designación de Vahidi, mientras que el fiscal de la causa, Alberto Nisman, la calificó de "sumamente grave".
...

DM Barak on appointment of Vahidi as Iranian defense minister

20 Aug 2009
Ahmad Vahidi is wanted by Interpol for his involvement in the bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires 15 years ago.

Ahmad Vahidi - Wanted by Interpol

(Communicated by the Defense Minister's Media Adviser)

Defense Minister Ehud Barak said that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's decision to appoint Ahmad Vahidi, wanted by Interpol for his involvement in the bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires 15 years ago, as his country's defense minister proves yet again the nature of the regime in Iran, and its leaders' intentions. The world must learn from this incident, and examine the intentions of the Iranian government, especially its leader, which has appointment a terrorist as its defense minister.

Ahmad Vahidi

la Ora-toria izquierdosa

2008-11-14T03:32:00.003-04:00

JEMA muestra en sus discursillos la duración y estilo característicos de los charlatanes revolucionarios.
Debería haber ya una página web con todos sus discursos y arengas, tal como se ha hecho con los discursos del coma-andante fidel.
Se planea crear unos espacios de erudición para la humanidad:
"Reflexiones de Evo" (ultra left Ghostwriters)
"La Pachamama y el Líder" (JEMA)
"Arengas por la democracia desde el indigenismo totalitario" (AGL)
"La sacra coquita" (Los discursos de Capinota)
"Bye, USAID!" (Prehistoria de la dignidad de los cocaleros)

"Patrimonio de la humanidad"

2008-11-14T03:00:00.003-04:00

Orinoca, Isallavi, Oruro,
República Cocalera Bolivariana de Bolivia (RCBB)
Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Bolivarianas (UdRSB)
Eje del Bien
Paraíso socialista

Planeta rojo

Sistema solar izquierdoso

"Gran Patrimonio de Cocalandia: la casa del prócer, caudillo, pensador y estadista 100% indígena"
Nota bene: Reconstrucción heroica de cómo puede protegerse el pueblo de balas de guerra (cerrar las ventanas de vidrio blindado es la protección principal sugerida en esta obra de arte proevismo) Febrero negro (4:00)

La patria entre MAS mierda

2008-11-11T13:39:00.002-04:00

Fuente
Muestra de un presunto delito de "ultraje a los símbolos patrios"

"La libertad de expresión es el derecho a
~~decir~~ escribir lo que otros no ~~quieren~~ ~~oir~~ van a leer" ---George Orwell y manechi afónico

Yo
me seco el orín en la bandera
tan indígena y originaria como inventada
de mi país mestizo,
ese trapo
~~sobre~~ ante el que se ~~acuestan~~ degüellan
los perros
y que nada representa,
salvo ~~tres~~ colores en cuadros
y un ~~águila~~ anulación de libertades
que me producen
un vómito anti~~nacional~~MASocialista
o tal vez por un ~~verso~~ discurso
~~lopezvelardiano~~ ayma-linaresco
de cuya ~~influencia~~ ideología estoy lejos,
yo, natural de esta tierra autonomista
me limpio el culo
con la bandera del MAS
y los invito a hacer lo mismo:
verán a la patria comunistaria
entre la mierda
de un ~~poeta.~~ pueblo libre.

Sergio Witz
Adaptación del original con ~~tachados~~ y aditamentos por manechi afónico (traidor según la nueva MAStitución)

Evo, is enough!

2008-09-13T16:29:00.001-04:00

Eladia Blázquez Lyrics

Evo Go Home
Yo no entiendo MAS lo que pasa aquí,
el pueblo está perdiendo la razón,
en ninguna parte ya me dejan aterrizar,
todo el mundo autonomista dice: evo go home,
venezolanos a casa, cubanos a casa...

No sé por qué creen que tengo mala fe,
con lo guapo y lo simpático que soy,
yo sólo pretendo ser caudillo eterno,
traigo coca, cheques y promesas, si no: gases!
evo go home, evo go home...

Dicen que me vuelva a donde yo nací,
que me quede para siempre en Isallavi,
pero a mi me gusta mucho más el palacio paceño,
porque allí cerquita está mi kato
y mi latifundio chapareño,
evo go home, evo go home...

"Yankee Go Home" Ringtone

La visita de JEMA a su abuelo

2008-08-04T00:36:00.001-04:00

Los tres reyes malos

2008-08-02T04:20:00.001-04:00

El dictadorzuelo y su originario

2008-06-23T18:02:00.001-04:00

JEMA en stupidedia.org (esbozo)

2008-06-13T20:31:00.004-04:00

La Mani-fiesta comunista vista por JEMA como invitado especial junto a Ortega, Chávez y Correa, quienes no quisieron posar para el cartel, porque llegaron tarde para el retroceso de la historia y el desarrollo...

Bases de la ideología Indigenista del MAS:
Socialismo
Los socialistas no poseen (generalmente) nada (mientras dicen serlo). Pero de eso, todos los socialistas poseen exactamente lo mismo.
Es MAS, JEMA no quiere que el pueblo viva mejor, sólo bien. Por lo tanto implementará como mejora importante a su ideología el comunismo indigenista. O en su mejor opción: el comuniStarismo o socialismo aymaroquechua.
En el comunismo todos los indígenas (aymaras y quechuas) son iguales y recibirán igual de(l) MAS o menos de lo mismo.
Naturalmente hay, como en todo el universo, algunos hombres que son MAS iguales que los otros, por lo que deben ser tratados BIEN (no MEJOR) y por eso recibirán igual de MAS que los otros, a veces MAS que todos los otros juntos.

Claro que este asunto no siempre les parecerá y les será equitativo a esos que que no son tan iguales como los MAS iguales. Por lo que siempre estos DESiguales siempre están envidiosos del indígena puro y (de puro llevar la contra) quieren destruir el proyecto de la constitución del MAS (MAStitución)
Los otros son los mestizos y extranjeros o descendientes de oligarcas de países capitalistas. Viven generalmente en el chaco, llanos y selvas que le pertenecen por derecho a los pueblos de los Andes
Socialistas (del MAS) bloquean (y atacan) generalmente en grupos de base y se reconocen por sus consignas antiimperialistas y antioligarquistas, sobre todo por los cachetes llenos de hoja, el machete y el mauser (correcto: AK-103 venezolanos) bajo sus ponchos rojos.
La forma más común de los movimientos sociales del MAS: ComuniStarios con paga del gobierno del MAS por cercar ciudades autonomistas y evitar que desintegren el país
Su ideología enemiga ancestral:
El Capitalismo Salvaje (algo mucho peor que el Capitalismo Civilizado) y sobre todo, la de los capitalistas y los oligarcas de la Media Luna
Su lema, callado durante 500 años, dicho finalmente el 2008 en el Palacio Ahumado:

"El capitalismo es la explotación del indígena por el hombre."
[En el socialismo (del MAS) es al revés!]

JEMA sobre la democracia:

"Democracia? Dónde queda la igualdad y la dignidad de mi pueblo?
Nosotros, los cocaleros queremos socialismo" [comunistoide]!

Sobre la guerra:

El pueblo MASista quiere la paz entre hermanos allegados,
por lo tanto debemos hacerle la guerra al resto del país!

Su lema, basado en otro de Carlitos M. ("Opio es la religión del pueblo"):

Coca es la religión del pueblo! Plántala [en el trópico] y consúmela!

[Aclaración: JEMA, el presidente de los MASistas, está tramitando acuerdos binacionales de seguridad e independencia alimentaria con el "pueblo hermano" de Irán, para intercambio de coca-ina por amapola-opio]
Sus modelos históricos:
Karlchen Marx (Carlitos M.), el yesca que empezó este embrollo
Friedchen Engels (Angelito Friedrich), el otro

lenin, el genio comunista que lo sabía todo en la Rusia post-zarista

pepe stalin, el que trató con mano de acero (correcto: hambre hasta la muerte) a
64 Millones de no-bolcheviques

honni, el germano de la "república democrática", muerto en la opulencia chilena

fidel castro, el del paraíso de la superdemocracia, ladrón dueño de un archipiélago
con tan sólo un poco más de unos 1000 Millones de dólares como fortuna personal.

h. rafael chavez, el del paraíso socialista del siglo actual [todavía no es historia, pero aquí hay una comparación!]

Similitudes con su enemigo simbólico: adolfin hitler, fuera de cambas y otros oligarcas desestabilizadores del gobierno incorruptible del MAS.

[Entiéndase como Incorruptible aquel indígena que no puede MAS corromperse, pues ha llegado al máximo nivel socialista-comunistoide]

Su autobiografía oficial, escrita por cualquiera de los que lo acompaña en sus paseos por el mundo (a costa de gastos del pueblo que lo eligió y del que no lo hizo) en avión y helicóptero prestados (título en relación a la obra de adolfin: Mi lucha):
Mi Coqueluche (Meine Höhenkrankheit), oda a la hoja milenaria (Eritroxylum coca) y a la generación milenaria comunistARIA de los indígenas Morales, basada en Mein Krampf (Mi calambre) de Adolfín.
Su grito socialista, a pesar de los cachetes rechonchos de coca premascada, difícil de entender pero con este significado:

Proletarios de todo el mundo, aculliquen!
[Proletarier aller Länder, kaut Cocablätter!]

No olvidar que eso obligaría a ampliar los katos de siembra para alimento de la hoja sagrada. Si hoy apenas una sexta parte se consume en acullico, hay 5 sextas partes de la producción que pueden exportarse. Mejor si en polvo y pura!
Que le añadan a su nombre ancestral el sufijo -ína, es una falacia a las costumbres y perversa alienacion nominal del capitalismo!

Delivery Status Notification:

2008-05-15T22:19:00.004-04:00

Permanent Failure (falla permanente al entregar mensaje)
Un amigo zurdo (en realidad es ambidextro) me cuenta que entre la cúpula de los +istas hay varios de los activistas que fueron a "debatir sobre política", "geopolítica", "conciencia social", "uso adecuado del plomo con respeto de la ecología" y otras "buenas cosas socialistas" a algún campamento de las FART en la frontera venezolana y ecuatoriana con Colombia están un poco ocupados borrando sus mensajes de correo y sus casillas de correo que los delate como contactados con Marulanda y Cía.
Manechi afónico les saluda y les desea suerte.
Ama ...
JEMA, AGL y demás acullicadores, no se cambien de pseudónimo electrónico!

Lean esto

Los hermanos Marx

2008-04-14T07:05:00.001-04:00

A un gran presidente indígena le pidieron su opinión sobre el rol histórico de Groucho Marx, durante una convención del cine Socialista-del-Siglo-Veintiuno en Hollywood.
Éste, chorreando sobre la alfombra roja del cuadragésimo piso el whisky que le correpondía a la pachamama, entornó los ojos, entregó el vaso semivacío a su asistente cubano, escupió al lado de la mancha de whisky las bolas de hoja sagrada que mantenía en sus cachetes para hablar claramente ante las cámaras, se puso la zurda al pecho y levantando empuñada la otra mano (o al revés!?) respondió con un estilo de muy leido en (o mejor referido: muy "cuenteado" sobre) ideologías izquierdistas, con un dejo de recuerdos fílmicos, típico de todo líder zurdo, que todo lo sabe en su extensión más allá del materialismo histórico-sintáxico-sintético:

"Aunque no quiero abusar de la dialéctica científica para dar una digna respuesta presidencial, pues tengo programado mañana temprano en el Chapare un partido de fútbol y la inauguración de una fábrica de cocaín... ehh, perdón: de coca excedentaria..., me limitaré a los detalles MAS-importantes:
Grandes épocas las de la revolución rusa! Incluso hay un filme Revolución Interplanetaria sobre cómo un valiente camarada llevó los ideales revolucionarios a Marte. Todo está documentado, por si no me creen...
El camarada Groucho fue uno de los hermanos Marx que ayudó a Engels y Trotzky a redactar el "Manifiesto Cumunista" en Hollywood; donde en esa época hicieron un exitoso documental en technicolor, que aún no he podido ver. El camarada chávez me ha prometido una copia en blanco y rojo rojito.
El Manifiesto fue aplicado en Rusia, pero por la injerencia del capitalismo no tuvo resultado a pesar de los "esfuerzos inhumanos" de sus líderes.
El camarada lenin del que admiro su grandeza: "Dennos al niño por 8 años y haremos de él un bolchevique para siempre" (introduciremos esa técnica en el próximo curriculum escolar para crear eternos masistas!)
El gran visionario stalin, del que debemos tomar sus tácticas para las futuras purgas en la oligarquía camba y chapaca.
Cómo olvidar en 1957 al gran premier ruso krushchev al lado del inigualable mao tse tung en la conmemoración de los 40 años de la gloriosa revolución de octubre. Fue una carrera armamentista nuclear y espacial inolvidable Tomemos ejemplo de quien le dió apoyo incondicional al camarada fidel con armas y rublos!
El gran estadista brezhnev y su hija . No olvido el desfile de la armada roja de 1968 y en todo su esplendor el 1974 y digno de nombrar el de 1984. Qué precisión y belleza las banderas rojas con la efigie de lenin...y los hermosos misiles.
Cuentan por ahí que los últimos cuatro líderes soviéticos (stalin, krushchev, brezhnev and gorbachev) estaban en el mismo tren y el tren se paró. En mi gestión el tren no se parará, pues tenemos locomotoras con las calderas a gas. Y eso nos sobra...

Desearía organizar un desfile así en Valle Grande para conmemorar los 50 años del asesinato del che por la derecha boliviana. Yo, al lado de la Wiphala, con el puño en alto cantando la internacional y comandante che guevara! A mis pies pasan los tanques y misiles chinos y mis huestes con AK-103 venezolanos. Arriba sobrevuelan los helicópteros desplegando wiphalas enormes. Y los caza rusos haciendo piruetas. Ahh... la gloria es una sola...! Lástima que no me dejarán, pero veremos qué puedo hacer para cambiar el destino de mi República Cocalera de Bolivia....!!

El camararada ceuacescu tampoco tuvo éxito porque su ejército no lo protegió de los anticomunistas y en el escape una "pequeñísima turba de oligarcas descontentos" lo asesinó.
El gran ulbricht (el perfecto aparatchik)poco antes de comenzar a construir la muralla de Berlin refirió en un modo estratégico, tal como la ideología socialista nos obliga a proceder, algo que siempre gusto contar como anécdota real:
"Nadie tiene la intención de construir un muro!"
Tan bonita que le quedó la muralla de protección antifascista...
El camarada honecker de la gran "república democrática alemana" tuvo que ceder a la propaganda imperialista de la República Federal Alemana, a pesar de sus grandes logros revolucionarios en la democracia, en la guerra electrónica contra el capitalismo, en el adoctrinamiento perfecto ("el futuro le pertenece al socialismo"), en el rendimiento de los deportistas, en las viviendas socialistas revestidas de asbesto de la mejor calidad y sobre todo en el apoyo incondicional a Cuba socialista para el control adecuado de la ciudadanía y los elementos desestabilizadores del enemigo interno. Pronto visitaré en Chile la tumba de ese gran hombre incomprendido por sus compatriotas consumistas!
El único que siempre logró mantenerse querido por sus correligionarios fue el camarada abuelito fidel, que pachamama lo tenga en su seno, quien pocos años después de llegar al poder eliminó los gusanos más molestos e hizo de Cuba una isla de la felicidad y del sexo de bajo costo, un paraiso marxista-leninista frente a las costas del decadente imperio capitalista de EUA, que con su bloqueo total es el único responsable de la libertad de los cubanos, pues algunos tienen que "morir nadando para salir de la isla".
Los cubanos siempre salvan vidas, consideren lo que cuestan sus hospitales y sus servicios, todo regalado por el comandante para nuestros pobres.
El camarada hugo también está implementando con éxito en Venezuela el Socialismo-del-Siglo-Veintiuno, pese a todos los ataques de Bush, la CIA y el FBI.
El me ha asegurado que a todos los venezolanos les va muy bien, pese a las falacias del terrorismo mediático, del CIDH y Globovisión.
No olvidemos a los descontentos que dicen tener hambre, que no tienen ni leche, ni carne, ni café, ni azúcar, ni harina para las arepas, ni garrafas de gas, ni gasolina, ni techo ni agua potable, ni tranquilidad de vivir por las muertes por asaltos y secuestros. Puro mentiras del imperialismo! Por eso ha creado sus batallones presidenciales, para librar
personalmente batalla contra el enemigo interno. Una idea que debo
copiar lo más pronto posible.
Cómo les va a ir mal con los altos costos del crudo. Si nos ha regalado flotas de vehículos, armas y varias chequeras con petrodólares para comprar, perdón: fomentar y apoyar a alcaldes necesitados. Este MicoMandante es una flor de pariente ideológico!

(Algo que no pienso cometer como error al expresarme, pero ya me entienden...)
Bueno, basta por hoy... necesito un poco de whisky y un acullico. El avión de hugo rafael me espera para llevarme de vuelta a casa. De ahí un viajecito en uno de los helicópteros Super Puma que me regalaron 'los venezolanos'.

"Viva el camarada Groucho Marx!"
"Patria, Socialismo o Muerte! Venceremos!"

La idea vale!

2008-04-12T03:05:00.001-04:00

Basta de estos careculo MASistas!

Test originario o...

2008-04-01T04:57:00.002-04:00

... Juan Evo Morales Ayma, JEMA, el EVO, ese: el Gran Indígena, el Acullicador Máximo.
Nadie impresionante, a no ser que ande al lado de chávez o los castro, quienes le dan el reconocimiento que necesita, lo pasean en sus aviones, le apoyan en lo ideológico y le enseñan que esa ideología cavernaria puede ser parte de los preceptos incaicos de los tres Ama... (NO seas... )
El empleado público destinado a administrar por un mandato nuestro país, que los bolivianos masistas y otros tontos eligieron. Tenemos justamente al que gran parte del pueblo se merece.
Este Test (gracias ThreeOneSeven por la idea!) fue adaptado a la realidad boliviana por un manechi, afónico por gritar y avisar que ese "movimiento" no nos traería nada provechoso.
Este test fue desarrollado para determinar cuán grande es tu rechazo al macaco menor en el Palacio Ahumao.
Se asume que quien obtiene el mejor puntaje no puede ni oler la coca (peor la presidencial). El que no pasa el test es generalmente alguien que cree que autoritario tiene que ver con vehículos comunarios o no sabe la diferencia real entre "vivir bien" y "vivir mejor" (sic: JEMA)
Si al mayor representante de los masistas lo ves como tonto de la diplomacia mundial en poncho o chompa, jugando a fiel empleado consigue-coca del macaco mayor como ocurrió en una Cumbre de la "AURORA", no dejes de probarte en este test con autovaloración.

1. Primeramente y sobre todo, al responder las preguntas, seguirás el precepto Ama llulla (No seas mentiroso) o sigues una estrategia como la de JEMA?

Sí
No
Depende,a veces el primero, a veces la segunda
Sí, cuando eso signifique un No
Sólo los mentirosos son honrados
Nos han mentido 500 años, ahora nos toca a nosotros!

2. Por quién diablos te consideras realmente?

Soci
Unzaguista
Conser
Autonomista
Oligarquista
Depende de las ventajas que me ofrezcan
Abierto para toda política que pague bien
+ista, pues toda mi familia consiguió trabajo en la administración pública!

3. Cómo es tu nombre o el de tus hijos o tus futuros nietos?

evo
Ivan
fidel
hugo rafael
Illich
Me dicen che

4. Cómo describirías a nuestro estimado tirano – oops, eeh...., me refiero al presidente que ejerce su régimen en Bolivia?

Mestizo mentiroso
Zurdo cocainómano, idiota útil de los totalitarios
Ahíto de poder y borracho de ideologías, vomita lo que ya sabemos
Un gran estratega diplomático y un estadista culto

5. Cuánto lo odias?

Como él a George W. Bush
Como a un perrito altiplánico degollao
Como a los que mataron al Gran Pensador Revolucionario Guevara delaSarna
Como a todo el que te destruye tu futuro

6. Qué piensas de la forma como se creó la MAStitución?

Me recordó a las matanzas por el agua
todo MASipulado, sin duda alguna
Todo fue friamente calculado, no se puede perder un año de sueldos para asambleístas incapaces

7. Encuentras a JEMa en algún callejón de Santa Cruz, sin sus acólitos masistas, cubanos y venezolanos. Qué haces?

Le pides un autógrafo sobre el quipu que siempre llevas contigo
Lo ignoras, otro collita más que la historia olvidará
Le dices sólo lo que piensas... maldita democracia!
Le gritas: colla resentido! Escupes para la pachamama y lo dejas a merced del resto de la turba
Le das un par de coscorrones para que aprenda a no meterse con la economía y la paz del país
Le rompes la jeta para que aprenda que quien mucho miente, mal acaba. Pides un colepeji...
Le pides coca, pues sabes que aún es presidente de los cocaleros
Le cuentas de tu negocio de parcelas de 5000 ha

8. Qué piensas sobre sus mentores: fidel y hugo rafael

La peor lacra de la historia latinoamericana, no hay peores!
Esos empezaron esta mierda en la que nos están metiendo
Los líderes de la democracia! Patria, socialismo o muerte!
Que no se metan con mi futuro

9. A quién elegirías para convivir en el destierro?

morales
hitler
garcía l.
Alguna magnífica poco usada
guevara de lasarna
Eva Longoria

10. Matarías al mono de JEMA?

Sí
No, aunque lo permitan las leyes
Sí, en representación de su amo
Ese tonto títere tiene un macaco?

11. Tu color favorito?

Verde jumbacá fresco y seco en franjas
Rojo rojito
Los colores "wiphala"
Odio el rojo como los de Miura

12. Viste el filme Evo cocalero?

Sí, claro, adoctrinamiento de las bases
NO, prefiero ver una porno
El filme no lo presenta en toda su grandeza
Ese tipo de filmes deberá ser prohibido por una nueva constitución

13. Cuándo es el cumpleaños de JEMA?

El día de la revolución
El 24 de diciembre
Día de festividad nacional
El 24 de septiembre

14. Cóno te sientes cuando ves a JEMA ante cámaras en una entrevista o encuentro internacional

Listo a reirme a carcajadas
Como un desgraciado impotente
Cambio el canal
Le disparo al momento una carga de perdigones a mi décimo televisor

15. Qué piensas del estilo oratorio de JEMA?

Directo, ameno, simple, único
Oratoria? Te burlas de mí?
Oratorio? Nunca lo ví en la iglesia
Tan inaguantable como el de fidel y hugo rafael
Hablará tan mal en quechua como en español?

16. Cónmo consideras la situación entre el gobierno masista y el resto del país?

Me dan ganas de gritar: Autonomía!
No puedo consumir tanto como quisiera vomitar
Eso se llama situación?

17. morales ayma es un títere...:-)

Sí, lo es!!
Y el titeretero es garcía linera o... hugo rafael I?
Pensé que él era una marioneta en la mano izquierda de fidel castro
Quí sera un tétere? Mana entendiquichu

18. Crees que patriotismo y odio al imperio tiene algo que ver con JEMA?

Sí pero como patriota me iría de buena gana a vivir a EUA
No
Doble NO
Sí, pues el dijo que el imperio nos ha azotado con La Niña

19. Consideras importante que se enseñe el alemán y el ruso hasta en las escuelas más recónditas de grupos indígenas en lugar del español? Idiomas necesarios para que se entienda perfectamente el Marxismo-Leninismo de nuestro régimen.

Marxismo o MASismo?
Si uno que llegó a presidente no ha logrado hasta ahora aprender español , cómo lo hará el resto con el ruso? Tovarich!
Proletarier, seid nicht zu blauäugig!
Mientras no sean profesores cubanos o venezolanos...
Mejor que aprendan el persa, el idioma del gran pueblo hermano.

20. Qué piensa de los dos empleados estatales más importantes que tenemos pagando para que manejen el país?

Manejen es el término adecuado: cada uno a su modo!
Manejan el barco estatal girando todo el timón a la izquierda.
Y para colmo encima les estamos pagando todo!
morales y garcía L. son maricas. Y maricas no pueden ni deben gobernar.

Post weblog scriptum:
Por cada frase que podría salir de tu boca, un punto!
Si tienes alta puntuación, puedes mandarme tus resultados, comentados, lógico!

Liquidar o morir!

2008-03-18T20:47:00.001-04:00

Ante la pregunta a rajatabla, sin asesores castristas, senderistas o chavistas en las cercanías:

Si tuviera que matar (mandar matar, más elegante) a 5000 cambas autonomistas para evitar que mueran en sus manos unos 50000 ponchos rojos cuando invadan Cambalandia, lo haría??
JEMA respondría sin dudar un segundo, tal como éste político:

Asumo que García L. respondría:

"Depende de La Constitución que tengamos. Con la nuestra no hay cómo dudar cuál sería la respuesta!"

JEMA y un camba indígena originario

2008-03-07T18:43:00.001-04:00

Un diálogo entre acullicos: JEMA con un indígena de tierras bajas

la vestimenta presidencial

2008-01-18T13:46:00.000-04:00

Lean para entender las caricaturas de un mexicano.
la chompa diseño presidencial
Además el suéter de Evo Morales

EVISMO o CRETINISMO?

Seguridad Alimentaria Marx-MASista

Peripecias griegas del fin del año 2005

MacMorales's Plurinational Index

Pequeñeces de un hombre de estado

La estatura del jefazo

BOLIVIA: COUNTER-NARCOTICS NEWS AND TRENDS

EU WEIGHS ITS COUNTER-NARCOTICS EFFORTS IN BOLIVIA

BOLIVIA'S REFERENDUM: MARGIN OF VICTORY MATTERS

MORALES BASHES GOLDBERG PINATA ONE MORE TIME

MORALES MANIPULATES MEDIA OWNERS

BOLIVIA: BEFORE U.S. VISIT, EVO LASHES OUT

SHANNON MEETING WITH PRESIDENT EVO MORALES

GOB RESPINS ANTI-U.S. ALLEGATIONS

GOB RESPINS ANTI-U.S. ALLEGATIONS

VENEZUELA-BOLIVIA: HOW MUCH FIRE BEHIND THE SMOKE?

OPPOSITION, OTHERS DEFEND US AID

DEPSEC'S UPCOMING MEETING WITH BOLIVIAN VP

MORALES TO TOBIAS: THANKS FOR THE ASSISTANCE

BOLIVIA: BACKGROUND NOTES

REACTIONS TO BOLIVIA'S NEW COCA STRATEGY

WILL THE REAL OPPOSITION LEADER PLEASE STAND UP?

AMBASSADOR DISCUSS WAYS TO IMPROVE BILATERAL TIES

MORALES: WALKING A FINE LINE ON DRUGS

EVO'S POLITICAL ADVISERS

THE ROLE EVO'S "INTELLECTUALS" PLAY

Evo: The Cuban and Venezuelan conspirator

MINISTER OF PRESIDENCY ON COCA, ERADICATION, AND BILATERAL RELATIONS

Depesches de Embajada EUA en La Paz

Llamar o insultar?

Morales llama traidores a algunos de sus partidarios

Bolivia (Uncyclopedia)

Contents

Introduction

Evo Morales

Críticas de observadores 'kjaras'

El mestizo morales

Héroes de la revolución: la versión final

CV de líderes: El amo y el peón.

Los hermanos iraníes del evismo

DM Barak on appointment of Vahidi as Iranian defense minister

la Ora-toria izquierdosa

"Patrimonio de la humanidad"

La patria entre MAS mierda

Evo, is enough!

La visita de JEMA a su abuelo

Los tres reyes malos

El dictadorzuelo y su originario

JEMA en stupidedia.org (esbozo)

Delivery Status Notification:

Los hermanos Marx

La idea vale!

Test originario o...

Liquidar o morir!

JEMA y un camba indígena originario

la vestimenta presidencial